Understanding the human behavioural factors behind online learners’ susceptibility to phishing attacks by Shargawi, Ayman
  
Understanding the Human Behavioural Factors behind Online 
Learners’ Susceptibility to Phishing Attacks  
 




This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree  




Department of Educational Research, 
Lancaster University, UK. 
 
 
Understanding the Human Behavioural Factors behind Online 
Learners’ Susceptibility to Phishing Attacks  
 

















This thesis results entirely from my own work and has not been offered previously for 
any other degree or diploma.   










Phishing is an act of fraudulence to lure victims to respond to an illegitimate request 
for the sake of a financial or informational gain (Huang, Qian, and Wang, 2012).  
Phishing can jeopardize the security of online learning (e-Learning) systems.  Phishing 
cannot be prevented by depending on technical controls alone (Proctor, Schultz and Vu, 
2009).  Effective Information Security Awareness is key to protecting against Phishing 
(Chen, Shaw and Yang, 2006).   However, most information security awareness 
programs overlook human behavioural factors as a root cause of exploitation in 
Phishing (Proctor et al 2009, Anttila et al 2007). 
 
This research aims to better understand the human behavioural factors behind online 
learners’ susceptibility to Phishing attacks (Luo et al, 2013).  Thus, literature review 
was conducted to identify and analyse the human behavioural factors exploited in 
Phishing attacks with relation to the online learners’ awareness needs.  A conceptual 
framework called ‘Security Awareness Model for Phishing’ (SAMFP) has been 
developed based on the integration of Endsley’s Situation Awareness model (Endsley, 
2015), the awareness delivery guidelines by Chen, Shaw and Yang (2006) and Poepjes’ 
(2012) Information Security Awareness and Capability Model (ISACM).  SAMFP aims 
to improve information security awareness for online learners.  Hence, data was 
gathered from 100 participants, experienced in learning online, who completed 5 
activities: a pre-awareness (1st) assessment test, participating in the 1st awareness 
session and group discussions, an assessment (2nd) test, participating in the 2nd 
awareness session and group discussions and finally a post-awareness (3rd) assessment 
test.  Data was analysed quantitatively with 18 hypotheses to validate the effectiveness 
of the SAMFP model.  Following a design based research approach, the researcher was 
heavily engaged in the design, development and testing of the SAMFP model which 
included development of training materials, tutoring and assessment of learning 
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Chapter 1 Introduction and Background 
 
Thanks to the Internet and the evolution of web technologies with features such as 
collaboration, knowledge sharing, user-content generation, collective intelligence, 
creativity and innovation (Zuev, 2012), E-Learning systems such as Moodle and 
Blackboard have become an essential part of the modern society (Rjaibi, Rabai, Aissa, 
and Louadi, 2012).  Public and private universities and institutions (Rjaibi et al, 2012; 
Alecu, Pocatilu and Capisizu, 2010) have adopted e-Learning systems as a credible 
means of education and training to share and distribute information electronically (Chen 
and He, 2013).  Even in the business world, the need for online learning is on the rise 
(Chen and He, 2013). 
 
The Internet has revolutionized the way people learn as it has brought great flexibility 
in terms of time and space into online learning.  As such, public and private universities 
and institutions (Rjaibi et al, 2012; Alecu, Pocatilu and Capisizu, 2010) have adopted 
online learning as a credible means of education (Chen and He, 2013). Yet, it has 
introduced potential Information security risks due to its openness (Vasilescu, Tatar and 
Codreanu, 2011), diverse technologies and interconnectedness.   One of the major 
information security risks introduced to Online Learning is Phishing.  Phishing is a type 
of identity theft and an act of fraudulence to lure unsuspecting victims to believe that 
an illegitimate website or a link is legitimate for the sake of a financial or informational 
gain (Huang, Qian, and Wang, 2012; Zhang, Hong and Cranor, 2007).  Phishing uses 
Social Engineering which involves fraudulent manipulation techniques to trick people 
into revealing sensitive information by posing as a trustworthy entity to them (Steyn, 




E-Learning Systems’ stakeholders such as designers, developers, tutors, students, 
administrators and managers should be aware of such risks in order to play their role 
effectively in protecting the Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (McCumber, 
1991; Vasilescu, Tatar and Codreanu, 2011) of E-Learning systems.  The diversity of 
technologies used coupled with the dependency on the Internet which is relatively 
insecure for communication (Barik Karforma, 2012; Costinela-Luninita and Nicoleta-
Magdalena, 2012; Luminita, 2011; Rjaibi et al, 2012) have introduced a lot of 
vulnerabilities into E-Learning systems.  These vulnerabilities need thoughtful adoption 
of appropriate security controls to mitigate their exploitation (Vasilescu, Tatar and 
Codreanu, 2011; Zuev, 2012).  However, a major security control may be overlooked, 
that is users' security awareness. 
 
A major Information Security Preventive control may have been overlooked, that is 
Online Students’ and online tutors’ awareness about Phishing and how Phishing attacks 
are schemed to target its victims.  In the literature, most attention has been given to the 
risks of Phishing that could threaten the security of information, whereas little attention 
has been given to the issues of lack of awareness in research and practice (Vasilescu, 
Tatar and Codreanu, 2011; Aljawarneh, 2011; Yong, 2007) or to the reasons why 
victims fall for Phishing attacks.  In other words, Online Students’ and online tutors’ 
lack of awareness about the behavioural factors, that are used as incentives to lure 
victims into Phishing traps such as: temptation (Jagatic, Johnson, Jakobsson, and 
Menczer, 2007; Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012), curiosity, urgency (Kirlappos and Sasse, 
2012), threatening and over-trust (Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012; Furnell, 2008; 




In fact, few organizations including universities adopting Online Learning have 
security awareness programs in place.  67% of 400 information security officers 
described security awareness in their organizations as 'inadequate' as per 2002 
Pentasafe Security Technologies report (Chen, Shaw and Yang, 2006).  Despite all the 
sophisticated technologies used for protection, lack of security awareness can make an 
organization vulnerable to all kinds of external and internal threats (Chen, Shaw and 
Yang, 2006).  Most of Information Security-related risks especially Phishing which is 
the focus of this research, are deeply interwoven with interaction with human 
behavioural factors. Therefore, Online Students’ awareness about behavioural factors 
plays a major and overarching role in combination with technical countermeasures to 
effectively mitigate the risks of Phishing (Proctor, Schultz and Vu, 2009).   
 
Despite the growing use of E-learning systems reported by many studies (Chen and He, 
2013), little attention has been given to the issues of lack of information security in e-
Learning systems’ users (Vasilescu, Tatar and Codreanu, 2011; Aljawarneh, 2011; 
Yong, 2007).  For this reason, this project aims to bridge this gap, research this area 
and find out how to improve Online learners’ awareness about these behavioural factors 
underlying Phishing attacks.  Therefore, a conceptual framework is needed to help 
improve Online learners’ awareness about the behavioural factors underlying Phishing 
attacks.  Based on the literature review conducted in chapter 2,  a Situation Awareness 
model by Endsley (2015) has been identified to be a suitable conceptual framework to 
propose for this purpose thanks to its sustainability and dynamicity to meet the 
requirements for building measurable, robust and in-depth knowledge in participants 
about Phishing attacks exploiting behavioural factors over changeable space and time, 
integrated with a set of pedagogical guidelines recommended by Chen, Shaw and Yang 
(2006) and measured by the use of Poepjes’ (2012) Information Security Awareness 
and Capability Model (ISACM) – more details can be found under the Theoretical 
Background section.  The reason for the suitability of Endsley (2015) Situation 
Awareness Model lies in its dynamic use of time and space as measurements of 
situation change, which makes it capable of providing continuity and sustainability of 




1.1 Research Problem Statement 
 
Phishing awareness mainly focused on visual cues and Internet protocol syntactical 
indicators to be identified in order to recognize Phishing attacks (Kirlappos and Sasse, 
2012), despite the fact that many studies showed that unawareness of how some human 
behaviours are exploited and manipulated by Phishers to deceive victims played a key 
role in victims falling prey to Phishing attacks (Proctor, Schultz and Vu, 2009; 
Vasilescu, Tatar and Codreanu, 2011; Chen and He, 2013).   
 
As the Internet has become the primary media for conducting e-learning for which 
many online learning providers have adopted technical controls such as anti-virus 
detectors and firewalls to protect their systems and information, yet the human related 
behavioural factors based awareness are neglected (Luo et al, 2013).  According to 
Chen, Shaw and Yang (2006), the biggest challenge facing Information Security 
Awareness is the changing nature of ICT and the agility of applications.  As a result, E-
Learning systems required security awareness providers to use delivery methods that 
are more interactive and collaborative.   This means incorporating activities to 
encourage interactive participation from users to help promote awareness among users 
while exchanging and sharing experiences.  Oppositely, traditional training methods 
have been shown ineffective in raising awareness about Phishing risks. (Anttila et al, 
2007).  This is in addition to the fact that human behavioural related exploitation in 
Phishing attacks is still under-explored (Zuev, 2012) and therefore needs further 
research to uncover it.  Therefore, understanding human behaviours and providing 
relevant security awareness sessions to address all kinds of exploitation of human 
behaviour factors such as demotivation, low self-esteem, technology incompetence, 
over-competence are very essential to constitute effective information security 




1.2 Research Context 
 
The stage has been set for this research to focus on the researcher and participants on 
how to better understand the human behavioural factors behind Phishing attacks 
targeting online learning users and systems.  According to Parrish, Bailey and Courtney 
(2009), these human behavioural factors can be exploited as luring incentives in 
phishing attacks.  Thus, the context of this research will address these behavioural 
factors and the online learners that use the Internet and the online learning systems for 
education as potentially susceptible targets for such Phishing attacks.   The context will 
also address proposing and testing a conceptual framework for achieving higher levels 
of awareness in online learners about these behavioural factors and how they may be 
exploited in Phishing attacks. 
   
Lack of awareness about Phishing human behavioural factors (Proctor, Schultz and Vu, 
2009) threatens the security of e-Learning systems and would increase the susceptibility 
of online learners for falling for Phishing attacks if not given the right attention it 
deserves.  For this reason and the significant risks emerging from this lack of awareness 
(Styne, Kruger and Drevin, 2007) and the pressing need for a dynamic and practical 
framework to improve online learners’ awareness, this research has been contextualized 
to attempt to bridge this awareness gap and establish a frontline layer of defence against 




This research was conducted with a focus on linking Information Security as the 
researcher’s practitioner field with Educational Theory in general and TEL in particular 
to explore and investigate e-Learning users’ susceptibility to Phishing attacks (The 
information security part) and to link that with Learning theories (TEL part) to explore 
ways to enhance the level of awareness about Phishing attacks targeting online learners.  
The collective research in both realms have contributed the conceptual framework 
SAMFP which is based on a combination of learning theories to address the awareness 
residual risk in online learners in particular and general online users in general.   As 
such, this research has been conducted on 100 online learners, however, the results of 
the study could indirectly be applicable to any type of online users in general since all 
online users including e-learning users rely on the Internet and online environments to 
conduct their activities.  Hence, they use the same medium through which online 





1.3 Research Questions 
 
This research will attempt to answer the following questions: 
1. What are the potential human behavioural factors exploited by Phishers to 
design and launch Phishing attacks against online learners? 
1a: How are these human behavioural factors exploited to lure targeted 
online learners to respond to Phishing attacks? 
2. What is the preliminary level of online learners' awareness about these human 
behavioural factors and the ways they are used by Phishers to set up Phishing 
attacks? 
2a: How can online learners' awareness be improved and sustained as a 
frontline protection measure against these Phishing attacks? 
 
1.4 Research Goals 
 
The research aims to achieve the following goals: 
 To better understand the human behavioural factors that are exploited by 
Phishers to attack online learners exploiting their lack of awareness about 
Phishing and the vulnerabilities of behavioural factors.  
 To propose and test a conceptual framework that can help raise and improve 
online learners’ awareness to pose as a frontline protection measure against 
Phishing attacks. 
 To assess the effectiveness of the proposed conceptual framework by measuring 
the learning outcomes and analysing the awareness improvement levels 




1.5 Conceptual Framework 
 
A conceptual framework is proposed and developed based on Endsley’s (2015) 
Situation Awareness, the pedagogical guidelines of Chen, Shaw and Yang (2006) and 
Poepjes’ (2012) Information Security Awareness and Capability Model (ISACM) to 
undertake the tasks of this Design-Based research.  The conceptual framework is called 
‘Situation Awareness for Phishing Model’ (SAMFP).  The SAMFP model is used to 
achieve the goals of the research and eventually provide answers to the research’s two 
questions by allowing the researcher and participants to better understand the human 
behavioural factors exploited in Phishing attacks through effective awareness methods 
that help participants build knowledge through engaging in interactive group 
discussions.  The use of group discussions whether online or Face-to-Face as part of 
designing and implementing the conceptual framework has really revolutionized the 
way awareness sessions are delivered.  By engaging participants in these group 
discussions, way was given to better learning results to emerge through interactivity 
and knowledge sharing.  The three components incorporated in the SAMFP model 
helped it achieve these goals by a) adopting Endsley’s (2015) Situational Awareness 
Model as its base framework to implant knowledge in the participants, b) adopting 
Chen’s et al (2006) pedagogical guidelines to overcome awareness delivery issues 
realized from the one-way communication based awareness methods normally used in 
Information Security awareness and b) incorporating Poepjes’ (2012) ISACM Model 
along with other devised measurement tools to measure the learning outcomes and 





1.6 Research Methodology  
 
The implementation of the conceptual SAMFP model requires the researcher to design 
a solution, implement it and then assess it.  The researcher’s involvement in these three 
tasks made this research a Design Based Research (DBR) (Andriessen, 2007).  This 
involvement is demonstrated by the researcher being the designer of a solution to the 
research problem through developing an instructional design of a full awareness 
program with all its resources and materials including the assessment tests.  As such, 
putting the solution to test by applying the SAMFP model to a sampled population and 
finally assessing its effectiveness by measuring the resulting learning outcomes.  
Quantitative data analysis (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2011) is used to statistically 
assess and measure the significance of the outcomes from the implementation.  
This research used convenience or non-probability sampling despite the argument in 
literature about using convenience sampling in social qualitative research being subject 
to the risk of selection bias (Etikan, 2016; Coyne, 1997).  However, it is considered an 
acceptable alternative sampling approach when used with compensating precautions 
(Magnani, Sabin, Saidel and Heckathorn, 2005).  Therefore, considering the fact that this 
research is a quantitative study that focuses on participants being online learners only, 
regardless of any other traits, combined with the hardship associated with participant 
recruitment within the timeframe allotted, this research used convenience sampling to 
select the minimum required number of participants (which is 100) who should 
complete the 5 required steps of participation in order for their data to be included in 
the analysis.   Thus, the sampling approach taken in this research is convenience 
sampling requiring participants only to be online learners regardless of any other traits 
such as specific location, discipline or culture.   Therefore, the distribution of 
participants in terms of location and culture was not part of the selection strategy or the 
data analysis.  As such, this is a limitation of the research but could also be a potential 
opportunity to extend this in future research studying the effect of a particular sampling 
distribution that is based on specific demographics such as culture, nationality, location, 




This research project will undertake four steps to achieve the research’s goals: 1) 
Conduct a Literature Review to identify potentially exploitable human behavioural 
factors that pose a threat to online learning learners; and the frameworks to help better 
understand them.  2) Conduct a Pre-Awareness assessment test to assess the level of 
awareness that online learners have about these behavioural factors.  3) Conduct two 
Awareness sessions to participating online learners to help them improve their level of 
awareness about Phishing and how Phishing attackers exploit vulnerable human 
behaviours to trap victims. Finally 4) conduct a Post-Awareness assessment tests to 





1.7 Researcher’s Role and Impact 
 
The role of the researcher in such Design-Based research is very dynamic.  Part of the 
researcher’s knowledge strengthening engagements in the research was to practice 
teaching online and in classroom conducting awareness.  This was a fruitful experience 
that located the researcher in the heart of the action.  This had allowed the researcher to 
observe participants, their reactions and their learning progress more closely and with 
in-depth understanding of how situations developed and redeveloped according to the 
changing parameters of time and space e.g. after different elapses of times and in 
learning environments such as online and classroom based.  At the same time, caution 
was always taken by the researcher not to influence participants’ learning and 
judgement by not showing bias to any actions to drive participation into the researcher’s 
favoured direction.  Observations were recorded as they happened to ensure the 
reliability of the data collected for analysis. 
 
1.8 Contributions of this Research 
 
The conducted research linking both realms Information Security and technology-
enhanced learning (TEL) have contributed the conceptual framework SAMFP (see 
chapter 3) which is based on a combination of learning theories to address the 
awareness residual risk in online learners in particular and online users in general.   As 
such, the outcome of the study could indirectly be applicable to any type of online user 
in general since all online users including e-learning users rely on the Internet and 




The research contributed to knowledge with a proof of concept about the effectiveness 
of the proposed conceptual framework namely Situation Awareness for Phishing 
(SAMFP) that is derived from Endsley’s Situation Model (2015), the pedagogical 
guidelines of Chen, Shaw and Yang (2006) and Poepjes’ (2012) Information Security 
Awareness and Capability Model (ISACM); to improve awareness in online learners 
about 16 human behavioural factors exploited in Phishing attacks and measure the 
outcomes of such awareness in a continuous and iterative manner.  The contributed 
proof of concept provides the evidence in the form of 18 hypotheses statistically tested 
yielding significant findings that the conceptual SAMFP model and the process 
designed for implementing it were demonstrated to be effective for improving the 
awareness level of a 100 online learners about the identified 16 human behavioural 
factors related to Phishing.   Furthermore, the feedback from participants about their 
reasons for considering the given scenarios on the 1st Test as Phishing had also 
contributed with novel knowledge about the participants’ preliminary understanding 
about Phishing and the related 16 behavioural factors. 
The SAMFP model was a novel contribution to the theory of providing effective cyber 
security awareness about Phishing, while the implementation of the model was a 
contribution to the practice of conducting cyber security awareness about Phishing to 
online learners.  Additionally, the results obtained from that implementation could 
contribute to making an effective policy for providing and conducting cyber security 
awareness about Phishing within an organization.   
 
Additionally, the literature review contributed with the identification of the 16 
behavioural factors and the ways of exploiting them in Online Learning based Phishing 
attacks.  All the studies referenced in the literature review had studied only some of the 
behavioural factors related to Phishing based on general scenarios as opposed to online 
learning scenarios in particular.  Nonetheless, not a single research was found to have 
covered all the 16 identified behavioural factors and thoroughly studied their 
exploitation methods in Online Learning based Phishing attacks, nor thoroughly had 





Furthermore, the implementation of the SAMFP model made a novel contribution by 
identifying the preliminary awareness level of 100 online learners  about Phishing and 
these 16 behavioural factors exploited in Phishing attacks.  This contribution was 
considered as a set point for further iterations of awareness sessions and assessment 
tests to start by using the SAMFP model to enhance the 100 participants’ preliminary 
awareness level to higher levels of awareness.   
 
In summary, this research contributed by 1) identifying 16 Phishing related behavioural 
factors, 2) a snapshot of current 100 online learners’ awareness about these Phishing 
behavioural factors, 3) a novel conceptual framework model called SAMFP to improve 
information security awareness and 4) providing evidence of the efficacy of the SAMFP 
model by statistically showing it has helped improve the awareness of 100 online 
learners.  
 
The contributions of this research are intended for information security practitioners 
who are tasked with providing effective cyber security awareness about Phishing to 
their audiences and organizations, Information security and educational researchers 
who are interested in experimenting with different methods of conducting awareness 
and finding ways to improve the learning outcomes from cyber security awareness and 
finally the cyber security awareness free-lancers who conduct online and classroom 
based cyber security awareness sessions to the public with the aim of enhancing their 
level of awareness about cyber security. 
 
1.9 Thesis Overview 
 
In this introductory chapter, the research problem statement, research questions and 
goals are discussed.  Also, a brief summary of the research conceptual framework, 
methodology, role of the researcher and research contributions are provided.  The thesis 
consists of the following chapters: 
1. Literature Review:  Discusses findings resulting from literature review namely, 
identifying the 16 behavioural factors potentially exploited in Phishing attacks 
and the conceptual frameworks to help improve awareness about it. 
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2. Research Design:  The research methodology and methods are discussed here.  
Also, a detailed discussion of the conceptual framework and the tasks required 
to conduct the research is provided. 
3. Data Collection:  The data collection strategy and approach, methods, tools and 
issues are all discussed.   
4. Data Analysis:  The data analysis methods, tools and tests are discussed and 
explained in detail supported by examples from the data collected.  Also, the 
hypotheses set and their analysis are thoroughly discussed and followed by a 
discussion of correlations between the results of the analysis findings and 
literature review.  In addition, the recruitment of participants and sampling are 
discussed. 
5. Results:  This chapter explains the results of the data analysis findings. 
6. Results Discussion, Contributions, Implications and Future Research:  This 
chapter discusses how the results relate to the research questions and objectives; 
followed by a discussion of the implications of this research and the avenues it 




Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
This literature review has been conducted to explore the existing body of knowledge 
surrounding the subject of this research which is better understanding Phishing attacks 
and enhancing awareness about them in online learners to provide a solid background 
supporting the goals set for the research.  In parallel, this review is also part of gathering 
the required information about any potential human behavioural factors that are 
exploitable in phishing attacks as this information will provide the answer to the first 
part of the 1st question of this research.  The following areas were covered as part of 
this review:  Online learning and phishing, e-learning systems and online learning, 
information security in online learning systems, awareness in secure online learning, 
Information Security Awareness Tools, role of ISS support to protect against phishing, 
and behavioural factors employed to deceive victims in phishing attacks. 
 
2.1 Online Learning and Phishing 
 
Online Learning depends on the Internet and the use of e-mail to deliver content; which 
make it vulnerable to Information Security risks such as Phishing as any other business 
organizations (Steyn, Kruger and Drevin, 2007).  One of the major information security 
risks introduced in Online Learning is Phishing.  Phishing is a type of identity theft and 
an act of fraudulence to lure unsuspecting victims to believe that an illegitimate website 
or link is legitimate for the sake of a financial or informational gain (Huang, Qian, and 
Wang, 2012; Zhang, Hong and Cranor, 2007).  Another definition of Phishing is that it 
is a type of a cyber-attack using Social Engineering techniques which involves fraud to 
trick people into revealing sensitive information by posing as a trustworthy entity to 
them (Steyn, Kruger and Drevin, 2007; Parrish, Bailey and Courtney, 2009).  An 
example of a Phishing case was when hackers used social engineering techniques to 
trick Ford credit employees into revealing an authorization code that was used to access 
the personal information of about 13,000 individuals who were exposed to the risk of 




Information Security technical controls could be rendered useless without proper 
understanding of the risks resulting from the lack of awareness and irresponsible 
behaviour.  As such, the lack of awareness in online learners about the security risks 
associated with Online Learning systems is a source of a vulnerability that could be 
exploited by insiders and outsiders alike.  Attackers would conduct a Phishing attack 
on a target by manipulating him/her to break into the system and cause damage (Chen 
and He, 2013) and therefore, jeopardize the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
the system and its resources.  Most internal abuse is caused by users’ lack of awareness 
where the human behaviour factor is more vulnerable to exploitation than technology 
(Vasilescu, Tatar and Codreanu, 2011).   
 
Unfortunately, Chen and He (2013) stated that many organizations are rushing the use 
of online learning without carefully thinking about the security threats and risks 
inherent to it.  Accordingly, a study was carried out to test the level of awareness in an 
academic environment about Identity theft revealed that more than 50% of respondents 
gave away their passwords in response to a phishing test email (Steyn, Kruger and 
Drevin, 2007).  According to another study in 2004 by the Gartner group, about 57 
million US adults received a phishing email whereas almost 11 million online adults 
have clicked on a link in phishing emails (Steyn, Kruger and Drevin, 2007).   According 
to a third study conducted jointly by the Computer Security Institute and the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 2005, Phishing attacks are the most common type of 
electronic thefts and fraud.  More than 260,000 cases of identity fraud were identified 





2.2 E-Learning Systems and Online Learning 
 
The first general-purpose E-Learning system ever developed was the Programmed 
Logic for Automatic Teaching Operations (PLATO) by the Computer-based Education 
Research Laboratory (CERL) in 1960 (Basha and Dhavachelvan, 2010).  Accordingly, 
E-Learning in general refers to computer-enhanced learning or in other words, it can be 
described as doing learning activities electronically through the Internet (Barik and 
Karforma, 2012).  Also, Chen and He (2013) described E-Learning as using content 
repositories to store content while facilitating communication through web-based 
technologies that learners can interact with to collaboratively learn and share 
knowledge. 
 
Therefore, Online Learning depends on the Internet to execute and so do E-Learning 
Systems. The use of e-mail and the Internet at academia makes it as vulnerable to 
Phishing as any other business organizations (Steyn, Kruger and Drevin, 2007).   
Technical controls are of less value without proper understanding by the workforce of 
the risks of their irresponsible behaviour.   Therefore, they inherit all the security risks 
associated with the use of the Internet.   Hence, information security awareness becomes 
necessary to enhance the posture of information security in online learning systems and 
environments through raising awareness of online learners about the risks associated 
with their roles in the information security process (Kruger et al, 2008) 
  
Information Security depends on three categories in the analysis of security threats and 
risks. These three categories make the Information Security triad (CIA) which refers to 
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (McCumber, 1991; Vasilescu, Tatar and 
Codreanu, 2011).  Accordingly, inherent threats of the Internet (Aljawarneh, 2011) and 
the diversity of technologies underlying E-Learning systems may lead to the 
exploitation of vulnerabilities in these three areas (CIA) creating potential risks (Chen 
and He, 2013; Zuev, 2012; Lim and Jin, 2006).  Below are some more examples of risks 
under each area of the Information Security Triad (Costinela-Luninita and Nicoleta-
Magdalena, 2012; Luminita, 2011; Rjaibi et al, 2012): 
 Confidentiality Risks: Such as data leakage. 
 Integrity Risks: Such as cross site request forgery and scripting. 
 Availability Risks: Such as Denial of Service attacks. 
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A security threat can be any anticipated danger that may exploit a vulnerability which 
is a weakness or a loophole in a system producing risk which is the probability of a 
particular threat exploiting a vulnerability (Barik Karforma, 2012). Thus, a security 
breach can be defined as an event where a vulnerability in a system is exploited to 
subvert a security control to commit harmful acts (Proctor, Schultz and Vu, 2009).  
Information Security’s ultimate goal is to protect the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability (CIA) of information (McCumber, 1991; Vasilescu, Tatar and Codreanu, 
2011).  One of the major threats that can impact upon the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of online eLearning systems is Phishing.  As such, Phishing can jeopardize 
the confidentiality, availability and integrity of online eLearning systems and the 
information processed within them.   
 
To combat the risks of threats such as Phishing, many online learning providers have 
adopted technical controls such as anti-virus detectors and firewalls to protect their 
systems and information while controls based on the human related behavioural factors 
such as awareness were overlooked and neglected (Luo et al, 2013).  The lack of users’ 
awareness about the security risks and the protection methods is still a source of a 
weakness.  Most e-learning systems were designed with more emphasis on functionality 
than on security.  That was because E-Learning systems were built to introduce the 
culture of openness to learning as opposed to the restrictions of its brick-and-mortar 
counterpart in terms of space and time.  As such, incorporating security in the design 
would highly limit the achievement of openness in E-Learning systems (Vasilescu, 




Information Security threats can originate from outside and inside of an organization 
whereas countermeasures can be preventive, detective, deterrent and recovery 
depending on the level of protection they are placed at (Chen, Shaw and Yang, 2006).  
As such, detective controls take over when preventive controls are bypassed while 
recovery controls take over when all other controls have failed. Therefore, E-Learning 
systems should be designed to fend off not only external threats, but also those threats 
coming from within such as the lack of users’ security awareness (Costinela-Luninita 
and  Nicoleta-Magdalena, 2012; Luminita, 2011).  There is no absolute 100% security 
for any system, but carefully implemented security controls could minimize the 
possibility of risk occurrence (Lim and Jin, 2006).  However, awareness can play a 
major role in minimizing risks for online learning systems.  The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) define information security awareness as a way of 
simply focusing individuals' attention on security concerns and how to respond 
accordingly (Chen, Shaw and Yang, 2006).  This definition emphasizes the role of 
awareness as a method to instil security-aware culture within organizations changing 
online learning systems’ users' behaviours and enforcing good security practices 
(Aljawarneh, 2011; Chen, Shaw and Yang, 2006).  According to the study conducted 
by Chen, Shaw and Yang (2006) to investigate the awareness needs of an insurance 
company that has an e-business presence, the study revealed that implementing a good 
security awareness program requires incorporating activities to encourage interactive 
participation from users to help promote awareness among users as they exchange and 
share experiences, history of security breaches and lessons learned (Chen, Shaw and 
Yang, 2006).  Most internal abuse is caused by users’ lack of awareness where the 
human behaviour factor is more important than technology (Vasilescu, Tatar and 
Codreanu, 2011).  Therefore, understanding human behaviours and providing relevant 
security awareness sessions to address all kinds of human vulnerabilities such as, but 
not limited to, demotivation, low self-esteem, technology incompetence, over-
competence, lack of interest, lack of awareness, lack of responsibility and 
accountability and poor management are very essential to information protection (Zuev, 
2012).  Understanding the factors especially those that are human related which pose 
as luring incentives behind falling prey to Phishing attacks is under-studied and requires 
in-depth research to better understand them.  In addition, an online leaner in particular 
as a subject of Phishing attacks is also under-explored.  For these two reasons, this 
research has attempted to better understand those human related luring motives behind 
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online learners’ susceptibility for falling victim to Phishing attacks and how their level 
of awareness about Phishing and its underlying factors can be raised and sustained as a 
frontline countermeasure against such attacks.  Next, the Information Security in Online 
Learning Systems and its challenges are discussed. 
 
2.3 Information Security in Online Learning Systems 
 
The modern learning theory for information security awareness emphasizes the need 
for collective, interactive and collaborative networked communities to facilitate 
knowledge and experience sharing among all members whereupon new knowledge can 
be constructed collectively (Anttila et al, 2007).  Knowledge construction goes through 
Six (6) layers of mental processes namely: 1) Knowing, 2) Comprehension, 3) 
Application, 4) Analysis, 5) Synthesis and 6) Evaluation.  Security Awareness should 
take into consideration each phase of the knowledge construction process when 
designing awareness and selecting tools for that.  Web 2.0 tools such as wikis, 
discussion forums and blogs have proven effective in accommodating such learning 
needs (Anttila et al, 2007).  Vasilescu, Tatar and Codreanu (2011) see the goal of 
implementing information security for E-Learning systems is to achieve the following 
information security objectives:  
 Confidentiality of content and users' data 
 Integrity of content, tools and teachers and students data processed by the 
system against malicious acts.   
 Availability of e-learning services 
 Identification and Authentication to eliminate identity thefts and impersonation 
 Authorization to limit access as needed to information to prevent data loss and 
leakage and unauthorized modification of information. 




This goes in line with the goal of implementing information security in online learning 
in general which is meant for the protection from malicious or accidental misuse of 
resources (Chen and He, 2013).  To do that, a robust security policy must be established 
to cover all potential risks and vulnerabilities in E-Learning systems including 
hardware, software, human resource and nature (Zuev, 2012).  Second, organizations 
should conduct risk assessment to identify risks and prioritize them based on impact 
and develop an effective mitigation plan to mitigate each risk (Rjaibi et al, 2012).  As 
seen in the literature review that most technical controls could be rendered useless due 
to the lack of effective security awareness.  Information Security Awareness is as much 
culture as a corporate policy directive.  Successful information protection strategies rely 
on information security awareness that focuses on culture and tries to instil the security 
sense in users’ practices and behaviours (Aljawarneh, 2011; Chen, Shaw and Yang, 
2006).  Security in E-learning is based on policy and technology where policy states 
how and what technology is used while technology assists policy by providing best 
practices in information protection.  However, policy and technology cannot work alone 
without the support of people (stakeholders’ awareness of security risks and mitigation 
methods) to achieve security goals such as securing e-exams, eliminating cheating and 
resolving the identity verification issues in online assessment (Chen and He, 2013; 
Vasilescu, Tatar and Codreanu, 2011).   Therefore, all society members need a level of 
awareness about information security risks according to their interaction level with the 
system (Anttila et al, 2007).  While, end users need a basic level of awareness that 
qualify them to use computer networks, deal with critical information and 
authentication, be aware of cyberspace rules and have self-protection in privacy and 
sensitive situations, system developers of Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) systems need awareness in more depth to be able to identify risks and apply 
appropriate security measures to mitigate them (Anttila et al, 2007).  On the other hand, 
Security Managers should have the competence to manage their organizations to 
implement security in light of the security policy in place and motivate employees to 




Although studies showed that many security and privacy measures are dependent upon 
human behaviours for being effective, not much research has been conducted to 
investigate the role of human behaviour factors in enabling security and privacy 
measures (Proctor, Schultz and Vu, 2009).  As such, all stakeholders of E-Learning 
Systems from Administrators to Developers should be aware of this relationship and 
consider human behaviours in their designs (Anttila et al, 2007).  However, users 
including online learners will not cooperate with these security systems unless they find 
them user-friendly and intuitive (Proctor, Schultz and Vu, 2009).  Anttila, Savola, 
Kajava, Lindfors and Röning (2007) suggest that Information Security professionals at 
an organization should stay current on any changes to information security industry 
standards in order to be able to provide awareness to others on how to apply and 
conform to approved industry Information Security standards and guidelines.  The 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 17799 security standard 
recommends that user security awareness should focus on Ten (10) major security 
domains (Chen, Shaw and Yang, 2006):  
 Information Security Policy  
 System Access Control 
 System Development and Maintenance  
 Personnel Security  
 Physical and Environmental Security  
 Security Organization  
 Asset Classification and Control  
 Communications and Operations  
 Business continuity Management  
 Compliance.  
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In the same way, Barroca and Gimenes, (2012) suggest that users who use social media 
and Web 2.0 tools should be aware of the potential security issues of privacy that are 
publicly available through dedicated awareness sessions.  Security awareness sessions 
should address all kinds of human behaviours' vulnerabilities such as, but not limited 
to, demotivation, low self-esteem, technology incompetence, over-competence, lack of 
interest, lack of awareness, lack of responsibility and accountability and poor 
management (Zuev, 2012).  One issue worth mentioning in the discussion of human 
behaviours-based awareness is the Online Trust (Beldad, Jong and Steehouder, 2010).  
Beldad, Jong and Steehouder (2012) see that people who are highly proficient with the 
web are more likely to have lower perceptions of the risks using the web and be inclined 
to trust online transactions and therefore need awareness to raise their sense of online 
potential security risks. 
 
The biggest challenge facing Information Security Awareness is the changing nature of 
ICT and the agility of applications such as E-Learning systems which created a 
necessity for security awareness providers to use delivery methods that are more 
interactive and collaborative given the need for deepened security awareness for which 
traditional training methods have been proven ineffective (Anttila et al, 2007).  
Following are some challenges that Information Security Awareness programs need to 
address and focus on in order to instil security awareness into E-Learning Systems’ 
stakeholders’ culture. 
 
Users should be aware of risks such as generating easy-to-guess passwords, while 
System Administrators should be aware of how to enforce complexity schemes to 
passwords.  For example, a recommended awareness session should be given to educate 
users on how to use a passphrase as opposed to a password whereby the user generates 
a phrase and composes the password from the first initial letter of each word in the 
phrase after applying some character substitutions with digits/symbols where 
applicable such as converting the 'a' to an '@' and so on.  Analysis of one password 
cracker revealed that 62% of passwords which did not contain a symbol or a digit were 
cracked as opposed to only 2% of passwords containing a symbol or a digit (Proctor, 




Users should be aware of how to determine when to reveal personal information in 
order to complete a transaction.  Studies show that this practice could lead to identity 
theft (Proctor, Schultz and Vu, 2009).  Users should be aware of how to read and 
understand web site privacy agreements and software certificates in order to securely 
accept them.  Accordingly, system developers should be educated on how to make these 
technical documents more user-friendly and automated (Proctor, Schultz and Vu, 
2009).  Users should be aware of how to identify content that they should trust or ignore 
as this could be a type of Phishing and Social Engineering attacks (Proctor, Schultz and 
Vu, 2009).  The common factor among all the above challenges is the requirement for 
raising awareness about information security risks for online learning systems’ users.  
Next, the role of Information Security Awareness in Online Learning is discussed. 
 
2.4 Awareness in Online Learning 
 
Parrish, Bailey and Courtney (2009) studied the susceptibility of people to Phishing 
attacks and the impact of personal traits such as age and gender in correlation with the 
Big five (5) personality traits which are Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Openness to 
experience, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness to explain why some people are 
more susceptible to Phishing attacks than others.  The study revealed that understanding 
the impact of the 5 personality traits has a significant impact on predicting human 
behaviours and their relative susceptibility to Phishing.  Likewise, a similar study was 
conducted by Schrammel, Köffel and Tscheligi (2009) to investigate the relationships 
between personality traits and information disclosure in online communities.  A similar 
study by Wright and Marret (2010) aimed to better understand the behavioural factors 
that affect one’s susceptibility to Phishing attacks.  The study revealed that four 
behavioural factors are responsible for people’s susceptibility to Phishing attacks and 





Phishing awareness mainly focused on visual cues and indicators to identify and 
recognize Phishing attacks (Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012) using techniques such as online 
games (Kumaraguru et al, 2010) whereas, Phishers tend to exploit human 
vulnerabilities by tapping into behavioural factors such as temptation (Jagatic et al, 
2007; Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012), curiosity, urgency (Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012), 
threatening and over-trust (Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012; Furnell, 2008; Kumaraguru et 
al, 2010) and using them as incentives to lure victims into their Phishing attacks.  These 
behaviour factors are not well-covered by awareness programs.  Therefore, 
understanding human behaviours and providing relevant security awareness sessions to 
address all kinds of human behavioural vulnerabilities is very essential to information 
protection (Zuev, 2012).   
 
The role of security awareness is very important in supporting the overall security 
posture in Online Learning environments and should address all needs of stakeholders 
(Anttila et al, 2007) such as Online learners.  In addition, Anttila et al (2007) also 
suggest the use of Formal Learning, Experience Gaming, Mentorship, Performance 
Support, Self-Learning, Community Based Learning and Information Learning as 
effective methods to support collective learning and the creation of information 
security-aware culture.  Chen, Shaw and Yang (2006) suggest that the most effective 
way to educate Online Learning stakeholders is the situational user-centred learning 
approach which best suits online information security.  Furthermore, Chen, Shaw and 
Yang (2006) recommend a set of guidelines to enable Information Security 
professionals to design effective multi-faceted security awareness programs that can 
address Online Students: 
 Use two-way communication as opposed to one-way whereby users can 
interactively participate. 
 Create measureable targets to assess awareness program outcomes before and 
after. 
 Create flexible Awareness programs that can be modified as needed or as 
informed by their outcomes assessment. 
 Make reachable programs by introducing diverse methods of communication 
such as e-mail, wikis, blogs, discussion forums, online surveys and Face-to-
Face presentations.  
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 Support decision making by creating a repository to document past security 
incidents, events and lessons learned from previous awareness activities.  
 
Online Learning and the Internet have become an essential part of our modern 
educational and business systems.  Likewise, Information Security threats have.  In 
order to combat those security threats such as Phishing, deploying technical state-of-
the-art controls like setting up a firewall and powerful anti-virus software are not 
enough without sustaining a proper level of Information Security Awareness in people 
who use these systems.  As suggested by Chen, Shaw and Yang (2006) the Situational 
Awareness user-cantered model is the most effective way to educate online students.  
Hence, the Situation Awareness Model (Endsley, 2015) is used to underlie this 
research’s proposed conceptual framework and integrate the set of guidelines 
recommended by Chen, Shaw and Yang (2006) in its fabric to raise awareness in online 
learners about Phishing behavioural factors.  In addition to Endsley’s Situation 
Awareness framework (2015) and the guidelines of Chen, Shaw and Yang (2006), 
Poepjes’ (2012) Information Security Awareness and Capability Model (ISACM) is 
also integrated as part of the proposed conceptual model for the sake of Phishing 
awareness raising and measurement.  This model is called ‘Security Awareness Model 
for Phishing’ (SAMFP).  Poepjes’ (2012) Information Security Awareness and 
Capability Model (ISACM) is also based on Ensdley’s Situation Awareness theory 
(2012) by capitalizing on the integration of three attributes of situational awareness to 
measure the awareness level achieved.  These attributes are (1) the Awareness 
Importance, (2) the Awareness Capability which is the participants’ knowledge or 
existing level of awareness about the risk and the required controls to prevent it and 
finally (3) the Awareness Risk which is the difference between the Awareness 
Importance and Awareness Capability.  More on these integrations between the three 
components that formulate the proposed conceptual framework SAMFP is going to be 
covered in more detail in Chapter 3.   
 
Most risks and vulnerabilities associated with E-learning Systems are protected against 
using technical controls.  On the other hand, awareness can play a major role in 
protecting E-Learning systems just as much.  According to Barik and Carforma (2012), 




 Authors' (Course Developer) Risks such as unauthorized change of content 
 Teachers' Risks such as cheating on assessment and availability of content. 
 Managers' (System Admin) Risks such as identity theft, copyright infringement 
etc. 
 System Developers' Risks such as poor encryption or clear-text password 
transmission or insecure code practices in general. 
 Students' Risks such as misuse of credentials, phishing and lack of security 
awareness in general. 
 
There is no absolute 100% security for any system, but carefully implemented security 
controls can minimize the possibility of risk occurrence (Lim and Jin, 2006).  Therefore, 
a balance should be stricken to achieve the goals of security and usability.  
Understanding how online learners develop learning and awareness of the human 
behavioural factors is under-studied and requires in-depth research. In addition, an 
online learners in particular as a subject of Phishing attacks is also under-explored 
whereas academics in general have been the subject of Phishing related research.  For 
these two reasons, this research is going to attempt to improve understanding of how 
online learners can enhance their level of awareness about Phishing and the human 
behavioural factors underlying Phishing attacks.  Next, a review of existing information 




2.5 Discussion of Existing Information Security Awareness Tools 
 
Most information security training programs fail because they lack interactivity and 
adventure with the audience.  According to Kumaraguru (2009), this lack of 
interactivity in traditional cyber-security awareness is attributed to three reasons:  1) 
thinking that users will act proactively and seek training, 2) expecting users to have 
some knowledge about the content e.g. Phishing attacks and 3) training material has not 
been designed with learning principles in mind.  Therefore, Information Security 
programs need to engage users by making them think and apply cyber-security 
concepts.  This approach to cyber-security training is called ‘Embedded Training’ by 
which training material is integrated with day-to-day tasks.  PhishGuru is an example 
of using this approach where users interact with training material while performing their 
tasks (Kumaraguru, 2009).  Another example of this approach is using game-based 
tools such as ‘Anti-Phish Phil’ (Kumaraguru, 2009) for delivering information security 
awareness in an interactive and adventurous way.  Preliminary results of using these 
game-based tools are encouraging as opposed to traditional cyber-security awareness 
that is distributed through e-mail or published online (Cone, Irvine, Thompson and 
Nguyen, 2007).  Another anti-Phishing game-based tool that was developed is ‘Phree 
of Phish’ which provides cues to identify Phishing e-mails and URLs (Pars, 2017).  This 
game was used to measure users’ awareness improvements before and after training 
using a control group and an experimental group.  The results showed a significant 
difference in the level of awareness gained by the experimental group after being 
trained using the game (Pars, 2017).  However, the content focused on visual cues more 
than human behaviours in those anti-phishing game-based tools.  Another game-based 
tool that is used to educate users about Phishing uses simulated sequential messages 
that includes a disguised Phishing e-mail in the thread of e-mails it sends to random 
users (Higbee, Belani and Greaux, 2013).  The approach of phasing out the attack over 
sequential messages enable the users to understand the phishing techniques used.  
However, most of these messages that are crafted by the tool rely on the trusted contact 
factor to deceive the unsuspecting users.  A similar tool based on simulated messages 
is PhishMe (PhishMe.com).  PhishMe provides Learning by Doing to its users in order 
to educate them how to recognize Phishing attacks.  It uses customizable human 
behaviour driven scenarios that resemble the organization’s specific threat vector 
(PhishMe.com).  GoPhish is also a platform that provides Phishing awareness through 
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repeatedly practicing simulated Phishing attacks (GoPhish.com).  On the other hand, 
Phishing IQ tests are used to educate users about Phishing through asking them 
questions.  According to a study conducted by Anandpara, Dingman, Jakobsson, Liu 
and Rointestad (2007), these IQ tests are claimed to have failed to measure users’ 
awareness and ability to recognize Phishing attacks.  Phishing IQ tests had rather 
measure users’ fear of Phishing (Anandpara et al, 2007).   Finally, mindfulness 
techniques were also used as an approach to train users how to dynamically allocate 
attention to recognize suspicious content based on rule-based training (Jensen, Dinger, 
Wright, and Thatcher, 2017). 
Next, the role of Information Security Services (ISS) in raising awareness about 
Phishing is discussed. 
 
2.6 Role of ISS Support to Protect Against Phishing 
 
The literature review cannot be concluded without talking about the role of Information 
Security Services (ISS) in protecting online learning systems from information security 
risks including Phishing.  The role of organizations’ ISS Support in protecting against 
Phishing focuses on implementing technical controls such as setting up firewalls, 
Intrusion Detection/Prevention systems and monitoring logs (Vasilescu, Tatar and 
Codreanu, 2011; Kruger et al, 2008).  However, providing awareness about Phishing to 
users comes next on their list, and in some cases is inadequate or superficial mostly 
depending on learning visual clues such as grammar and spelling mistakes to identify 
phishing e-mails.  This simple awareness given by ISS does not help users to understand 
the real behavioural factors behind victims falling prey to Phishing attacks which is 
what this study has explored and tested to strengthen participants’ understanding and 
vigilance about Phishing behavioural factors.  In addition, findings from the literature 
review about the limitations of the ISS role in awareness, are further explored by asking 
participants for feedback on the role of their own ISS in providing awareness.   That 
has been achieved by asking the participants to evaluate their ISS on their role in 
supporting awareness on a scale of 5.  The analysis of participants’ evaluation of ISS 
informed the researcher how effective and supportive their role was in raising 
awareness among online learners.  Next, the behavioural factors identified in the 




2.7 Behavioural Factors Exploited to Deceive Victims in Phishing 
Attacks 
 
Kirlappos and Sasse (2012) studied 36 online shoppers to explore their tendency to fall 
prey to Phishing on online shopping websites and how their misconceptions about 
secure Internet browsing would affect their behaviour online.  It was revealed that most 
participants were led by their real-world experiences based on their level of awareness 
being limited to identifying visual security indicators in a website such as using a secure 
protocol denoted by a lock, a trusted logo or link or the overwhelming information 
provided on the website for them; to trust a website.  They were completely oblivious 
of the real drivers by which they were internally vulnerable to such attacks such as the 
temptation of a first-come-first-serve voucher.  The study found that temptation and the 
false sense of urgency were exploited to deceive online shoppers to trust a website. 
Kirlappos and Sasse (2012) suggested that information security awareness has to make 
a paradigm shift by focusing more on the dangers of vulnerable behavioural factors of 
online users than visual website cues and indicators. 
 
Online users’ disposition to trust, urgency and similarity are also other behavioural 
factors that were studied by Wright and Marett (2010) as hypothesized incentives to 
increases online users’ susceptibility to Phishing deception as opposed to, disposition 
to suspicion and risk perception which are adverse behavioural factors to decrease 
online users’ susceptibility to phishing deception.  However, the findings from their 
study did not support the hypotheses made about the adverse behavioural factors 
decreasing the likelihood of deception.   
 
Another study by Vishwanath, Herath, Chen, Wang, and Rao (2011) tested the 
susceptibility to Phishing of a university’s real phishing attack’s victims and their 
abilities for cognitive elaboration of Phishing cues to detect phishing e-mails.  
According to the study, urgency and e-mail volume overloading were supported by the 
study results to be the behavioural factors among others including physical cues that 




Luo et al (2011) introduced a theoretical framework based on a heuristic systematic 
model to investigate the human behavioural factors underlying victimization by 
Phishing.  The theoretical framework was validated by an experiment that unveiled 
these underlying behavioural factors which are 1) urgency by which victims are 
pressured to take immediate action without allowing adequate cognitive systematic 
processing of the contextual environmental information surrounding the phishing 
message and 2) over-trust caused by a fake source of credibility using techniques such 
as 3) likability and similarity of genre using well-known message titles and logos, 
organizational mimicked communication styles by which victims are misled to trust. 
 
Ibrahim (2016) studied the effect of personality traits on SMS Phishing Vulnerability 
identifying a number of human behavioural vulnerabilities behind Phishing attacks.  
Based on an investigation of Social Engineering Techniques conducted by Rusch (1999 
as cited in Ibrahim, 2016), Ibrahim (2016) categorized these human behavioural 
vulnerabilities by three areas: emotions, attitude and belief.  Emotions by which a 
phisher deceives victims through temptation, greed, excitement, urgency, threatening 
and fear.  For example a phisher might tempt a victim by a false prize, using the scarcity 
of the prize and the limited offer time to pressurise the victim.  An example of attitude 
and belief include behavioural factors such as over-trust, authority and reciprocation 
when a victim tends to trust a message just because it seems to be coming from a 
credible source or a source of authority such as a manager; which might be 




Similar to Luo et al’s study (2011), Williams, Beardmore and Joinson (2017) conducted 
a similar study using models such as the Elaboration Likelihood Model and the 
Heuristic-Systematic Model to investigate the effectiveness and influence of persuasion 
techniques used in Phishing attacks which exploit individual differences in human 
behaviours.  These human behaviours are reciprocity e.g. when doing someone a favour 
in order to make him/her obliged to respond, conformity or social proof by which a 
victim is persuaded to conform to a certain action influenced by social norms and 
patterns, authority by which a victim is influenced to comply with certain action, 
urgency and scarcity by which a victim is pressured to take immediate action without 
considering consequences, and other human behaviour factors including dispositional 
trust, likability and similarity (Lederman, 2012), commitment and consistency, 
temptation, threatening and fear.  Both models suggested that the effectiveness and 
influence of online persuasion techniques exploiting these human behavioural 
vulnerabilities depend on the depth and thoroughness of the recipient’s cognitive 
elaboration when processing the message. 
 
Laribee et al (2006) designed trust and attack models that exhibit different ploys and 
tricks that exploit certain human behavioural factors to gain trust of the targeted victims 
in a coordinated iterative manner.  The objective of their model is to formalize the social 
engineering attacks vector and infer good countermeasures to protect targets from such 
planned attacks.  Among many human behavioural tactics included in the model is the 
diffusion of responsibility by which a victim is persuaded to take action deceived by a 
false feeling of lack of personal responsibility and a minimized feeling of guilt in that 




Workman (2008) conducted an empirical study to synthesize theory from the marketing 
literature explaining consumer behaviour and the factors accounted for successful 
marketing techniques and investigate whether the same human behavioural factors may 
account for successful phishing attacks.  Among the human behavioural factors studied 
that are commonly used for persuasion in marketing and are also suitable for use in 
social engineering are reciprocation, consistency and commitment, social proof, 
likability and credibility, threatening and fear, urgency and scarcity and interpersonal 
relationships.  While some phishers tend to use temptation to dupe online users into 
divulging information, others may resort to developing interpersonal relationships with 
the victim to gain their trust and commitment to reveal confidential information or 
commit an action. 
 
According to Lazy User Theory in Adams’ (2012) study of mutual authentication and 
Phishing, a user would only do the minimum to satisfy his/her requirement taking the 
more convenient path to achieve that requirement.  This user behavioural tendency for 
convenience and laziness could be exploited by Phishing attackers to tempt the user to 
take an insecure shortcut that would involve bypassing security checks rather than the 
secure path that would take more effort to fulfil their informational needs.  
 
Finally, Hanamura, Takemura and Komatsu (2013) concluded their analysis of the 
characteristics of cyber-security victims represented by Japan Home Internet users that 
users’ self-consciousness and over-confidence in their information security knowledge 
increased the probability of falling victim to Phishing attacks. 
 
Based on this literature review of human behavioural factors exploited as a bait in 
Phishing attacks, the following 16 human behavioural factors are identified to underlie 
Phishing attacks and therefore are considered to construct the content of the three tests 
and the materials for conducting the 2 awareness sessions for this research: 
 
1. Temptation e.g. greed etc. (Jagatic et al, 2007; Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012; 
Ibrahim 2016; Williams, Beardmore and Joinson, 2017), 
2. Urgency or Scarcity (Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012; Vishwanath et al, 2011; Luo 
et all, 2011; Williams, Beardmore and Joinson, 2017; Workman, 2008), 
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3. Over-confidence or Self-Consciousness (Hanamura, Takemura and Komatsu 
(2013), 
4. Dispositional (Over) Trust (Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012; Furnell, 2008; 
Kumaraguru et al, 2010; Wright and Marett 2010; Williams, Beardmore and 
Joinson, 2017; Hong, Kelley, Tembe, Murphy-Hill, and Mayhorn, 2013), 
5. Authority (Ibrahim, 2016), 
6. Threatening, Fear or Anxiety (Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012; Furnell, 2008; 
Kumaraguru et al, 2010; Ibrahim, 2016; Williams, Beardmore and Joinson, 
2017; Workman, 2008), 
7. Social Proof (Williams, Beardmore and Joinson, 2017; Workman, 2008), 
8. Likability and Similarity (Luo et al, 2011; Williams, Beardmore and Joinson, 
2017; Lederman, 2012; Workman, 2008), 
9. Reciprocation (Ibrahim, 2016; Williams, Beardmore and Joinson, 2017; 
Workman, 2008), 
10. Curiosity or Excitement (Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012; Ibrahim, 2016; Workman, 
2008), 
11. Commitment and Consistency (Williams, Beardmore and Joinson, 2017; 
Workman, 2008), 
12. Overloading (Vishwanath et al, 2011), 
13. Diffusion of Responsibility (Luo et al, 2011; Laribee et al, 2006), 
14. Show-off e.g. heroism (Ibrahim 2016), 
15. Convenience (Adams, 2012), 
16. Interpersonal Relationships (Workman, 2008). 
 









This chapter discusses the theoretical background underpinning the proposed 
conceptual framework called Situational Awareness Model for Phishing (SAMFP) 
which was developed during this research to help better understand the behavioural 
factors related to Phishing and improve awareness about them.  SAMFP is the approach 
to answer the research questions and fulfil the research goals.  According to the findings 
from literature (Proctor, Schultz and Vu, 2009; Anttila et al, 2007) and others, and as a 
practitioner in the field of Information Security, awareness has always been a concern 
since huge amounts of efforts put forth to protect information from cyber-attacks could 
be rendered useless if effective awareness outcomes are not achieved.  These ineffective 
awareness results are either caused by lack of awareness or by providing awareness in 
an ineffective manner and due to these two reasons, the online learning environment or 
the workplace becomes exposed to the risk of Phishing despite all the technical controls 
in place.  Mostly, awareness is provided using a one way communication in which the 
presenter delivers a speech or a presentation using highly technical jargon that not all 
attendees understand.  In addition, most of these presentations talk about the visual 
symptoms of Phishing such as grammatical mistakes and typos ignoring the root cause 
manifested by the human behavioural factors exploited in Phishing attacks.  As a result, 
the presentation or speech finishes with the audience not being able to clearly 
understand or tie what they have just learned to their living world in a way that makes 
sense to them so that cyber-attacks such as Phishing and its impact on information is 
correctly realized and assessed and that relevant mitigation controls such as awareness 
are appreciated.  For this reason, it has been decided to make this attempt to better 
understand the reasons why such awareness efforts are ineffective and how to improve 
the learning outcomes of Phishing related awareness to provide a better human-based 
mitigating control against Phishing.  Therefore this research’s first question is two parts:  
1) to identify the human behavioural factors that are vulnerable to exploitation in 
Phishing attacks targeting online learners and understand how they are exploited in 
Phishing attacks. 2) Explore and measure the level of awareness about such behavioural 
factors in a sample of online learners and find out conceptual ways to improve their 




In order to answer these questions, a thorough literature review has been conducted to 
identify and analyse the human behavioural factors used in Phishing attacks with 
relation to the online learners’ awareness needs.  Furthermore, the findings from the 
literature review and the analysis of the human behavioural factors have been used to 
design the required awareness materials that address the identifiable online learners’ 
needs.  Not only that, but also helped in the design and development of the conceptual 
framework and the methodology proposed to develop the awareness program and 
deliver it.   Thus, the research process consists of three elements: 
 
 Building upon the literature review foundation (Ellis and Levy, 2008) which 
included the identification of the sixteen (16) human behavioural factors and 
based the design and development of the conceptual framework on Endsley’s 
Situation Awareness Model (Endsley, 2015) and the pedagogical guidelines of 
Chen, Shaw and Yang (2006) to design and conduct the awareness program 
sessions and finally the Poepjes’ (2012) Information Security Awareness and 
Capability Model (ISACM) for the assessment of the learning outcomes. 
 Conducting the awareness program according to the proposed conceptual 
framework (SAMFP) to collect the required data through three (3) assessment 
tests. 
 Evaluating the collected data through statistical quantitative analysis of the three 
(3) assessment tests’ scores. 
 
This research is considered a Design Based Research (DBR) since it meets the three 
elements of the Design Based Research emphasized by Andriessen (2007).  These three 
elements are: 
 
 The researcher is the designer of a solution to the problem which is in this 
research the instructional design of a full awareness program with all its 
resources and materials including its assessment tests. 
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 The solution is explicitly built upon the redesign of already known conceptual 
frameworks which are in this research derived from the integration of Endsley’s 
Situation Awareness model (2015), the proposed guidelines for delivering and 
communicating awareness by (Chen, Shaw and Yang, 2006) and finally the 
Poepjes’ (2012) Information Security Awareness and Capability Model 
(ISACM) which is interwoven in the design as part of the awareness 
measurement tool. 
 The designed solution is put to action to test the validity of the solution and 
measure its outcomes which is in this research fulfilled by the researcher 
orchestrating and conducting the designed awareness program and the 
participants being at the centre of the action while the researcher simultaneously 
collects the required data for assessing and measuring the learning outcomes 
through conducting three assessment tests and quantitatively analysing their 
results.  
 
The Endsley (2015) Situation Awareness Model, guidelines of Chen, Shaw and Yang 
(2006) and Poepjes’ (2012) Information Security Awareness and Capability Model 
(ISACM) were adopted through the literature review of behavioural factors for their 
sustainability and dynamicity to underpin the design of this research’s conceptual 
framework to address the identified needs for enhancing online learners’ awareness 
about human behavioural factors used in Phishing attacks. 
 
These three components have been integrated into a new model that is iterative in nature 
and capable of providing successive interactive awareness sessions based on the 
assessed learning outcomes after each awareness session given until the highest level 
of awareness is achieved and the marginal lack-of-awareness risk is reduced. 
 
Finally, as a researcher, having undertaken awareness materials design, delivery and 
analysis has given the researcher an excellent opportunity to observe closely the 
learning outcomes as they develop, which was a fruitful experience.  At the same time, 
this has put a responsibility on the researcher to take extra care to record events as they 
happen minimising influence on participants.   
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In this chapter, the theoretical background underpinning the proposed conceptual 
awareness model used to raise awareness about Phishing behavioural factors is 
discussed.  In addition, other aspects of this research design will also be covered in the 
discussion. 
 
3.2 Theoretical Background 
 
It is very critical for a successful information security program to be accompanied by a 
conceptual model that effectively addresses awareness needs of stake holders in order 
to help them thoroughly understand the information security risks and their mitigating 
controls.  Addressing awareness requires good understanding of how humans acquire 
and manage awareness (Poepjes 2012).  Based on the literature review conducted, out 
of many awareness theories such as OODA loop (observe, orient, decide and act) 
(Brehmer, 2005) and PDCA cycle (plan, do, check and act) (Sokovic, Pavletic, and 
Pipan, 2010), Situation Awareness (SA) (Endsley, 2015) has prevailed in the area of 
awareness raising (Poepjes 2012).   Situation Awareness (SA) is the perception of what 
is going on in a situation where the perception is governed by the time and space of the 
current situation (Endsley, 2015).  Similarly, Poepjes (2012) also described Endsley’s 
Situation Awareness as “being aware of information or cues in your environment, and 
then determining what might happen next”.  Situation Awareness has several theoretical 
models such as Situated SA, Distributed SA and other current models such as Endsley 
1995 SA Model (Endsley, 2015).  Endsley 1995 SA Model is meant to enhance 
individual and team awareness in fields like Aviation, Air Traffic Controlling, Power 
Plants and ship navigation (Endsley, 2015).  Likewise here, SA is going to be used to 
dynamically assess participant awareness about Phishing and enhance their 
understanding of Phishing behavioural factors by the researcher developing and 
implementing a conceptual awareness model engaging participants in interactive 




3.3 Situation Awareness Levels 
 
Situation Awareness has 3 hierarchically ascending levels namely (1) Perception, (2) 
Comprehension and (3) Projection.  Wright, Taekman and Endsley (2004) in their 
simulated medical environment study and Kalliniatis et al (2017) in their efforts to unify 
Endsley Situation Awareness (Endsley, 2015) and Distributed Situation Awareness 
(Statnton et al, 2006) described these Situation Awareness Levels as: 
 
 Perception (Level 1): The baseline in understanding the status, attributes and 
dynamics of relevant elements in the environment or as the “ground truth” as 
Brynielsson and Varga (2016) explained it in their Cyber Situational Awareness 
Testing.  
 Comprehension (Level 2): The level of understanding whereby a synthesis of 
disjointed Level 1 SA elements is achieved through the processes of pattern 
recognition, interpretation and evaluation. 
 Projection (Level 3): The highest level of Situation Awareness where 
participants have the ability to project the future actions of the elements in the 
environment.    
   
Endsley’s SA Model (Endsley, 2015) is dynamic in that it dynamically addresses 
awareness gaps and maintains sustainability.    Thus, its link to time and space becomes 
viably capable of providing continuity and sustainability of awareness in a constantly 
changing field like information security.  In other words, Endsley’s SA is a cyclic 
process that the more iterations of awareness sessions provided, the higher levels of 
awareness achieved e.g. the Projection level.  Therefore, Endsley’s Situation 
Awareness model (Endsley, 2015) is adopted as a suitable foundation for this research’s 
proposed conceptual framework that is integrated with a set of guidelines recommended 
by Chen, Shaw and Yang (2006) to raise awareness about Phishing behavioural factors 




3.4 Proposed Conceptual Framework for Raising Awareness about 
Phishing Behavioural Factors (SAMFP) 
 
In order to answer the Research question 2, a conceptual framework is proposed based 
on the integration of three components namely, Endsely’s Situation Awareness model 
(2015), a set of pedagogical guidelines recommended by Chen, Shaw and Yang (2006) 
and Poepjes’ (2012) Information Security Awareness and Capability Model (ISACM) 
to help raise and quantitatively measure awareness in online learners about the 
behavioural factors underlying Phishing attacks.  Thus, this proposed framework is 
called “Situation Awareness Model for Phishing” (SAMFP).   Figure 1 shows the 








Endsley’s Situation Awareness levels (Perception, Comprehension and Projection) are 
woven into this model in order to achieve the objective of this research that is to enhance 
participant awareness levels about Phishing attacks and reach the Projection level.  
SAMFP model incorporates the following pedagogical guidelines (Chen, Shaw and 
Yang, 2006) into its fabric to provide an effective multi-faceted interactive awareness 
delivery methods in order for participants to achieve better awareness levels: 
 
 Two-way communication as opposed to one-way whereby users can 
interactively participate. 
 Create measureable targets to assess awareness program outcomes before and 
after. 
 Flexible Awareness programs that can be modified as needed or as informed by 
the assessment outcomes. 
 Reachable programs by introducing diverse methods of communication such as 
e-mail, wikis, blogs, discussion forums, online surveys and Face-to-Face 
presentations.  
 
Hence, Online and Face-to-Face group discussions are utilized to enable interactive 
two-way communication to encourage collaborative discussions among participants 
during the delivery of awareness sessions.   The categorization of online learners into 
the two groups namely the Online Group and the Face-to-Face group is based on the 
awareness delivery method.  Thus, those participants who attended the awareness 
sessions via online means are categorized as the Online Group, while the participants 
attending the sessions in a classroom setup are called the Face-to-Face group.  This 
categorization which is also the base of the scores analysis after the implementation of 
the SAMPF model aimed to explore and analyse whether the awareness delivery 
method being online or Face-to-Face could have impacted the participants’ learning 
outcomes as a dynamic variable of the space.  However, the results of the analysis 
showed non-significant implications of such an impact in the tests’ scores despite the 
fact that the Online Group participants outperformed the Face-to-Face group 
participants.  Yet, this outperformance of the Online group was found to be due to other 
significant factors such as the age, education level and the number of years using online 
learning as explained thoroughly in the Results Discussion Chapter.   
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The SAMFP’s six phase process is designed to be flexible and reachable to 
accommodate participants’ needs e.g. time zones, level of awareness etc.  In the next 
section, the implementation of the SAMFP’s six phase process is discussed in detail. 
 
Finally, SAMFP model utilizes Poepjes’ (2012) Information Security Awareness and 
Capability Model (ISACM) to quantitatively measure participant awareness 
improvements at the following 3 Endsley’s Situation Awareness levels: 
 
 Level 1, Perception: At this preliminary level of awareness, participants’ 
perception about Phishing and its underlying behavioural factors is assessed. 
 Level 2, Comprehension: At this level, participants’ comprehension level 
(deeper understanding) of Phishing and its underlying behavioural factors is 
enhanced and assessed. 
 Level 3, Projection: Participants are also assessed at the highest level of 
awareness for which they are targeted and thereby become able to predict 
Phishing attacks by recognizing behavioural factors in exploitable situations. 
 
SAMFP utilizes the three attributes of ISACM (Poepjes, 2012) namely, Awareness 
Capability, Awareness Importance which are mapped to the gradual levels of Endsley’s 
Situation Awareness (2015) to calculate the third attribute which is Awareness Risk 
Residuals based on participants’ scores in the three assessment tests and the weighted 
difficulty levels for each test.  Hence, the 3 Situation Awareness Levels are designed 
with a pre and post assessment tests surrounding each level.  Detailed discussion of how 
SAMFP assigns weights to tests’ difficulty levels and calculates scores, assesses and 
measures awareness improvements can be found in Chapters 4 and 5, sections 4.13, 




The proposed conceptual framework (SAMFP) is time and space based which means 
that time and space are two dynamic variables that have direct impact on the learning 
outcomes.  The effect of the time variable can be manifested by the cyclic nature of the 
SAMFP model which facilitates iterated awareness sessions, while the effect of the 
space variable is manifested by the flexibility of the SAMFP model to facilitate 
awareness sessions using face-to-face and online settings.  Hence, SAMFP uses these 
two variables to maintain continuity and sustainability for information security 
awareness provided to participants across time and space to ensure better learning 
outcomes and measured gradual awareness improvements until the highest level of 
awareness ‘Projection’ is achieved.   
 
While the proposed conceptual framework SAMFP is based on a combination of 
learning theories and guidelines from literature.  It is distinctive by the following 
features: 
 It provides a collective set of features that may be found in one tool and missing 
in another.   
 It adopted the best features from each of the underlying learning models and at 
the same time complemented them by adding the other features from the other 
models.  For example, SAMFP adopted the situation awareness levels and their 
space and time attributes from Endsley’s Situation Awareness Model (Endsley, 
2015) and enhanced it by devising a novel measurement technique to measure 
and track awareness progress and awareness risk residuals based on the ISACM 
(Poepjes, 2012).    
 In addition, the SAMFP model ensures continuous assessment of the 
participants’ level of awareness about each behavioural factor individually after 
each test which also can help in directing the focus for the awareness materials 
development in the right direction of participants’ learning needs in the next 
awareness sessions to follow in the SAMFP cycle.   
 Furthermore, the Endsley’s Situation Awareness model and even the ISACM 
(Poepjes, 2012) did not define a process for developing and conducting 
awareness, while the proposed SAMFP has provided pedagogical guidelines to 
inform the process of awareness program development and delivery.   
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 In addition, the SAMFP model ensures continuous assessment of the 
participants’ level of awareness about each behavioural factor individually after 
each test which also can help in directing the focus for the awareness materials 
development in the right direction of partivcipants’ learning needs in the 
awareness sessions to follow in the SAMFP cycle.   
 Finally, the SAMFP also ensures maintainability of the identified behavioural 
factors by injecting a periodic review as part of its cycle of emerging literature 
about behavioural factors to ensure that SAMFP will always remain up-to-date 
in terms of the knowledge it provides.   
 





3.5 SAMFP Implementation 
 
In order to implement the SAMFP model, the following 6 steps have been implemented: 
1. Conduct Literature Review to Identify Phishing Exploitable Behavioural 
Factors:  Conducted a literature review to explore existing literature such as 
security breach reports and analytical studies on Phishing using behavioural 
factors to lure unsuspecting victims.  The objective of the literature review was 
to identify and understand the potentially vulnerable behavioural factors that 
could be exploited in Phishing attacks.  The outcome from this literature review 
is 16 potentially behavioural factors forming the basis for developing the 
awareness materials for the awareness sessions, group discussions and 




2. Develop and Conduct SA Level (1) Perception Assessment Test - the 1st Test:  
This assessment test is the 1st Test which is one of 3 online surveys (tests) that 
serves three purposes.  First, it provides an introduction about the research in 
general and the assessment test in particular and obtain the participant’s consent 
to proceed with his/her participation in the research.  Second, it gathers 
participants’ demographical information such as age group and education level.  
Third is the preliminary assessment test which makes the main content of the 1st 
Test.  The 1st Test poses as (1) the initial assessment test in the data collection 
phase by which participants’ preliminary understanding (SA Perception Level) 
about Phishing is assessed and (2) as the pre-awareness assessment test before 
participants attend the first awareness session and take the post assessment test 
afterwards (2nd Test).  The objective of the pre-awareness test is to quantitatively 
assess the preliminary awareness level (Perception Level in the Conceptual 
Framework) of participants about Phishing in general before attending any 
awareness sessions.  The 1st Test consists of 20 fictitious scenarios whereof 16 
scenarios are potentially Phishing scenarios demonstrating the exploitation of 
one of the 16 Phishing behavioural factors identified in the literature review.  
Participants are assessed on whether they are able to identify, based on their 
preliminary understanding, if the scenario represents a Phishing or Non-
Phishing situation.  If a participant chooses ‘Phishing’ as the answer, he/she is 
required to explain in their own words the reasons for choosing such an answer.  
This is to assess how relatively close the participants’ own rationale to identify 
phishing is to the actual behavioural factor exploited in the Phishing scenario.  




3. Conduct the 1st Awareness Session as Online and Face-to-Face Group 
Discussions: In order to help participants gain better understanding of how the 
16 behavioural factors are exploited in the Phishing scenarios after their initial 
assessment in the 1st Test, they are scheduled to attend their first awareness 
session.  The 1st awareness session is designed as an interactive group discussion 
to encourage participants to share their own ideas and experiences about 
Phishing and openly discuss the risks and dynamics of Phishing attacks 
reflecting on the 20 fictitious scenarios from the 1st Test and the 16 behavioural 
factors employed in each scenario.  As key to the SAMFP implementation, this 
awareness session is a necessary step helping participants move from the 
‘Perception’ Level to the ‘Comprehension’ level where they can have more of 
an in-depth understanding about the 16 behavioural factors and how they are 
exploited to deceive victims in the Phishing scenarios.  The awareness session 
is set up either as an online group discussion using Google Hangouts or as a 
Face-to-Face classroom based meeting.  This is to accommodate the variability 
of time and space as far as the SAMFP model is concerned.  The setup of the 
online group discussion accommodates 5 to 8 participants each for those who 
are not able to attend in person, while the classroom based setup accommodates 
participants in a Face-to-Face setting since they can attend in person.  In both 
setups, participants are engaged in interactive discussions and role play acting 
where a participant is asked to play the role of the attacker while another 
participant plays the role of the victim and demonstrate different ways of 
exploiting the 16 behavioural factors similar to those demonstrated in the 1st 
Test’s scenarios.  This approach is helpful for participants to develop an in-
depth understanding about the 16 Phishing behavioural factors which helps 
them gradually achieve the next level of awareness namely Comprehension.  In 
addition, a thorough review followed by a discussion of the 20 fictitious 
scenarios from the 1st Test was conducted to allow participants to contrast their 




4. Develop and Conduct SA Level (2) Comprehension Assessment Test - 2nd Test:  
This is the 2nd assessment test which aims to verify whether the participants’ 
awareness about Phishing has reached the Comprehension level.  The 2nd Test 
is considered the post-awareness assessment test after the first awareness 
session and at the same time the pre-awareness assessment test before the 
second awareness session.  The 2nd Test is based upon the same 16 behavioural 
factors employed in the 1st Test’s scenarios.  However, the 16 behavioural 
factors are re-arranged differently and merged into 7 complex scenarios such 
that 2 or 3 behavioural factors are combined into one scenario.  This is to add a 
layer of difficulty to the assessment in the 2nd Test in proportion to the 
‘Comprehension’ level (Level 2) which is a higher level on the SA based 
conceptual framework.  Thus, each of the 7 Phishing scenarios on the 2nd Test 
demonstrates the exploitation of 2 or 3 behavioural factors.  Unlike the 1st Test, 
on the 2nd Test, participants are asked to choose the correct combination of 
behavioural factors that are exploited in the scenario from a pre-defined list of 
options.  In contrast to the 1st Test where participants were only asked to identify 
if a scenario was Phishing or not, on the 2nd Test, they are asked to identify the 
behavioural factors exploited in each scenario by using the knowledge gained 
from attending the 1st awareness session and by demonstrating their in-depth 
understanding.  This is to assess whether they achieved the ‘Comprehension’ 
level of Situational Awareness.  However, unlike the 1st Test, participants on 
the 2nd Test are not required to enter any additional information to explain why 




5. Conduct 2nd Awareness Session as Online and Face-to-Face Group Discussions: 
Similar to the 1st Awareness Session, the 2nd Awareness Session is attended by 
participants after completing the 2nd Test and before taking the 3rd assessment 
Test.  The objective of the 2nd Awareness Session is to help participants improve 
their understanding and knowledge about the 16 behavioural factors even better 
and take it to the next level of ‘Projection’ on the Situation Awareness model.  
Achieving the ‘Projection’ level of situation awareness means that participants 
will not only be able to recognize the exploited behavioural factors in Phishing 
scenarios, but also will be able to predict how the 16 behavioural factors will be 
used in future Phishing attacks.   The 2nd Awareness Session is designed and set 
up similarly to the 1st Awareness Session except that the participants will be 
discussing the 7 scenarios on the 2nd Test instead.   
 
6. Develop and Conduct SA Level (3) Projection Assessment Test - 3rd Test:  This 
is the third and final assessment test. The 3rd Test concludes participants’ 
participation and demarcates the end of the data collection phase.  The 3rd Test 
is also the post-awareness assessment test taken after the 2nd Awareness Session.  
Similar to the 2nd Test, the 3rd Test consists of only 7 scenarios with a pre-
defined list of answers combining 2 or 3 of the 16 behavioural factors which 
participants will choose from in order to answer the questions on the test.  
Unlike the 2nd Test’s scenarios, on the 3rd Test, the scenarios are composed to 
potentially exploit a vulnerable situation where participants are asked to select 
the most suitable combination of behavioural factors to be exploited in the 
vulnerable situation of the scenario.  This is to add a layer of difficulty to the 3rd 
Assessment Test in proportion to the ‘Projection’ level (Level 3) of the SA in 
the SAMFP model.   In other words, the 7 scenarios are set up to assess whether 
participants had achieved the ‘Projection’ level of awareness after attending the 
2nd Awareness Session.  This is assessed by participants demonstrating their 
ability to predict the behavioural factors most suitable for exploiting a 
vulnerable situation compared to their ability to only identify behavioural 




3.6 Research Methods 
Quantitative Analysis (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2011) is used as the primary 
method to analyse the collected data from the three assessment tests.  Quantitative 
Analysis is used to analyse the scores from the three pre and post-awareness assessment 
tests in order to measure the improvements gained by the participants before and after 
attending the 1st and 2nd awareness sessions respectively.  This is achieved by 
comparing the scores between the 3 assessment tests using statistical variance analysis 
tests such as t-tests and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) tests.   
 
The secondary method of analysis is the qualitative thematic analysis using the 
“Essentialist” method with which the meaning of the participants’ response is captured 
and linked to the overall context of the research (Braun and Clarke, 2006), which is the 
Phishing behavioural factors.  As such, the meaning of participants’ comments from 
the 1st Test are categorized under general themes related to the Phishing context.  These 
themes were coded from participants’ comments using the ‘Inductive’ approach (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006).  These comments were entered by participants to explain why they 
thought a scenario on the 1st Test was Phishing.  Then those general themes were 
quantitatively analysed and correlated with the participants’ scores to verify whether 
the participants had answered the 1st Test’s questions based on correct perception of 
Phishing behavioural factors (perception level) or based on having a different 
interpretation of the scenario in the question.  The general themes and the analysis of 
the participants’ comments will be further discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
Finally, all the results from the quantitative analysis tests are correlated in search of 
potential relationships that would support the final research findings.  Next, Situation 




3.7 Situation Awareness Measurement 
There are several measurement techniques in the literature proposed for the assessment 
and measurement of situation awareness.  However, only a few are suggested by 
Endsley for measuring the Situation Awareness levels.  These are the Situation 
Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT) and the Quantitative Analysis of 
Situational Awareness (QUASA) technique (Brynielsson and Varga, 2016).  The 
SAGAT technique relies on probing the participants’ understanding levels by 
intermittently asking them questions crafted to assess each level of situation awareness 
(Perception, Comprehension and Projection).  These questions are geared to investigate 
carefully chosen parameters in a dynamic situation at random points of time 
(Brynielsson and Varga, 2016).  On the other hand, the QUASA technique is a 
combined self-rating and probing technique by which participants are asked 
‘True/False’ or ‘Yes/No’ questions to confirm their understanding (perception level), 
thus the probe.  Then, they are asked to explain and state why they had chosen a certain 
answer and on what basis they were guided by the scenario towards choosing that 
answer, hence the self-rating (Brynielsson and Varga, 2016).  Brynielsson and Varga 
(2016) suggested at the end of their discussion of situation awareness measurements, 
that there is no method that is perfect for one discipline.  Thus, they suggest that a 
customized measurement technique is devised to suit a domain such as the cyber 
security domain under assessment.  Therefore, SAGAT and QUASA techniques were 
both capitalized upon in this research to measure participant awareness levels about 
Phishing attacks and the behavioural factors behind them.  Accordingly, on the 1st Test, 
participants were asked to confirm whether a given scenario was a Phishing scenario 
by answering a ‘True/False’ (e.g. ‘Phishing/Non-Phishing) question and then support 
their chosen answer in the case of confirmation (e.g. if it was a Phishing scenario) by 
stating their reasons for choosing that answer.   On the other hand, on the 2nd and 3rd 




Based on Endsley’s Situation Awareness, Poepjes (2012) introduced the Information 
Security Awareness and Capability Model (ISACM) which capitalizes on the 
integration of three attributes of situational awareness to measure the achievements 
gained in the three awareness levels.  These attributes are (1) the Awareness Importance 
(Awareness criticality level based on given weights) of the controls required to prevent 
a risk such as Phishing from occurring, (2) the Awareness Capability which is the 
participants’ knowledge or existing level of awareness about the risk and the required 
control to prevent it and finally (3) the Awareness Risk which is the difference between 
the Awareness Importance and the Awareness Capability.  ISACM (Poepjes, 2012) is 
adopted in this research to measure the level of the residual awareness risk after the 
participant awareness levels are assessed against Endsley SA levels using the weights 
assigned to each level.  Thus, when the different levels of Situation Awareness are 
measured, normally pre and post assessment tests are conducted and their respective 
scores are compared.  To ensure fair comparison of scores between pre and post-tests, 
weights are used to factor in the varying difficulty levels in each test (Kalliniatis et al, 
2017; Poepjes, 2012).  The formulated Situation Awareness Weighted Network 
(SAWN) model by (Kalliniatis et al, 2017) adds incremental weights to the Situation 
Awareness levels.  Respondents to SAWN surveys found them very challenging due to 
the subtle incremental progression (Kalliniatis et al, 2017).   
 
Similarly, the three assessment tests in this research are designed to progress 
incrementally from Perception through Comprehension to Projection with incremental 
weights to match up to the three situation awareness levels manifested by each test.  
The responses on each test are scored using a 7 point scale where 1 represents the lowest 
and 7 the highest.  According to the SAWN model, the questions on the 3 assessment 
tests are constructed based on hypothetical scenarios that encapsulate different fictitious 
phishing attacks against which participant awareness is assessed for the three Situation 
Awareness Levels of the underlying (proposed) conceptual framework.  Details of the 
implementation of the situation awareness measurement technique adopted in this 
research will be discussed in Chapter 5.   Next, the limitations of the proposed 




3.8 Limitations of the Proposed Conceptual Framework 
Endsley’s Situation Awareness Model (2015) on which the proposed conceptual 
framework SAMFP is based, is considered effective in raising awareness (Endsley, 
2015).  However, within the scope of this study, the following limitations have been 
identified: 
 The awareness’ improvements measured during the implementation of the 
SAMFP model for the 100 participants were at varying levels; meaning that the 
improvement in awareness is achieved gradually and relative to the changing 
time and space variables of the SAMFP model.  Hence, the SAMFP model was 
effective in helping participants make quantifiable progress towards achieving 
better levels of awareness in relation to what they were initially assessed for; 
with every iteration of awareness conducted.  The limitation to this 
implementation of the SAMFP model lies in the constraint of the timeframe 
allowed for the research which restricted the awareness/assessment iterations to 
two iterations only.  However, had there been more time allowed, more 
iterations could have been conducted.  
 Another limitation or rather a challenge was to conduct the online awareness 
sessions and group discussions for participants at different time zones and 
behind virtual boundaries, which may have not helped fulfil the intimacy of 
Face-to-Face discussions.  However and aside from that, the nature of the study 
targeting online students, makes this limitation an opportunity for testing the 
effectiveness of the proposed conceptual framework when used in online 
settings as opposed to Face-to-Face settings.  To reduce the impact of this 
limitation, awareness was conducted to manageable groups of 10 so that 
participants from different time zones can be accommodated in a more flexible 
manner. 
 Social detachment while conducting the online sessions to the Online Group 
participants was sensed, although not statistically shown to be significant, 









Phishing cannot be prevented by depending on technical controls only (Proctor, Schultz 
and Vu, 2009; Anttila et al, 2007).  Effective Information Security Awareness is a key 
mitigating control against Phishing (Chen, Shaw and Yang, 2006) and to many other 
malicious attacks that come after it.  However, according to Proctor et al (2009), Anttila 
et al (2007) and many others, the way information security is currently provided does 
not enable users to acquire in-depth understanding of how Phishing attacks are set up 
to apply this knowledge in the real world to protect themselves from Phishing.  This is 
because many cyber awareness programs tend to overlook human behavioural factors 
as a root cause of exploitation in Phishing and focus mainly on teaching their audiences 
how to identity Phishing by superficial signs, such as hidden URLs, or fabricated logos 
(Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012).  These superficial signs today can be sleekly overcome by 
the use of advanced technology and sophisticated tools deployed by attackers to craft 
solid-proof phishing e-mails.  Therefore, this research aims to better understand these 
behavioural factors and their exploitation in Phishing in order to improve information 
security awareness training for online learners.  Hence, the research questions are to 1) 
identify the human behavioural factors that are vulnerable to exploitation in Phishing 
attacks targeting online learners and understand how they are exploited in Phishing 
attacks, 2) Explore and measure the level of awareness about these behavioural factors 
in a sample of online learners and how susceptible they are to Phishing attacks, and 
research, and test the effectiveness of, a conceptual framework that can be used in the 
design of training to improve the awareness levels of learners.  In order to answer the 
research questions, a thorough literature review has been conducted to identify and 
analyse the human behavioural factors used in Phishing attacks with relation to the 
online learners’ awareness needs.  Furthermore, the literature review and the analysis 
of the human behavioural factors have been used to design and implement a conceptual 
framework called ‘Security Awareness Model for Phishing’ (SAMFP) based on the 
integration of Endsley’s Situation Awareness model (Endsley, 2015), the awareness 
delivery guidelines by (Chen, Shaw and Yang, 2006) and the Poepjes’ (2012) 
Information Security Awareness and Capability Model (ISACM).  The conceptual 
framework has been used to address the identified needs of online learners to improve 
their awareness about Phishing behavioural factors and assess the effectiveness of the 
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learning outcomes after the implementation of the SAMFP model; which provided 
answers to the second research question.  The implementation of the SAMFP model 
involved the researcher in designing and developing awareness materials, assessment 
test content and measures and finally conducting the training. 
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This chapter discusses participant recruitment, ethical issues, participation issues and 
the researcher’s involvement and role in the research, followed by a discussion of the 
development of data collection strategies, tools and methods and finally the assessment 
tests’ scores standardization and tests’ difficulty levels weighting. 
 
4.2 Participant Recruitment 
Participants for this project were online students who were recruited based on self-
selection (Saunders, 2012).  750 participants were recruited, but only 100 participants 
successfully completed all 5 steps required.  Many of the recruited participants gave up 
participation after completing the 1st Assessment Test.  It felt great to have achieved 
100 complete participations after all; over a period of 8 months only.  According to 
Delice (2010), the number of participants required for quantitative analysis to produce 
meaningful results with acceptable level of confidence (5%) should be in the range 
between 30 to 500 participants.  Therefore, a target of 100 participants was set and 
when this was achieved the data collection process stopped.   
4.3 Participants Selection Strategy 
Despite the argument in literature about using convenience or non-probability versus 
purposive sampling in Social qualitative research being subject to the risk of selection 
bias (Etikan, 2016;; Coyne, 1997), it is considered an acceptable alternative sampling 
approach when used with compensating precautions.(Magnani, Sabin, Saidel and 
Heckathorn, 2005).  Therefore, considering the fact that this research is a quantitative 
study that focuses on participants being online learners only regardless of any other 
traits; combined with the hardship associated with participants recruitment given the 
timeframe allotted, this research used convenience sampling to select the minimum 
required number of participants which is a 100 who should complete the 5 required 
steps of participation in order for their data to be considered for analysis.   
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Therefore, an invitation for participation with all the details of the 5 steps was sent to 
several online student communities including the local online university of Taybah 
based in Saudi Arabia’, multi-nationality academic research collaborative network e-
mailing lists such as the UK based JISCMail,lists, multi-nationality LinkedIn accounts, 
multi-nationality Twitter groups such as the UK based Twitter account of 
@PhDForrum group which has members  from all over the world,  the US and UK 
based Saudi Students’ Twitter groups accounts and finally the Online Learning 
department of a local Saudi based company.   
 
In line with the convenience sampling approach, the invitations were sent to reach out 
for any potentially candidate source of recruitment for online learners.  As a result, 750 
participants were recruited; however, only 100 participants completed all the required 
steps of participation.  These 100 participants are located based on the convenience 
sampling approach, mainly in Saudi Arabia, the UK and USA.   
 
It is worth highlighting that the only requirement for a participant to be selected to 
participate in this study is to be an online learner regardless of location or culture.  
Therefore, the distribution of participants in terms of location and culture was not part 
of the selection strategy or the participation criteria.  As a result, there was no ground 
for any solid implications to be elicited in the data analysis that could support any 
significant conclusions based on the existing sample distribution.  Furthermore, the 
distribution of the sampled 100 participants in terms of other demographics such as the 
job and education field did not reveal any significance in the study due to inconsistent 
distribution of participants in terms of these two demographics.  While this is a 
limitation of the study, this could also be a potential opportunity to extend this in 
future research studying the effect of a particular sampling distribution that is based on 
specific demographics such as culture, nationality, location, education major or career 




Based on the awareness delivery method used, 40 participants out of the 100 were 
categorized as the Online participants group since they were given the awareness 
sessions via an online medium, while the remaining 60 participants who are also online 
learners were categorized as the ‘Face-to-Face participants group since they were given 
awareness using a classroom based setup. 
 
The process of participant recruitment took many cycles of communication back and 
forth with interested members from the invited groups to answer any questions and 
clarify any concerns raised.  The process of recruitment and participant selection was 
ongoing iteratively even during and after the data collection phase had started.  This 
was due to some of the participants withdrawing from participation or not completing 
their participation bringing down the number of completed participations below the 
required minimum number.  After 8 months of continuous coordination, the required 
number of completed participants successfully reached 100.  
 




4.4 Participants’ Demographics 
 
Participants were recruited on the condition that they were or had been part of an online 
learning course.  100 participants were finally considered for the research activities.  
These 100 participants were divided into two groups with 40 participants in the Online 
Group and 60 participants in the Face-to-Face group.  The majority of participants were 
males and aged between 20-51 years old. However, the majority of them (74%) aged 
between 20-25 years old.  The participants’ education levels varied between High 
School and PhD with the majorly (57%) being in the High School level and 32% with 
bachelor degrees while the rest have higher educational degrees such as Masters and 
PhD.  The participants also came from a wide variety of work and study fields and 
backgrounds ranging from trainees in Oil and Gas to part-time students in fields such 
as Human Resource, IT and Engineering.  Participants also had different responsibilities 
at their workplaces ranging from leadership and management positions to trainees and 





4.5 Ethical Issues 
 
This awareness program is a preventive measure against Phishing attacks, however, the 
improper knowledge resulting from not fully completing the program could potentially 
increase the sensitivity of participants to Phishing attacks.  On the other hand, gaining 
the knowledge with lack of accountability could also introduce a risk of abuse or 
malicious use of the knowledge.  Therefore, as a precautionary measure, participants 
should be made aware of their accountability and need to ensure due diligence for 
proper use of the knowledge shared and that they should always adhere to secure 
practices.  This study was given ethical approval by Lancaster University FASS-
LUMS Ethics Committee, see appendix D. 
 
Other than the above, no major ethical issues emerged during the conduct of the 
research because ethics related matters had been considered in the design of the research 
from the very beginning.  Preventive measures had been established to protect and 
handle ethical considerations such as participants’ information confidentiality which 
was taken care of in the participation consent obtained as part of the 1st Test (See 
appendix C).  The 1st Test was designed to include the participation consent form by 
which ethical considerations and conditions were explained to participants as 
participants were free to accept or reject the consent statement.  Participants were 
assured that their information would be classified as confidential information and 
anonymized, and that it would only be used for data analysis in this research.   In 
addition, participants could choose to withdraw from the research at any time before 
data analysis commenced.  Participants were also assured that their data would be 
securely handled and retained anonymously in secure media storage.  Videotaped 
footage of the online group discussions during the awareness sessions and the 
classroom based sessions were also stored in secure storage media as participants were 
assured that these videos would only be used in the research data analysis and would 
not be disclosed outside that scope.  All information of participants who failed to 
complete the 5 steps, but agreed to the consent was dropped completely from the 




4.6 Researcher’s Role 
 
Combining Action Research with a Design Based Research (Andriessen, 2007) to 
execute and enact the design, the researcher was heavily engaged in the design, 
development and implementation of the research action plan.  The researcher has 
developed the awareness materials and assessment tests’ content and measurements, 
tutored awareness sessions online and at a classroom.  These activities the research took 
on were part of implementing the conceptual framework designed for conducting this 
research.  Finally, the researcher’s role was to conduct data analysis to verify and 
validate the learning outcomes from implementing the conceptual framework against 
the research questions and objectives.  In this research type and environment, where the 
researcher is heavily engaged in conducting the research and particularly when the 
researcher had practiced tutoring online and in a classroom, the risk of bias (Elliot, 
1999) is high as the researcher is the designer and the action taker at the same time 
(McKay and Marshall, 2001) knowing exactly what needs to be achieved.  The 
researcher might unconsciously drive the research and the results thereof to where the 
results could meet the objectives of the research.  Therefore, the researcher has always 
taken extreme care and constantly reminded himself to remain a diligent, and reflective, 
observer of personal and participants’ actions while simultaneously being a moderator 
for action.  This has allowed the researcher to observe participants’ reactions and 
responses during awareness group discussions more closely with an eye on the 
researcher as well to avoid directing participants’ actions while recording observations 




Moreover, the experience of tutoring online and in a classroom added a great value to 
the researcher’s engagement by deepening the researcher’s understanding of how 
knowledge was constructed through collaborative information sharing and exchanging 
individual experiences of participants as well as tutors in the research.  Part of this 
added value was in understanding the differences between the online and classroom, or 
Face-to-Face, environments as far as tutoring and knowledge construction are 
concerned including the reason for Blended Learning emerging to compensate for such 
differences (Rovai and Jordan, 2004).  An example of these differences observed was 
the loss of facial expressions and eye contact in the online virtual environments which 
might have caused detachment from the online group and impacted the learning 
outcomes and the effectiveness of the knowledge construction process. 
 
4.7 Validity and Reliability 
 
Validity and reliability are two important attributes of quantitative research 
(Golafshani, 2003; Winter, 2000) in which research instruments, content and results 
should demonstrate an acceptable level of validity namely instrument validity, content 
validity and external validity respectively (Winter, 2000).   
Although Factor Analysis is a reliable method to assess validity in quantitative research, 
it was not used in this research since the sample size in this research is 100 participants 
is not large enough to meet the prerequisite of using Factor Analysis which is 10-15 
participants per item in the questionnaire in order to produce meaningful results 
(Melainie, 2012).  Although, Factor Analysis can be used to measure validity of binary 
datasets such as the True/False questions used in the dataset of this study (Goforth, 
2015), yet it is more efficiently used with a dataset featuring scaled responses and 
continuous variables such as those using Likert Scales that measures for example, 
attitude, favouritism, pleasure (Melainie, 2012). 
 
With regards to using Cronbach’s alpha for assessing reliability, the reverse-phrased 
scores in the dataset being either 0 or 1 will produce negative covariance between the 
scores which will render lower and consequently incorrect Cronback’s alpha (Melainie, 
2012).  For these reasons, qualitative validity and reliability methods are used. 
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Instrument validity is demonstrated by developing the tools used for collecting the data 
in this research using SurveyMonkey which is a reliable and trustworthy online 
platform for developing surveys and questionnaires.  These tools were used as the 
means for conducting the three assessment tests through which the research data was 
collected.  On the other hand, content validity was manifested by the content of the 
three assessment tests and the awareness materials which were developed in conformity 
with the findings from the literature review as far as the research objectives and 
questions were concerned.  The content of the three assessment tests and the awareness 
materials was developed to be consistent with and reflective of the behavioural factors 
identified through the literature review in response to the identified online learners’ 
awareness needs about exploiting human behavioural factors in Phishing attacks.  
Based on the adopted Situation Awareness Model of Endsley (2015), the content of the 
tests and awareness sessions demonstrated the exploitation of behavioural factors using 
fictitious scenarios similar to the real-world phishing incidents reported in security 
reports found in the literature.  The similarity of the fictitious scenarios to the real-world 
attacks was meant to ensure the validity of the tests’ content or in other words the 
content of the research instruments used.   
 
Finally, the external validity of the collected data which lies in the generalizability of 
the research findings from the research sample to the full population (Merriam, 1995) 
of online learners was considered from the beginning by selecting a representative 
sample of the population.  The sample was selected based on one criteria which was a 
participant must be an online learner or have spent some time in online learning.  The 
number of participants selected was 100, which is considered to be within the 
acceptable range of 30 to 500 participants with (5%) of confidence to produce valid and 
reliable results that are generalizable (Delice 2010). 
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The reliability of the data is concerned with the consistency of the measurements used 
to assess and measure the data and the outcomes of data analysis in the research (Winter, 
2000).  In this research, the data collected from the three assessment tests are the 
participants’ scores.  Two measures were taken to ensure consistency of the 
measurements and thus the reliability of the data in this research (Burke, Fahn, 
Marsden, Bressman, Moskowitz, and Friedman, 1985).  First, the scoring scales were 
standardized among the three tests to ensure equality and norm.  Second, weight factors 
were assigned to each test respective to the test’s incremental difficulty level that had 
been built into its content and design.  These weights were factored in the calculation 
of the scores of each test to ensure fairness and consistency of score measurement 
among all three tests.  The quality and credibility of the collected data depended so 
much on the design of the tests to encourage participants to answer the questions by 
posing user friendly designs.   
 
4.8 Data Collection Strategy 
 
Data collection started as soon as the literature review started as a preparatory step for 
further data gathering at a later stage.  During the literature review, relevant materials 
on Phishing behavioural factors were consulted.  The outcome of the literature review 
was the identification of 16 exploitable behavioural factors behind tricking victims in 
Phishing attacks.  See Chapter 2 for details on these behavioural factors. 
1. Temptation. 
2. Urgency or Scarcity. 
3. Over-confidence or Self-Consciousness. 
4. Over Trust. 
5. Authority. 
6. Threatening, Fear or Anxiety. 
7. Social Proof. 
8. Likability and Similarity. 
9. Reciprocation. 
10. Curiosity or Excitement. 
11. Commitment and Consistency. 
12. Overloading. 





16. Interpersonal Relationships. 
 
All the above-mentioned behavioural factors were used as the basis for developing the 
awareness course materials and the assessment tests used during the data collection 
phase which is explained next.  As explained in Chapter 3, the data collection procedure 
involved carrying out 5 activities in addition to the initial literature review.  These are: 
1. Develop and conduct the 1st Test, including, collecting participants’ consent and 
demographic information.  
2. Develop the material for Awareness Session #1 and conduct it. 
3. Develop and conduct the 2nd Test. 
4. Develop the material for Awareness Session #2 and conduct it. 
5. Develop and conduct the 3rd Test. 
Five tools corresponding to each step of the data collection procedure were developed.  
Thus, three surveys were developed as the tools used to facilitate the 3 tests and two 
Power Point presentations contained the course material for conducting the two 
awareness sessions.  A detailed discussion of the development of these 5 tools is next. 
 
4.9 Data Collection Tools 
 
First, three surveys were developed to facilitate collecting participants’ consent to 
participate in the research, participants’ demographic information (Categorical data 
about the participants such as years of experience being an online student, education 
level and age).  This is in addition to conducting the three assessment tests to measure 
participant awareness and understanding about the 16 behavioural factors behind 
Phishing attacks identified during the literature review.  SurveyMonkey (Waclawski, 




SurveyMonkey Survey - the 1st Test:  The 1st Test serves three purposes. First, it 
provides the means to get the participant’s consent to participate in the research. 
Secondly, it gathers demographical information about the participants such as age, and 
education.  Thirdly, it delivers the 1st assessment test which serves as the pre-awareness 
test taken by participants before attending the planned two Phishing awareness sessions.  
The objective of the 1st Test is to assess and measure the participants’ preliminary level 
of understanding about Phishing. This preliminary level of understanding is called 
‘Perception’ according to Endsley’s Situation Awareness Model (Endsley, 2015) 




The 1st Test comprises 20 questions.  Each question is composed of an imaginary 
scenario manifesting one of the 16 Phishing behavioural factors as the Phishing bait to 
trick potential victims to fall prey to it.  16 of these 20 questions demonstrate a Phishing 
scenario, while 4 questions demonstrate non-Phishing normal scenarios inserted 
between the test’s questions just to create the required testing effect.  The 20 questions 
are Dichotomous questions (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2011) which require a 
nominal answer provided in a selectable answer list as ‘Phishing’ or ‘Non-Phishing’ 
(see Figures 2 and 3).  Thus, each question requires the participants to carefully read 
the scenario, evaluate it and provide an answer by choosing one of the selectable 
answers describing the scenario as Phishing or Non-Phishing based on the participant’s 
preliminary understanding of Phishing and evaluation of the scenario.  As far as the 1st 
Test is concerned, the assessment of the participants’ preliminary understanding of 
Phishing requires the participants to demonstrate their ability to distinguish a Phishing 
Scenario from a Non-Phishing scenario without being asked to identify the Phishing 
behavioural factors underlying each scenario at this preliminary stage.  However, in the 
event they chose ‘Phishing’ as the answer, they were required to answer a follow-up 
open-ended question explaining in their own words the reasons for choosing ‘Phishing’ 
as the answer; or in other words, their own rationale for why they believed the scenario 
was Phishing.  For example in a Phishing scenario, the attacker used temptation (Jagatic 
et al, 2007; Kirlappos and Sasse, 2012) as the bait to lure victims into the Phishing trap.  
Temptation is the underlying behavioural factor that was used as an incentive to 
manipulate victims and impact their logical decision making process so that they would 
fall into the trap (Thabtah and McCluskey, 2012).  If the participant chose ‘Phishing’ 
as the answer, he or she was required to support their answer by stating the reasons for 
choosing that answer.  In the Non-Phishing scenario, there are no implied behavioural 
factors involved that would hint Phishing to the participant.  It is only there to test the 





Figure 2 - Example of 1st Test's Scenarios 
 
Figure 3 -Example of 1st Test's Scenarios 
 
SurveyMonkey Survey - the 2nd Test:  As the 1st Test’s objective was to provide for the 
pre-awareness assessment, the 2nd Test provides for the post-awareness assessment for 
participants after taking the first Phishing awareness session.  The 2nd Test aims to 
assess whether there was a significant improvement in participants’ understanding 
about Phishing after having attended the first awareness session by comparing their test 
scores before and after attending the awareness session; e.g. comparing their scores on 
the 1st Test (Pre-Awareness Assessment) with their scores on the 2nd Test (Post-
Awareness Assessment).  The participants in both tests were the same group; however 
their scores on the 1st test represented the control group (Fraenkel,, Wallen, and Hyun, 




Unlike the 1st Test, the 2nd Test comprises 7 Phishing scenarios composed of combining 
two or three behavioural factors from the 16 factors into one scenario to bait the victim.  
Hence, the 2nd Test covers all the 16 behavioural factors using 7 scenarios only.  
However, the 2nd Test adds an extra level of difficulty to the scenarios to match up to 
the expectations of the second highest level of awareness according to the Situation 
Awareness Model (Endsley, 2015) namely ‘Comprehension’ against which participants 
in the 2nd Test are assessed.  Yet, the 2nd Test maintains the similarity of content with 
the 1st Test.  The extra level of difficulty in the 2nd Test is meant for testing a higher 
level of understanding in the participants expected to be gained after attending the first 
awareness session.  In order to quantitatively measure the participant awareness 
improvements gained between the two tests, the participants’ scores on each test are 
factored by a weight assigned to the level of difficulty manifested by the test 
corresponding to the level of awareness assessed respective to Endsley’s Situation 
Awareness levels (Endsley, 2015) which is Perception in the 1st Test, Comprehension 
in the 2nd Test and Projection in the 3rd Test.  More on this was discussed in Chapter 3, 
Section 3.5. 
 
In the 2nd Test, participants were not asked to choose whether a scenario was Phishing 
or not because all the 7 scenarios were Phishing scenarios.  Instead, they were asked to 
identify the behavioural factors involved in each of the Phishing scenarios by selecting 
the correct answer out of 7 possible predefined answers.  The same 7 predefined 
answers were provided under the 7 scenarios with only one answer being the correct 
answer.  Thus, participants could select one answer only.  Each answer comprised two 
or three behavioural factors.  Figure 4 shows one of the 7 scenarios on the 2nd Test with 




Figure 4 Example of 2nd Test's Scenarios 
 
SurveyMonkey Survey - the 3rd Test:  After the same groups of participants had taken 
the 2nd Test, their scores on the 2nd Test represented the control group’s scores against 
which their scores on the 3rd Test were compared (Experimental Group).  So after the 
second awareness session had been attended, the 2nd Test became the pre-awareness 
assessment test and the 3rd Test became the post-awareness assessment test.  The 3rd 
Test aimed to assess whether there was another significant improvement in participants’ 
understanding about Phishing after attending the second awareness session compared 
to the assessment results from the 2nd Test.   
 
Like the 2nd Test, the 3rd Test also comprised 7 Phishing scenarios combining two or 
three behavioural factors from the 16 factors to bait the victim.  Hence, the 3rd Test also 
covered all the 16 behavioural factors using 7 scenarios only.    The 3rd Test adds an 
extra level of difficulty to the scenarios while maintaining similarity of content with the 
1st and 2nd tests.  The extra level of difficulty in the 3rd Test was meant for testing the 
highest level of understanding acquired by the participants after attending the first and 
second awareness sessions.  According to the adopted Situation Awareness Model 
(Endsley, 2015), the third level of understanding assessed by The 3rd Test is the 
‘Projection’ level.  In order to quantitatively measure the participant awareness 
improvements gained between the 2nd Test and the 3rd Test after attending the two 
awareness sessions, the participants’ scores on each test were factored by the given 
weights of difficulty respective to the level of awareness level assessed by each test.    
More on this was discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.5. 
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In the 3rd Test, participants were presented with 7 Phishing scenarios and were asked to 
infer the most relevant behavioural factors that a Phishing attacker would exploit 
according to the situation presented in each Phishing scenario and answer by selecting 
the correct answer out of 7 possible predefined answers.  The same 7 predefined 
answers were provided under the 7 scenarios with one answer only being the correct 
answer where each answer comprised two or three behavioural factors.  Figure 5 shows 
one of the 7 scenarios on the 3rd Test with the 7 answers below.  
 
 
Figure 5 - Example of 3rd Test's Scenarios 
The answers collected from the three tests were nominal data which was unsuitable for 
conducting quantitative analysis (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2011).  Therefore, the 
collected nominal data was converted to parametric ratio data by calculating the sum of 
the correct answers for each question.  This technique provided the required data 
conversion from nominal to ratio rendering the data suitable for consumption by 
quantitative parametric data analysis tests in order to statistically compare the variances 
between the mean scores among the three tests.  The conducted variance analysis for 
the three tests’ scores helped verify the learning outcomes and validate the effectiveness 
of the proposed conceptual framework used in conducting the awareness sessions as it 
also provided answers to Research Question 2.  More on this will be discussed in detail 





4.10 Awareness Session #1 and #2 
Participants attended and interactively participated in the group discussions of the 1st 
and 2nd awareness sessions after they had completed the 1st and 2nd assessment tests 
respectively.  That was to assess whether participants had progressed from the 
Perception level to the Comprehension level after the 1st awareness session and from 
the Comprehension level to the Projection level after the 2nd session.  During these 2 
awareness sessions about the behavioural factors underlying Phishing attacks, 
participants discussed in depth the scenarios from the 1st and 2nd Tests as examples to 
enhance their understanding of how the 16 behavioural factors would be used by 
attackers.  The group discussions were important for participants to improve their 
awareness and take their awareness to the next level and gain the required knowledge 
for the post-awareness assessment tests. 
 
Both awareness sessions were conducted online repetitively using Google hangouts to 
accommodate groups ranging from 5 to 10 participants until all the 40 participants 
categorized as the Online Group were covered.  On the other hand, Face-to-Face version 
of the two sessions were also conducted using a classroom-based setup to accommodate 
the remaining 60 participants categorized as the Face-to-Face group.  The agenda of the 
2 awareness sessions consisted of a thorough review of the 16 behavioural factors 
followed by a group discussion of the  imaginary Phishing scenarios on the 1st  and 2nd 
assessment tests; making links to the 16 behavioural factors.  The objective of the 
assessment tests was to verify that the learning outcomes participants demonstrated 
during the two awareness sessions were significantly reflected in participants’ scores. 
4.11 Data Collection Process 
Data collection and participants’ recruitments were carried out in parallel spanning over 
8 months of coordination, arrangements, scheduling, re-arrangements and rescheduling.  
As participants were recruited, they were informed that the 5 step process had to be 
fully completed in order for their participation to be accepted and to successfully finish 
their participation cycle.  This means that if they agreed to the participation consent, 





When a participant had completed the 1st Test, an average of one week elapsed before 
he or she could join a group of around 5 to 10 participants to attend the online 
Awareness Session #1.  When the awareness session was scheduled, an invitation was 
sent to each participant in the session attendee list for acceptance.  Once invitations 
were accepted, the session was conducted online as scheduled using Google Hangouts.   
As more participants completed the 1st Test, they were joined and scheduled to attend 
Awareness Session #1. 
 
Once a group of participants attended Awareness Session #1, they were sent a link to 
the 2nd Assessment Test and requested to complete it.  When a group of participants 
had completed the 2nd Test, around a week later they attended Awareness Session #2. 
Once, a group had attended Awareness Session #2, attendees were sent a link to the 3rd 
Assessment Test.  Finally, when a group of participants complete the 3rd assessment 
Test, their participation come to an end.  This cycle continued almost for 20 weeks until 
all 40 online participants had completed the 5 steps of their participation.  Although the 
process seems straight forward, it involved a lot of coordination and rescheduling for 
make-up sessions as some participants did not show up in the online awareness 
sessions, did not complete tests on time or rejected invitations due to time-zone issues 
or other personal reasons.   
 
With the 60 Face-to-Face participants, the same cycle of steps 1, 3 and 5 took place.  
However the two Face-to-Face awareness sessions were conducted one time each for 




Both the Online and Classroom-based awareness sessions took about 1 hour and a half.  
However, the classroom-based sessions were more interactive compared to the online 
versions.  In the classroom-based Face-to-Face awareness sessions, participants were 
asked to come out in pairs in front of all the other 60 participants and play roles of the 
Phishing victims and attackers in the imaginary phishing scenarios discussed during the 
session.  This level of interactivity could not be easily achieved in the online sessions. 
Moreover, participants showed their creativity by coming up with their own phishing 
scenarios that were discussed and analysed as well during the group discussions in both 
the online and Face-to-Face sessions. Participant recruitment formed a critical part in 
how the data collection work progressed.  Later in this chapter, participant recruitment 
is discussed. 
4.12 Data Collection Issues 
The data collection activities having been tightly coupled with recruitment of 
participants and participation became an over-whelming and time consuming process 
that demanded a lot of coordination effort and arrangements with participants.  Eight 
months of hard work was put into finding the right candidates to participate in the 
project and to maintain their continued participation until all the 5 steps of the data 
collection process were successfully completed, a number of obstacles were 
encountered and eventually overcome along the way.  The following are these obstacles 
dealt with during the course of data collection: 
 
• Discontinued Participation:  The participation process is a lengthy 5 step process 
that required the completion of all 5 steps.  On average each participant’s 
activities were planned and scheduled over two weeks however most 
participants would not be able to continue all the way and would just drop out 
part way through.  As a result, more than 650 participants were dropped from 
data analysis.  This necessitated a further search for more new participants every 
time it was thought that the required number of participants had been finally 
obtained.  However, data gathering ceased when 100 participants successfully 
completed all the required steps. 
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• Diverse Time Zones Issues:  Participants were located in different and diverse 
time zones as they were scattered in different parts of the world.  Some 
participants were in Saudi Arabia, while others were in the US and the UK.  This 
diversity of locations made it difficult to reconcile one standard schedule for 
conducting the online awareness sessions without some participants rejecting 
the invitation due to the inconvenient timing according to their time zones or 
simply not showing up at the scheduled session time after they had accepted the 
invitation.  This situation necessitated rescheduling of the online awareness 
sessions over and over again.   That, in addition to conducting make-up sessions 
at a very late Saudi Arabia time such as 2:00 a.m. to make up for absentees in 
order to help them synchronize their participation with the groups that had 
already been scheduled and conducted.  The compulsory chronological order of 
the participation process also made it even more difficult to arrange and manage 
those make-up sessions since for example, participants were not supposed to 
attend Awareness Session #2 if they had not attended Awareness Session #1 
and could not attend Awareness Session #1, had they not completed the 1st Test 
and so on.  However, with more participants on board and more perseverance, 
this issue was finally overcome. 
• Participants’ Slack Commitment to Schedule and Deadlines:  100 of 750 
participants had completed their participation cycle to the end.  The 100 
participants who made it to the end, had also issues with their commitments to 
the set deadlines.  For example, not showing up for the online awareness 
session, which happened very often, resulted in having to repeat parts of the 
session every time a late comer joined the discussion in order to get them up to 
speed.  The learning outcomes of late comers may have also been affected by 
their tardy attendance (Gillies and Quijada, 2008) which disturbed the flow of 
the session and might have potentially affected their scores on the three tests 
and the overall objectives of those awareness sessions. 
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• Technical Limitations of Online Environments:  Last but not least, the 
limitations of online environments for conducting group discussions may have 
had implications for how effectively the group discussions were conducted and 
the objectives achieved (Johnson et al, 2000; Wang and Woo, 2007; Walsh and 
Brown, 2013).  One of the major restrictions of online environments 
encountered was the limited number of participants to accommodate in an 
online session.  For instance, Google Hangouts has a limitation of 10 
participants per session (Isaacson, 2013), while Skype has a limit of 15 
participants (Nyíri, 2008) per session.  This made it impossible for the group 
discussions to accommodate more participants in fewer sessions to save time 
and coordination effort, and lessen the need for conducting more make-up 
sessions.  Another limitation was the diverse online supporting infrastructure 
from one location to another e.g. online technologies used such as the graphical 
media based collaboration web-based applications which are band-width 
dependent (Zhang, Zhou, Briggs, and Nunamaker, 2006) and hence are heavily 
affected by poor bandwidth connections.  Poor bandwidth forced some 
participants to disconnect from the session and reconnect multiple times thereby 
wasting session time and interrupting the flow of the discussion.  These 
disconnected participants were sometimes thrown out of the session without 
being able to reconnect resulting in having to reschedule them for a make-up 
session or two in the future thus requiring further coordination, arrangements, 
more time and effort.  Another limitation was the participants’ detachment from 
the online group discussion in case the moderator failed to maintain adequate 
social presence (Gunawardena, 1995).  This detachment happens because the 
participants may be too conscious of the actual physical barriers and the distance 
dividing them from the group they are engaged with over a virtual connection.  
Unlike the online group discussion, the Face-to-Face group discussions 
participants experienced physical presence, eye contact and facial expressions, 
which highly contributed to strengthening their feeling of social presence and 
therefore engagement in the discussion (Gunawardena, 1995).   
In the next sections, the tests’ scores standardization and tests’ difficulty levels 
weighting are discussed. 
 77 
 
4.13 Standardizing Scores 
As the 1st Test has 20 questions, its score scale is 20 compared to the 2nd and 3rd tests 
which both have only 7 questions and a corresponding score scale of 7.  In order to 
statistically compare the scores between the 3 tests and measure the significance of the 
differences in participant awareness, the score scales of the 3 tests had to be reconciled 
and therefore standardized to the scale of 7.  In other words, the scores of the 1st Test 
were scaled down from 20 to 7 in order to match the scoring scale of the 2nd and 3rd 
tests.   The 1st Test’s scores were standardized according to the following formula (IBM, 
2016; Aiken, 1987) taking the following steps:   
Standardizing Score Scale: Standardization of the 1st Test Scores was achieved by 
recalculating the original score as in the following formula: (7 - 1) * ((The 1st Test 
Original Score) -1) / (20 - 1) + 1.  This is interpreted as the following:   
1. Upper bound of the 1-7 scale = 7 is subtracted from the (Lower bound of the 1-
7 scale = 1) which is equal to (7-1 = 6). 
2. Then, the Original Score is subtracted from the (Lower bound of the 1-7 scale 
= 1). 
3. Then the results of the two subtractions above are multiplied together. 
4. Then, the product of the multiplication above is divided by the result of 
subtracting the (Upper bound of the 1st Test Original Score’s Scale 1-20:= 20) 
from the (Lower bound of the 1st Test Original Score’s Scale 1-20:= 1) which 
is equal to (20-1 = 19). 
5. Then, adding the result of the division above to the (Lower bound of the 1-7 
scale: = 1).   
 
For example, the original score of 13/20 is scaled down to 4.79/7 by recalculating it as 
(7-1)*(13-1)/ (20-1) +1 = 4.79 following the steps below: 
 (7-1) = 6 
 (13-1) = 12 
 6*12 = 72 
 72 / (20-1) = 3.789 
 3.789 + 1 = 4.789 
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The standardized scores on the 1st Test were used in all statistical tests that involved 
comparison of any two different sets of participants e.g. the Online and Face-to-Face 
participant groups within the same test.  However, for statistical tests that required 
comparison between the scores of two different tests whose level of difficulty varied, 
the standardized scores needed also to be weighted to equate the differences between 
the incremental levels of difficulty between the tests.   
 
Finally, not all the data collected for analysis are represented as test scores which are  
ratio data type (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2011).  Some of the collected data are 
Likert-scale items such as the participants’ age groups, education levels, which are 
ordinal data type (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2011).  Therefore, these ordinal data 
are converted to ratio data type using an appropriate coding scale based on their level 
(Allen and Seaman, 2007).  For example, education levels like High School, Bachelor, 
Masters and PhD are coded as 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively with High School given the 
lowest value of 1 and PhD given the highest value of 4 on a scale of 1 to 4.  After the 
conversion, all data becomes ratio data and therefore are ready for statistical analysis. 
The next section discusses how the weighted scores are calculated. 
4.14 Tests’ Difficulty Levels  
The Situation Awareness Model (Endsely, 2015) was adopted to raise awareness about 
the 16 Phishing behavioural factors to the participants.  Thus, the 3 tests aimed to 
measure the participant awareness and understanding levels of how the 16 behavioural 
factors would be exploited in 16 imaginary Phishing scenarios.  It was assumed that 
participant awareness would improve gradually from the initial Perception level, to the 
Comprehension level and finally to the Projection level as a result of participants 
attending the awareness sessions between the tests.  Therefore, the role of each test was 
to measure each level of the Endsley’s Situation Awareness (Endsley, 2015) by 
quantitatively analysing participant awareness improvements reflected by the 
participants’ scores on each test.  Despite the content of the 3 tests being similar, the 
questions and the answering approach were setup slightly different.  Each test was 
designed with increasing difficulty matching the corresponding difficulty level 
incorporated in the questions.   
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To maintain objectivity and fairness in the scoring scheme for the 3 tests, adjustment 
weights (Morris, 1982; Braun and Holland, 1982) were added to equate the differences 
in the scores due to the gradual difficulty levels on each test.  Therefore, in order to 
assess the significance of participant awareness improvements in each test, a proper 
weight was assigned to the difficulty level on each test and multiplied by each 
participant’s score.  The results then are the adjusted and reconciled scores between the 
three tests.  Next, the score weighting mechanisms are discussed. 
4.15 Weighting Scores 
 
Tests scoring scheme must be fair and should consider the variability in the difficulty 
levels between the three tests when scores are compared regardless of the differences 
in test forms (Kolen and Brennan, 2004).  Therefore, assigning a proper weight to factor 
in the level of difficulty in the scoring scheme is suggested (Kalliniatis et al, 2017; 
Poepjes, 2012) to ensure fair comparison between test scores.   
Following in the steps of the Situation Awareness Weighted Model (SAWN) model 
(Kalloniatis, Ali, Neville, La, Macleod, Zuparic, and Kohn. 178-196) to ensure that the 
weights assigned to each level of difficulty were objective, a consistent list of criteria 
(Jadhav and Sonar, 2009) was developed based on the answering approach required by 
each test.  Each criterion is assigned a weight based on the awareness level (Endsley, 
2015) measured.  Then, each test was compared to every criterion and assigned a value 
which then was added up to meet the preset criteria for that level.  If the test did not 
meet a criterion, a value of 0 was entered.  The summation of all criteria values for a 
test was the final weight assigned to the test’s difficulty level.  Table 1 shows the criteria 
list and the calculated weight for each test. 





As such, determining the proper weight to assign to a test, used a weighted objectives 
table (WOT) as a means of comparing several different alternatives ranked based on a 
list of criteria (Caro, 2011; Pesonen et al, 2001).  Also, Wright, Taekman and Endsley 
(2004) used objectives as a means to measure Situation Awareness.  In the same way, 
WOT is used in this research to compare the different difficulty levels between the three 
tests and to rank them accordingly.  The most difficult test is assigned the highest 
weight, while the least difficult test is assigned the lowest weight as illustrated in Table 
2.   
 
Table 2- Weighted Objectives Table for Tests 
 
Thus, the weights 1, 2 and 4 were proportionally assigned to the 3 Situation Awareness 
Levels namely Perception, Comprehension and Projection respectively as illustrated in 
Table 3. 





Considering the gradually increasing difficulty levels in each test’s objectives in 
proportion to the hierarchically ascending SA levels, respective ascending weights are 
assigned to each test based on the result of comparing and ranking the three Tests’ 
objectives.  These Tests’ objectives provide the basic criteria for such comparison.  For 
example, the 1st Test’s objective is to assess participants’ (Perception Level) ability by 
simply asking them to recognize a Phishing scenario without assessing their knowledge 
of the underlying behavioural factors exploited in the Phishing scenario.  Hence, the 
Perception level was given the weight value of 1; compared to the 2nd Test’s objective 
which aims to assess the ‘Comprehension’ level by requiring participants to take one 
step further to recognize the behavioural factors exploited in the Phishing scenario.  
Hence, the Comprehension Level as given the multiple value of 1 which is 2.  Finally, 
the 3rd Test which aims to assess the ‘Projection’ level by asking participants to 
demonstrate their ability to predict the behavioural factors most exploitable in the 
Phishing scenario was given the multiple value of 2 which is 4.  Thus, the multiple 
weights are calculated and assigned to the tests according to the different levels of 
difficulty embedded in each Test’s response objective.   Hence 1, 2 and 4 are used as 
the weight factors to effectively account for the respective tests’ levels of difficulty 
when comparing scores between these tests.    
 
There is no absolute way to assign specific weights to precisely match up to the 
difficulty level (Wang and Stanley, 1970) on each test since the judgement of how 
difficult a test is relative and judgemental.  Any combination of weights on different 
scales that represent ascending hierarchical values could be used and actually have been 
experimented with.  Nevertheless, the weight values (1, 2 and 4) are chosen based on 
its suitability to the standardized scoring scale of 1-7.  Accordingly, the three tests’ 
maximum standardized score will be 7 out of 7 and the total weights assigned to the 




As a result of this setup, a weight of one (1) is assigned to the 1st Test which provides 
assessment for the SA level 1 ‘Perception’.  The weight of one will ensure that the same 
score is rendered after multiplying the score by the given weight e.g. one (1).  This is 
to ensure that the starting difficulty level will match the ‘Perception’ level.    In other 
words, the weight assigned to each test will be based on multiples on a scale of 1-7.  As 
a result, The 1st Test will be assigned the weight 1 out of 7, which will always return 
the actual score e.g. multiplying the actual score by 1, since it represents the preliminary 
awareness Level – “Perception”.  Then, 6 units on the weighting scale are left after the 
‘1’ was assigned to the 1st Test.  Then, the 2nd Test is assigned double the weight given 
to the 1st Test which will be 2 out of 7.  In the same way, the 3rd Test will be assigned 
double the weight given to the 2nd Test, which is 4.  Adding the weights assigned to the 
three tests together (1+2+4) results in a total of 7 out of 7.   If the scores of the three 
tests are added together to be equal to 100% and then the total is divided by 7, the 1st 
Test will take 1 unit out 7, the 2nd Test will take 2 units out 7 and the 3rd Test will take 
the remaining 4 units on the weighting scale.   
 
The weights (1, 2 and 4) are converted to percentiles of the sum of the three Tests’ full 
weighted scores which is equivalent to the weighting scale of 7, This conversion is 
accomplished by dividing the full percentage (100%) by the total weighted score which 
is (7), resulting in the value of 14.29 for each unit on the weighting scale of 7.  To 
calculate the percentile equivalent to each test’s assigned weight, the respective test’s 
assigned weight value is multiplied by 14.29.  For example, the weight of ‘1’ will be 
calculated as (1* 14.29 = 14.29), the weight of 2 will be calculated as (2 * 14.29 = 
28.57), and finally the weight of 4 will be calculated as (4 * 14.29 = 57.14).   So, the 
final weighed score will be the result of multiplying the actual score by the respective 
test’s percentile and dividing the product of the multiplication by 100.  This means if a 
participant scores a 7 out of 7 on the 1st Test, his or her weighted score will be (7 * 
14.29) / (100), whereas the same score of 7 on the 2nd Test will be calculated as (7 * 
28.57) / (100) and of course the same score on the 3rd Test will be calculated as (7 * 




In other words, the total weighted scores a participant has accumulated over all the three 
tests will be calculated as one final score weighted over the scale of 7 which is equal to 
the sum of full scores on the three tests combined.   For example assuming a participant 
had scored a full mark of 7 on all the three tests, his weighted full score on the 1st Test’ 
would be 1 out of 7, his weighted full score on the 2nd Test would be 2 out of 7, while 
his weighted full score on the 3rd Test would be 4 out of 7.  Adding these three weighted 
full scores (1+2+4) will be the participant’s final weighted score of 7 out of 7 over the 
range of the three tests combined.    Hence, if a participant has the same score on the 3 
tests, each score will be evaluated according to the level of difficulty manifested by 
each test and the weight assigned to each test.  This way, the scoring scheme is fairer 
considering the varying difficulty levels on each test.   Table 4 shows these weights and 
their equivalent percentiles and how they are used to calculate the final weighted scores 
assuming the actual score is a full mark of 7 out of 7 on each test. 
 
Table 4 - Distribution of Weights 
 
 
There is also another benefit from the adopted weighting scale of 7 as shown in Table 
4.  Using the weighting scale, the ISACM (Poepjes, 2012) the Information Security 
Awareness and Capability Model can be easily adopted and implemented.  The ISACM 
consists of three components: 
 
1. Risk Importance is assigned in this study the maximum value on the weighting 
scale which is 7.  This means that the objective of our adopted SA conceptual 
framework (SAMFP) is to raise participant awareness to reach the maximum of 
the weighting scale by scoring a full mark on all the three tests. 
2. Risk Capability which is the current level of awareness a participant achieves 
after attending the awareness sessions.  This is represented by the participants’ 
scores on each test as shown in Table 4 
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3. Risk Residual, which is the difference between the Risk Importance (assigned 
the value of 7) minus the participant’s current awareness capability represented 
by the participant’s final weighed score after taking the three tests.   
 
The Risk Level is calculated based on the risk residual (difference between Risk 
Capability and Risk Importance).  For example, if the Risk Residual is less than or equal 
to the sum of the weights assigned to the assessed SA Level and the levels below it, the 
participant’s Risk Level will be categorized under that respective SA level represented 
by the test.  In other words, if the Risk Residual is equal to or less than 1 (Weight 
assigned to 1st Test), the Risk Level will be categorized as ‘Perception Level Risk’.  
Similarly if the Risk Residual is greater than 1 and equal to or less than 3 (Sum of (1+2), 
the weights assigned to the 1st and 2nd Tests respectively), the Risk Level will be 
categorized as “Comprehension Level Risk” and finally, if the Risk Residual is greater 
than 3 up to 7 (the sum of (3+4), the weights assigned to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Tests 
respectively) the Risk Level will be categorized as “Projection Level Risk”. 
 
These Risk Level categorizations are meant to distinguish participants from an 
awareness level risk standpoint.  For example, a participant whose category is in the 
‘Comprehension Level Risk’ means that he/she has successfully acquired a Risk 
Capability beyond the ‘Perception Level’, but yet has to acquire more awareness and 
knowledge to successfully achieve more awareness improvements within the range of 
the same level capability e.g. the “Comprehension Level”.   While a participant whose 
category is in the ‘Projection Level’, has successfully acquired a Risk Capability of 
awareness beyond the Perception and Comprehension levels as that would adequately 
protect him or her from the risks within the achieved awareness levels, yet they still 
need more awareness sessions to reach the maximum capability within the range of the 
their existing level e.g. the Projection level.  Thus, the participant is given more 
awareness sessions to help him/her achieve the advanced “Projection” SA level 
capability.  Even if a participant achieves the highest Risk Capability which is 7 on the 
adopted weighted score scale, he or she would still be within the ‘Projection Level 
Risk’.  There is always a potential chance for risk which means that risk cannot be fully 




Adopting the ISACM (Poepjes, 2012) as part of this research’s conceptual framework 
(SAMFP) has enabled not only measuring the current level of Situational Awareness 
participants have achieved, but also quantifying the progress made by participants over 
time and the gap left to be filled by performing more cycles of awareness sessions and 
tests to help participants achieve the maximum objective and Risk Importance level 
targeted.    
 
Finally, according to the above weights assigned to each SA awareness level and their 
respective tests, the tests’ scores are calculated to ensure the comparison between scores 
are fair and that the varying levels of difficulty on each test is factored fairly in the 
calculation of the final resulting score.  In Chapter 5, the scores from the 3 situation 
awareness level assessment tests are statistically compared and analysed for variance 
significance. 
 
The weighed scores are only used when comparing scores between two tests or more 
in which the level of difficulty varies.  However, when comparing scores between two 
sets of participants e.g. the Online and Face-to-Face participant groups within the same 




Chapter 5 Results 
 
This chapter aims to present the results of the data analysis and highlight the findings 
from the hypotheses testing and the correlations identified between the different 
datasets and participants’ demographics.  This chapter presents the results of the 
research into the effectiveness of the conceptual model SAMFP in improving 
participant awareness of the behavioural factors used in Phishing attacks.  In this 
chapter, analysis of the scores of the 3 assessment tests will be discussed covering the 
distribution of scores by question where each question is linked to the identified 16 
human behavioural factors.  The questions which received the most number of correct 
answers as opposed to those with the least number of correct answers will also be 
analysed and discussed.  After that, the discussion will cover the 18 hypotheses and the 
testing procedure.  In appendix A, the inferential analysis procedure developed for 
analysing the 18 hypotheses is discussed in detail.  Furthermore, the correlations of the 
hypotheses’ analysis results with the results from the descriptive analysis of 
participants’ demographics and tests’ questions will also be elaborated on.  Finally, the 
discussion will conclude with a detailed analysis of the characteristics of the highest 




5.1 Analysis of 1st Test’s Scores – Preliminary Awareness (Perception) 
The 1st Assessment Test features 16 Phishing scenarios out of 20 where each scenario 
potentially employs one of the 16 behavioural factors as the main incentive or bait set 
for trapping a victim.  Participants have to answer whether the scenario is a Phishing or 
non-Phishing scenario based on their preliminary understanding of the scenario.  If they 
answer the scenario as Phishing, they are then asked to describe in their own words the 
reasons for choosing such an answer.  These reasons are compared to the actual 
behavioural factor underlying the scenario.  This is to see how close and relevant their 
answers are to the actual behavioural factor in the scenario and to evaluate which of the 
16 behavioural factors are more easily recognized by the participants.  Choosing a 
correct answer on the 1st Test does not necessarily mean the participant recognized the 
correct behavioural factor underlying the scenario.  The participant could have just 
followed his/her intuitive feelings about something phishy in the scenario without 
actually knowing the actual behavioural factor exploited in the scenario.  This is left for 
the two awareness sessions to educate and equip participants with in-depth knowledge 
about these behavioural factors. 
 
Only 100 of the 750 participants continued their participation.  Consequently, the scores 
of the 100 participants who completed the full cycle of participation are analysed in 
order to measure awareness improvements and quantify risk residuals between attended 





5.3 1st Test’s Scores for 100 Participants 
The scores of the 100 participants who completed the full cycle of participation are now 
analysed.  The 4 non-Phishing scenarios had the highest number of correct answers as 
illustrated in Figure 8.   Phishing Scenarios #3, 18 and 8 representing ‘Over-Confidence 
and Self-Consciousness’, ‘Convenience’ and ‘Social Proof’ were correctly answered 
by the highest numbers of participants 79/100,  74/100 and 71/100 respectively; 
followed by scenarios #16 and 1 representing ‘Diffusion of Responsibility’ and 
‘Temptation’ which both were correctly answered by 66/100 participants.  The other 
scenarios representing the remaining behavioural factors ranged between 63/100 and 
28/100 participants.  Scenarios #11 and 4 representing ‘Reciprocation’ and ‘Over Trust’ 
respectively are the last two scenarios which received the lowest number of correct 


































Number of Participants with Correct Answers per Scenario on 1st 
Test out of 100 Participants
Scenario 10 - Non-Phishing
Scenario 5 - Non-Phishing
Scenario 15 - Non-Phishing
Scenario 20 - Non-Phishing
Scenario 3 - Over-Confidence
Scenario 18 - Convenience
Scenario 8 - Social Proof
Scenario 16 - Diffusion of
Responsibility
Scenario 1 - Temptation
Scenario 12 - Curiosity
Scenario 19 - Interpersonal
Relationships
Scenario 13 - Commitment and
Consistency
Scenario 14 - Overloading
Scenario 17 - Show-off
Scenario 9 - Likability and Similarity
Scenario 2 - Urgency or Scarcity
Scenario 7 - Threatening, Fear or
Anexiety
Scenario 6 - Authority
Scenario 11 - Reciprocation
Scenario 4 - Over Trust
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From a score standpoint, the average score recorded for the 100 participants on the 1st 
Test was 4.57 as shown in Table 9.  Figure 6 shows the distribution of the 100 
participants over the 1st Test’s score scale.  Thus, most of the 100 participants’ scores 
are distributed between 5 and 6 over 7, namely 27% participants scored 5/7, 24% scored 
6/7 and 18% scored 4/7.  On the other hand, only 17% participants scored 7/7.   
Table 9 - Statistics of 1st Test’s Scores 
– 100 Participants 
  
Figure 6 - 1st Test's scores for 100 participants 
The previous statistics show that 100 participants share a similar trend of scores and 
level of awareness about Phishing in general and Phishing related behavioural factors 
in particular.  This trend explains the preliminary level of awareness in the sampled 
participants where the average score is 4.31.  Mapping the scores to the underlying 
behavioural factors in each scenario indicates that the 4 non-Phishing scenarios had the 
highest scores.  On the other hand, ‘Over-Confidence’ and ‘Convenience’ were the 
most highly correctly answered scenarios out of the 16 Phishing scenarios, whereas, the 
‘Reciprocation’ and ‘Over Trust’ scenarios were the least correctly answered Phishing 
scenarios.  Next, the participants’ reasons for considering a Phishing scenario as 




5.4 1st Test’s Participants’ Comments (Reasons for Phishing) 
The objective of analysing participants’ comments is to evaluate the participants’ 
preliminary awareness level (Perception) of the 16 behavioural factors prior to 
attending the training sessions.  Participants’ reasons for considering a scenario as 
Phishing are analysed to see how closely they came to describing the actual behavioural 







Table 5 and Figure 7 show the 100 participants’ reasons are ordered by the highest 
frequency.  Accordingly, ‘Suspicious Request for Information’ (173, 10.81%) and 
‘Unknown/Untrusted Sender/Caller’ (129, 8.06%) are the most highly frequent reasons 
respectively.  However, ‘No Specific Reason’ (91, 5.69%) was the third highest reason.  
On the other hand, ‘Temptation’ (87, 5.44%) was the fourth highest reason whereas 
‘Suspicious Links’ (37), ‘Suspicious Course of Action’ (28), ‘Urgency’ (15), 
‘Monetary Matters’ (12), ‘Non-Credibility’ (7) and ‘Generality; (4) were the least 
frequently mentioned reasons respectively.   
 
Table 5 – 100 Participants' reasons (entered comments)  for ansering 1st Test's Scenarios to be Phishing, ordered 






Figure 7 – 100 Participants' comments on 1st Test ordered by highest frequency of entries 
 
Analysis of the participants’ reasons reveal a similar level of awareness specifically 
about the 16 Phishing related behavioural factors.  Their preliminary awareness level 
manifested the following observations from the comments’ frequency analysis: 
 
 Uncertainty denoted by the ‘No Specific Reason’ comment about the phishing 
reasons behind the 16 scenarios was common for both participant datasets and 
the most highly mentioned reason.  
 Generality of expressing Phishing reasons which was denoted by the 
‘Suspicious Request for Info’ and ‘Suspicious Course of Action’ comments 
mentioned in almost every scenario.   
 
On the other hand, the only 2 out of the 16 behavioural factors that were correctly 
referenced in participants’ comments were ‘Temptation’ and ‘Urgency’ which are 
represented by Scenarios 1 and 2 respectively.  ‘Temptation’ was referenced by 38% of 
the participants ,while ‘Urgency’ was referenced by 6% only.  The remaining 14 
behavioural factors were not clearly and specifically referenced in participants’ 
comments which indicates lack of in-depth awareness about these behavioural factors 





5.5 Analysis of the 2nd and 3rd Tests’ Scores (Comprehension and 
Projection) 
 
Unlike the 1st Test, the 2nd and 3rd Tests are shorter featuring only 7 scenarios each; 
compared with the 20 scenarios on the 1st Test.  However, these 7 scenarios are 
designed with more difficulty and complexity than those scenarios on the 1st Test where 
participants had to only choose an answer of whether a scenario was Phishing or Non-
Phasing whereas in the 2nd and 3rd Tests’ scenarios, participants have to identify the 
Phishing behavioural factor(s) underlying each phishing scenario.  The reason for the 
increased difficulty is to evaluate and measure whether the participant awareness level 
has improved after attending the 1st awareness session and that participants have 
achieved the next levels of awareness namely Comprehension and Projection through 
the applied SAMFP model underpinning this study.   
 
Each scenario on the 2nd Test introduces a potential Phishing situation where a 
combination of behavioural factors are employed to set up a potential victim.  The 
participants should be able to identify the combination of these behavioural factors 
underlying each scenario in order for the expected improvement in their awareness level 
to be indicated by the test results.   As illustrated by Table 6 and Figure 8, the highest 
score recorded was 85% for Scenario #1.  This means that 85 participants out of 100 
have correctly answered Scenario #1 choosing ‘Temptation + Urgency + Curiosity’ as 
the correct combination of behavioural factors employed in Scenario #1.  On the other 
hand, Scenario #5 had the lowest score of 33% in which ‘Diffusion of Responsibility + 
Social Proof + Likability and Similarity’ was the combination of behavioural factors 
underlying this Scenario.  Table 10 and Figure 10 show the 7 scenarios of the 2nd Test, 





Table 6 - 2nd Test's Scenarios and % of Correct Answers 
 
 
Figure 8 - 2nd Test's Scenarios and % of Correct Answers per scenario 
Table 7 shows that the 2nd Test’s unweighted scores have a mean score of 4.21 with a 
standard deviation of 1.86, Mode of 4.00, and a Median of 4.00. Distribution of the 
participants of the 2nd Test over the range of scores from 0 to 7 using the frequency bin 
is shown by Figure 9 where the highest number of participants is 19 scoring 4, followed 
by 18 participants scoring 5, 15 participants scoring 6, 14 participants scoring 3, 13 
participants scoring 7, 13 participants scoring 2, 6 participants scoring 1 and finally 








Figure 9 - 2nd Test's scores for all participants 
Similar to the 2nd Test, the 3rd Test has also 7 scenarios designed with even more 
difficulty and complexity than those scenarios of the 2nd Test where participants have 
to identify the Phishing behavioural factor(s) projectable for exploitation in each 
phishing scenario based on projection (Endsley, 2015).  The reason for the increased 
difficulty is to evaluate and measure whether the participant awareness levels have 
improved after attending the 2nd awareness session and that participants have achieved 
the ultimate level of awareness which is Projection by which participants can predict 
the potential behavioural factors a Phisher would exploit in a Phishing scenario. 
 
As illustrated in Table 8 and Figure 10, the highest score recorded was 56% for Scenario 
#2 choosing ‘Over-Confidence + Show-Off’ as the combination of behavioural factors 
most exploitable by an attacker.  On the other hand, Scenario #5 had the lowest score 
of 4% in which ‘Diffusion of Responsibility + Social Proof + Likability and Similarity’ 
was the combination of behavioural factors potentially projectable for Scenario #5.  
Table 9 and Figure 11 show the 7 scenarios on the 3rd Test and their percentage of 
correct answers.   
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Table 8 – 3rd Test’s scenarios ordered by highest number of correct answers 
 
 
Figure 10 - 3rd Test’s scenarios ordered by highest number of correct answers 
Table 9 shows that the 3rd Test’s unweighted scores have a mean score of 1.74 with a 
standard deviation of 1.08, Mode of 2.00, and a Median of 2.00.  Distribution of the 
participants of the 3rd Test over the range of scores from 0 to 7 using the frequency bin 
is shown by Figure 11 where the highest number of participants was 36 participants 
scoring 2, followed by 32 participants scoring 1, 16 participants scoring 3, 11 
participants scoring 0, 3 participants scoring 4 and finally only 2 participants scoring 
the highest as 5. 
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Table 9 - 3rd Test's statistics 
 
 
Figure 11 - 3rd Test's scores for all particpatns 
 
Figure 12 summarizes the distribution of participants by their unweighted scores 
(ranging from 0 to 7) for the 3 tests. 
 
 
Figure 12 – Participants grouped by their unweighted scores for the three tests 
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Despite the fact that the scores on each Test is affected by a gradual level of difficulty 
built into the test, however, the comparisons between the scores of the three Tests at 
this stage are carried out using the standardized scores not considering the given weight 
of the difficulty factor in the comparison.  The reason for not using the weighted scores 
is because the goal of these comparisons is to analyse and understand the distribution 
of the standardized scores over the 100 participants in each test as opposed to the 
hypotheses tests (Section 5.12) whose goal is to measure and compare the level of 
awareness improvements reflected by the participants’ scores, hence the weighted 
scores are used there instead.  Next, participants’ demographics are discussed. 
 
5.6 Participants’ Demographics 
From this point onward, participants’ demographics refer to the 100 Participants who 
completed the 5 phases of their participation only whose demographical data are 
collected as part of answering the 1st Test.  This data includes different attributes and 
demographics of the participants such as age group, education level and major, 
profession, and number of years spent in online study.  In the following sections, these 
participants’ attributes and demographics are discussed in detail. 
5.7 Participants’ Age Groups 
 
As the only criterion for selecting participants for this research was that they are 
studying online, other attributes such as gender was not part of the selection criteria.  
However, participants were required to answer the age question by selecting one of 7 
different age groups.  Each age group represents a 5 year span ranging from 20 to 51+ 
years as illustrated in Table 14.  The analysis of these age groups revealed that the 
majority of participants (74%), are in the 20-25 age group or alternately said, all 60 
participants in the Face-to-Face Group are in the 20-25 age group whereas (14/40) 
participants from the Online Participant group (35%) are in the 20-25 age group.  The 
next 10% of participants are all from the Online Participant group and are aged between 
26 to 30 years old.  All the other remaining 16% of participants are all also from the 
Online Participant group and are distributed over the other 5 age groups.  Table 10, 
Figure 13 and Figure 14 show the age groups break-down of the Face-to-Face 








Figure 13 - Age Groups Break-down for the Face-to-Face 
and Online particpatns 
 
Figure 14 - Age Groups Break-down for all 
participants combined 
 
5.8 Participants’ Education Levels and Major Field Studies 
  
Participants were requested to select one of 4 different education levels ranging from 
High School or below, through Bachelor and Masters’ Degrees to PhD to describe their 
education levels.  Eventually, analysis of participants’ education levels show that the 
majority of the Face-to-Face participant group (57/60) are in the High School level or 
below, while the majority of the Online Participant group (32/40) have a bachelor 
degree.  This explains the reason why all the Face-to-Face participant group are younger 
(in the 20-25 age group) than their counterparts in the Online Participant group who are 
distributed over the other different 7 age groups.  Table 11, Figure 15 and Figure 16 
illustrate the participants’ educational levels break-down. 






Figure 15 - Educational Levels break-down for the Face-to-Face and 
Online participants 
 
Figure 16 - Educational Levels break-down for all participants combined 
Dissecting participants’ education levels into majors as in Table 12 shows that 
participants study for 10 different disciplines and fields such as IT, education, 
Engineering, Medicine, Oil and Gas, Business Administration and Marketing, Fine Arts 
and Languages, Human Resource Management, Religious Studies and Science.  The 
top 3 disciplines are High School with the highest majority of participants (40%), 
followed by the Oil and Gas field which has 17% of participants and finally IT with 
13% of the participants. The other 30% participants are distributed over the remaining 
7 disciplines as shown in Table 12 and Figure 17.   
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Table 12 - Participants' Educational Levels by major 
 
 
Figure 17 - Participants' Educational Levels by major 
 
5.9 Participants’ Jobs and Number of Years in Online Study 
Participants’ years of online study is the only criterion for accepting them to participate 
in this project.  However, participants have spent different number of years in online 
study.  Participants were requested to select one of three categories ranging from below 
1 to above 5 years; based on the period of online study they have spent.  Table 14 shows 
these 3 categories and the break-down of participants by their jobs.  The statistics below 
show that the majority of participants (54%) have spent up to one year studying online 
and most of these participants are trainees with High School level qualification.     
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The second highest category is 27% of participants who spent in online study up to and 
beyond 5 years.  Again, the majority of these participants (14% of all participants; 
equivalently 52% of the ‘5 Years +’ category participants) are trainees as well.  Finally, 
the lowest category in number of participants is those who are in the middle group 
spending over 1 year and below 5 years.  19% of participants are in this category (1 to 
5 Years) with the majority (12% of all participants; equivalently 63% of the ‘1 to 5 
Years’ category participants) being trainees as well.  This makes the Trainee 
participants represent 57% of all participants; which explains the correspondence 
between this number and the number of participants with High School level 
qualification (59%) previously explained on participants’ education levels.   
The other 43% participants are represented by 8 different job categories such as 
Manager, Middle Management, Regular Employees, Senior Management, Team 
Leaders, Vice President, Unemployed and Others.  Most of these 43 participants (23% 
of all participants) have spent up to 1 year in online study, 13% have spent 5 or more 
years and finally 7% have spent from 1 to 5 years in their online study.  Table 13 and 
Figure 18 show these statistics in detail.   
Table 13 - Participatns by number 
of years in Online Study 
 
 






Table 14 - Participants' Years of online study by Job 
 
 
5.10 Participants’ Evaluation of ISS Role  
Last, but not least, Participants’ evaluation of Information Security Support (ISS) role 
at their workplace or school was obtained from participants in order to evaluate the ISS 
role from the participants’ standpoint in spreading awareness about Phishing and study 
the impact of ISS role on Phishing awareness raising.  Participants were requested to 
choose a category on a 6 point Likert scale (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2011) to 
evaluate the ISS role.  The Likert scale represents 6 categories ranging from ‘Worst’ to 
‘Best’ where ‘Worst’ is the lowest rating and ‘Best’ is the highest.  The Likert scale 
contains one more option for the ‘Not Sure’ category to represent neutrality.  
‘Excellent’, ‘Very Good’ and ‘Good’ represent the middle categories on the Likert scale 
between ‘Best’ and ‘Worst’. 
Table 15 and Figure 19 indicate almost half of the participants are highly satisfied with 
their ISS.  Thus, 49% of the participants have rated their ISS as ‘Best’, followed by 
21% as ‘Excellent’, 11% as ‘Very Good’, 7% as ‘Good’ and 2% as ‘Worst’ respectively 
while 10% of participants opted to be neutral by selecting the ‘Not Sure’ option.  37/49 
participants who rated their ISS as ‘Best’ are aged between 20 to 25 years and are part 
of the Face-to-Face group except for only 2 who are from the Online Group.  The 
majority of the 49 participants (36/49 participants) are in the high school education 




Table 15 - Participants' evaluations of ISS role in their organizations 
 
 
Figure 19- Participants' evaluations of ISS role in their organizations 
 
5.11 Tests’ Scores Analysis 
The SAMFP model (see Chapter 3 for more details) was designed and applied to raise 
awareness for a 100 participants who went through a series of 3 tests intervened by 2 
awareness sessions successively.  The outcomes of this experiment were the collected 
participants’ scores from the three tests.  To be able to understand and interpret the 
collected scores in accordance with the expected goals of the research and the proposed 
SAMFP model, a set of null hypothesis (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2011) were 
established to help in the analysis of these scores.  The analysis of the scores depends 
on statistically testing the scores for significance and verify whether the objectives and 
expected learning outcomes of SAMFP had materialized. Thus, the collected scores 
from the three tests are compared and contrasted with each other to identify variances.  
These variances are then analysed using a group of statistical tests to find out whether 
these variances are statistically significant.  The next section contains the details of the 
hypotheses and the analysis procedure to statistically test each hypothesis. 
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5.12 Tests’ Scores Analysis Procedure 
The 100 participants are divided into two groups based on the setup of the awareness 
sessions they attended whether online (40 participants) using Google Hangouts 
(Isaacson, 2013) or Face-to-Face (60 participants) using a classroom based setup.  The 
scores from the three tests are categorized into the following 9 datasets: 
   
1. Dataset of the 1st Test’s scores which contains all 100 participants including 
Face-to-Face and Online groups 
2. Dataset of the 1st Test’s scores which contains the Face-to-Face group only 
3. Dataset of the 1st Test’s scores which contains the Online group only 
4. Dataset of the 2nd Test’s scores which contains all 100 participants including 
Face-to-Face and Online groups 
5. Dataset of the 2nd Test’s scores which contains the Face-to-Face group only 
6. Dataset of the 2nd  Test’s scores which contains the Online group only 
7. Dataset of the 3rd Test’s scores which contains all 100 participants including 
Face-to-Face and Online groups 
8. Dataset of the 3rd Test’s scores which contains the Face-to-Face group only 
9. Dataset of the 3rd Test’s scores which contains the Online group only 
 
The separation of participants into these two different groups gives an opportunity to 
study and analyse the effect of Space which is a variable of the SAMFP model on the 
learning outcomes.  The Space variable is demonstrated by the online setup opposed to 
the Face-to-Face classroom setup through which the awareness sessions of SAMFP are 
delivered.  The other variable that may affect the outcomes of the SAMFP model is 
Time.  The Time variable is represented by the average time span over which each 
participant completed the five stages of SAMFP.  These time spans are not the same for 
all participants as they tend to complete the course consuming different periods of time.  
The representation of the Time variable and its effect on the outcomes of SAMFP will 
be discussed further in the Results Discussion Chapter.    
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The 9 datasets are statistically compared and contrasted for any significant variances 
between the tests’ scores.  The results from all the statistical tests are correlated to find 
any potential relationships that could influence and impact the scores of the participants.  
Nonetheless, some of the null hypotheses are stated to test the impact of some of the 
demographics of participants on the scores such as the participants’ age, education, 
number of years of online study and the role of ISS.  Hence, the null hypotheses are 
divided into three categories according to the scope of analysis: 
1. Hypotheses for an individual group’s scores across the three tests e.g. 
comparing the Online group’s scores on the 1st Test with the 2nd Test, the 2nd 
Test with the 3rd Test and the 3rd Test with the 1st Test. 
2. Hypotheses for two independent groups’ scores within each test e.g. comparing 
the Online Group’s scores with the Face-to-Face group’s scores on the 1st Test, 
then on the 2nd Test and finally on the 3rd Test. 
3. Hypotheses for analysis of participants’ demographics’ influence on the scores 
of each test e.g. the impact of participants’ age on the scores on the 1st Test, 2nd 
Test and 3rd Test. 
In order to achieve the objectives of the research and be able to answer the research 
questions of whether SAMFP has been able to help the participants’ improve and take 
their awareness about Phishing behavioural factors to the next levels, 18 null 





The first set of hypotheses consists of 3 Null and alternate hypotheses pairs aimed at 
testing whether there is a significant difference between the Face-to-Face and Online 
participant groups in gaining knowledge and improving awareness about Phishing 
behavioural factors.  These hypotheses are statistically tested by comparing the mean 
score of the participants in one group with the mean score of the participants in the 
other group to find out if the two compared mean scores are significantly different.  If 
the test result is significant, then the Null hypothesis will be rejected, otherwise 
supported and the Alternate hypothesis will be rejected.  Each null/alternate hypotheses 
pair is designed to test a level of participant awareness according to the Endsley (2015) 
Situation Awareness levels: ‘Perception’, ‘Comprehension’ and ‘Projection’.   
The second set of Null/Alternate hypotheses also consists of three hypothesis pairs.  
These 3 pairs aim to test whether there is a significant difference in the participants’ 
scores among the three tests.  However, this time the scores compared between the three 
tests are for the participants in the same group e.g. the Online participant group or the 
Face-to-Face group or all participants (combining online and Face-to-Face) as one 
group.  .  If the result of the test shows a significant difference between the scores, the 
Alternate hypothesis is accepted and the Null hypothesis is rejected.  This means that 
the respective participant groups (Online, Face-to-Face or all) either improved their 
awareness about Phishing after attending the two awareness sessions, or maintained the 
same/lower awareness level on the higher tests taking into account the fact that the 
higher tests are of increasing difficulty and weighted.  For example, participants’ 
scores on the 2nd and 3rd Tests’ scores are lower than their scores on the 1st Test.   
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This set of Null/Alternate hypothesis pairs do not specify on which test, participants 
performed significantly better and eventually gained higher levels of awareness.  For 
this reason, the third set of Null/Alternate hypothesis pairs are designed to compare 
individual pairs of datasets to identify which datasets have significantly made the 
difference among all compared pairs of datasets.  Therefore, nine (9) Null/Alternate 
pairs of hypotheses are stated to test whether the mean scores on the 2nd Test is 
significantly higher than the mean scores on the 1st Test considering that the participants 
attended the 1st awareness session before the 2nd Test.  Similarly, they test whether the 
mean scores on the 3rd Test is significantly higher than the mean scores on the 2nd Test 
and 1st Test respectively considering that participants had already attended the 1st and 
2nd awareness sessions; one before the 2nd  Test and the other one before the 3rd Test.  
It is worth noting that the level of difficulty on every test also varies and thus is taken 
into consideration when comparing the mean scores between the three tests.  This is 
accomplished by giving each test a specific weight that meets its level of difficulty.  
More on this has already been discussed in Chapter 4.   
 
The statistical tests chosen to compare these 9 Null hypotheses are two tailed t-tests 
(Zimmerman, 2017) aimed at verifying whether the participant awareness levels about 
Phishing had improved gradually after taking the awareness sessions.  Each pair of 
hypotheses test the awareness improvements for the Online participant group, the Face-
to-Face participant group and all participants combined against the three assessment 
tests.   
 
In summary, there are 3 Null/Alternate pairs of hypotheses comparing the mean scores 
of the 2nd Test with the 1st Test for all participants combined, Online participant group 
and Face-to-Face participant group to verify the Perception level.  In the same way, 
another set of 3 hypothesis pairs compare the Mean Scores of the 3rd Test with the 2nd 
Test for all participants combined, Online participant group and Face-to-Face 
participant group to verify if their awareness reached the ‘Comprehension Level’.  
Finally, another set of 3 hypothesis pairs comparing the mean scores of the 3rd Test with 
the 1st Test’s means scores for all participants combined, Online participant group and 
Face-to-Face participant group to verify if their awareness reached the ‘Projection’ 




If the result of any of these nine (9) tests does not significantly support the Null 
hypothesis and hence supports the Alternate hypothesis, this means two possibilities to 
be checked.  First, the mean scores on the compared Test e.g. the 2nd Test is significantly 
higher than the mean scores on the compared with Test e.g. the 1st Test, indicating that 
the awareness session given to the participants after the 1st Test and before the 2nd Test 
had significantly contributed to the improvement of participants’ level of awareness.  
The second possibility is that the mean scores of the 1st Test is significantly higher than 
that of the 2nd Test or the 3rd Test or the mean scores on the 2nd Test is significantly 
higher than the mean scores on the 3rd Test indicating that the awareness sessions given 
to the participants did not adequately contribute to improve the participants’ level of 
awareness.  The theory suggests that more iterations of awareness sessions may still be 
needed for the expected awareness improvements to materialize.  In either case 
(possibility), the resulting outcomes are in line with the theory of the proposed situation 
awareness conceptual framework SAMFP model.  
 
The last set of Null/Alternate pairs of hypotheses to test are aimed to assess the effect 
of participants’ demographical attributes on the scores and awareness achievements and 
to also use these participants’ attributes such as age groups, education level and number 
of years of online study to see if that can help predict the participants’ future scores on 
the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Tests through the use of Regression tests (Draper and Smith, 196). 
 
See Appendix B for a list of all the 18 hypotheses.  Now after the 18 Null/Alternate 
hypotheses pairs have been defined, the results of each tested hypothesis are explained 
next.  Please see Appendix A for details on the design of the statistical testing process 




5.14 Hypotheses Testing 
The 18 hypotheses will be statistically tested, analysed, compared and correlated and 
thus will provide the statistical information required to make meaningful conclusions 
about the assumptions made about the data in response to the research questions.   
Following the steps of the testing process explained in Appendix A and guided by the 
results of the normality and variance equality tests conducted on the data as part of the 
testing process, each hypothesis will be tested by the proper statistical tests.  The results 
will help determine whether to support the null or the alternate hypothesis.  After all 
the 18 hypotheses are tested and the results are analysed, more discussion of the results 
will take place in the next chapter ‘Results Discussion’.  Now the testing of the first 3 
hypotheses null/alternate pairs is discussed. 
5.15 Score Variance between Online and Face-to-Face Participant 
Groups within each Assessment Test 
The first three null hypotheses make an assumption that there is no significant 
difference in the level of awareness gain between the Online and the Face-to-Face 
participants on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Tests.   In order to test if these hypothesized 
assumptions are true, the means of the weighted scores of the two groups of participants 
are statistically compared using an Independent Two Sample t-Test (Cohen, Manion 
and Morrison, 2011) after having verified that both datasets meet the normality and 
variance equality assumptions required by the Independent Samples t-Test.  The 
Independent Two Sample t-Test is conducted three times comparing the two groups’ 
scores once for the 1st Test, then the 2nd Test and finally for the 3rd Test:  The results of 
these tests are as follows. 
 
H1: Comparing Datasets 2 and 3 
Null Hypothesis (H1a): There is no significant difference between the mean scores of 
the Online Group and the Face-to-Face Group on the 1st Test.   
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Test Results:  Since the Face-to-Face and Online Groups’ scores on the 1st Test have 
been verified to have an acceptable level of normal distribution and the results of the 
F-Test on the compared datasets indicated unequal variance, a two tailed Two Sample 
t-test assuming unequal variances is conducted.  The test shows that (p (two tailed) = 
0.60 > a = 0.05, t statistic = -0.518, df = 97) as in Table 16.  In conclusion, the results 
support the null hypothesis (H1a) that there is no significant difference between the 
mean scores of the Online Group (M = 0.65. SD= 0.14) and the Face-to-Face Group (M 
= 0.63. SD= 0.19) on the 1st Test and hence the Alternate hypothesis (H1b) is rejected. 
Table 16 - Two Sample t-test Assuming Unequal Variances Comparing Face-to-Face and Online Groups' 
scores on 1st Test 
  
 
H2: Comparing Datasets 5 and 6 
Null Hypothesis (H2a): There is no significant difference between the mean scores of 




Test Results:  Since the Face-to-Face and Online Groups’ scores on the 2nd Test have 
been verified to have an acceptable level of normal distribution and equal variances, a 
two tailed Two Sample t-test assuming equal variances is conducted as shown in Table 
17.  The test results indicated that there is no significant difference between the mean 
scores of the F2F Participants Group (M= 1.09. SD= 0.54) and the Online Participants 
Group (M=1.29, SD= 0.54) on the 2nd Test where (p (two tailed) = 0.07 > a = 0.05, t 
statistic = -1.80, df = 98).  Hence, the results support the Null hypothesis (H2a) and 
thus the Alternate hypothesis (H2b) is rejected. 
Table 17 - Using t-Test to compare Face-to-Face and Online groups' scores on 2nd Test 
 
 
H3: Comparing Datasets 8 and 9 
Null Hypothesis (H3a): There is no significant difference between the mean scores of 




Test Results:  Since the Face-to-Face and Online Groups’ scores on the 3rd Test have 
been verified to have an acceptable level of normal distribution and the results of the 
F-Test on the compared datasets indicated unequal variance, a two tailed Two Sample 
t-test assuming unequal variances is conducted.  The test results indicated that there is 
no significant difference between the mean scores of the Face-to-Face participant group 
(M = 0.91. SD= 0.62) and the Online participant group (M = 1.08, SD= 0.48) on the 3rd 
Test where (p (two tailed) = 0.12 > a = 0.05, t statistic = -1.54, df = 96) as in Table 18. 
In conclusion, the results of the test conducted support the null hypothesis (H3a) that 
there is no significant difference between the mean scores of the Online Group and the 
Face-to-Face Group on the 3rd Test and hence the Alternate hypothesis (H3b) is 
rejected. 
Table 18 - Two Sample t-test assuming unequal variances comparing Face-to-Face and Online Groups' 
scores on 3rd Test 
 
In summary as in Table 19 below, the 3 hypotheses (H1, H2 and H3) were tested to 
determine if there was a statistically significant difference between the Face-to-Face 
participants and the Online participants in acquired awareness as reflected by their 
scores on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Tests respectively.  The tests’ results show that there was 
no significance difference in the level of awareness gained between the two groups on 
the 1st, 2nd and the 3rd Tests.  It is noted that H1, H2 and H3 have different degrees of 
freedom despite the compared samples are the same in number.  This is due to the 
differences in variances and standard deviations of the two samples.  For example, H2 
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has equal variances where degrees of freedom are always rendered the same following 
the formula ((n1 + n2) – 2).  On the other hand, H1 and H3 have unequal variances and 
therefore, the formula tends to give different results depending on how large or small 
the differences between the standard deviations of the two samples.  MS Excel data 
analysis tool was used to generate these tests where it tends to round off the degrees of 
freedom to the next integer in case of unequal variances (Real.Statistics.com, 2017).  
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Table 19 - Results Summary of H1, H2 and H3 
 
5.16 Score Variance between Assessment Tests for each Participant 
Group  
The next 4th, 5th and 6th hypotheses test if there were significant awareness differences 
by the same group of participants between the three different Tests: 
 
H4: Comparing Datasets 3, 6 and 9 
Null Hypothesis (H4a): There is no significant difference between the mean scores 




Test Results:  Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is the appropriate statistical test to 
compare more than two datasets (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2011).  In this case, 
three datasets are compared by ANOVA.  These three datasets represent the scores of 
the three tests respectively.  Having already tested these three datasets for variance 
equality, the results indicated that the third dataset representing the 3rd Test’s scores 
compared to the 1st Test’s scores, had unequal variances which makes the whole idea 
of using ANOVA to compare the three datasets infeasible.  Therefore, the non-
parametric test “Kruskal-Wallis H” will be used as an alternative test to compare the 
three datasets.   Thus, Kruskal-Wallis H Test is conducted to compare the scores of the 
Online participant Group between the 1st Test and 2nd Test, between the 2nd Test and 
the 3rd Test and finally between the 3rd Test and 1st Test.  The results of the Kruskal-
Wallis H test indicates that there is a significant difference in the median scores between 
the 1st, 2nd and 3rd tests' scores for the Online participant group at the alpha level 0.05 
with H Statistic = 37.78  > H Critical  = 5.991 as shown in Table 20.  Therefore, the 
Null hypothesis (H4a) is not supported, hence the Alternate (H4b) is.  This indicates 
that there is a significant difference in the awareness levels between the three Tests’ 
scores for the Online participant group.  However, to determine on which test the 
significant difference resides, further individual statistical tests are conducted as part of 
the remaining hypotheses that follow where the effect size of any significant variance 
found is also measured. 






H5: Comparing Datasets 2, 5 and 8 
Null Hypothesis (H5a): There is no significant difference between the mean scores 
acquired on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Tests by the Face-to-Face participant group.   
 
Test Results:  Similar to the previous hypothesis (H4a), three datasets are compared 
using Kruskal-Wallis H test, however hypothesis (H5a) tests the Face-to-Face 
participant group’ scores across the three Tests.  Thus, Kruskal-Wallis H Test was 
conducted to compare the scores of the Face-to-Face participant group between the 1st 
Test and 2nd Test, between the 2nd Test and the 3rd Test and finally between the 3rd Test 
and 1st Test.  The results of the Kruskal-Wallis H test indicate that there is a significant 
difference in the median scores between the 1st, 2nd and 3rd tests' scores for the Face-to-
Face participant group at the alpha level 0.05 with H Statistic = 21.49  > H Critical  = 
5.991 as shown in Table 21.  Hence, the Null hypothesis (H5a) is not supported and 
therefore the Alternate (H5b) is supported indicating a significant difference in the 
awareness levels between the three Tests for the Face-to-Face participant group.  
However, to determine on what test the significant difference has emerged, further 
individual statistical tests are conducted as part of the remaining hypotheses that follow 
where the effect size of any significant variance found is also measured. 






H6: Comparing Datasets 1, 4 and 7 
Null Hypothesis (H6a): There is no significant difference between the mean scores 
acquired on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Tests by all participants combining the Online and Face-
to-Face Groups participants together.   
 
Test Results:  Similar to the previous hypotheses (H4a and H5a), three datasets are 
compared using Kruskal-Wallis H test, however hypothesis (H6a) compares the scores 
of all the participants combined from the two participant groups namely the Online and 
Face-to-Face across the three Tests.  Thus, Kruskal-Wallis H Test was conducted 
indicating a significant difference in the median scores between the 1st, 2nd and 3rd tests' 
scores for all participants at the alpha level 0.05 with H Statistic = 55.13  > H Critical  
= 5.991 as shown in Table 22.  Hence, the Null hypothesis (H6a) is not supported and 
therefore the Alternate (H6b) is supported indicating a significant difference in the 
awareness levels between the three Tests for all participants.  However, to locate which 
datasets caused the significant difference, further individual statistical tests have been 
conducted as part of the remaining hypotheses that follow where the effect size of any 
significant variance found is also measured. 






In summary, the hypotheses H4, H5 and H6 tested whether a significant difference in 
awareness gains between the participants had been reflected by their scores across the 
three Tests.  The results show a significant difference between the scores in all three 
tests and thus the 3 Null hypotheses above were not supported as shown in Table 23.  
The next set of hypothesise will identify where the significant of differences between 
the three tests’ scores lie and to what extent their effect was. 
Table 23 - Results Summary of H4, H5 and H6 
 
5.17 Score Variance between the 1st and 2nd Tests for each Participant 
Group  
The next 3 sections of hypotheses will test each pair of datasets individually to 
determine which one of the datasets exactly manifested the significant difference; hence 
two tailed paired t-tests were used.  For example, if the Online participant group had 
significantly differed in scores from one or two of the three Tests, the individual two 
tailed paired t-Test will ascertain on which test the Online participant group scored 
significantly different from the other test; whether higher or lower depending on which 
test their greater mean score was recorded.  Each 3 hypotheses in each section will 
address a pair of tests to compare the scores of the Online Group, Face-to-Face Group 
and all participants from both groups combined respectively.  As such, the next 3 
hypotheses will test the differences in mean scores between the 1st Test and 2nd Test. 
 
H7: Comparing datasets 1 and 3 
Null Hypothesis (H7a): There is no statistically significant difference between the 




Test Results:  A two tailed paired t-test was conducted to compare the mean scores 
between the 1st Test and 2nd Test for all participants to determine if there was a 
significant difference between the two tests and which test scores were significantly 
higher than the other.  This is to assess whether the participants had benefited from the 
awareness session they attended after they had completed the 1st Test and before they 
had taken the 2nd Test.  The participants’ scores on the 2nd Test (Experimental Group) 
are expected to be significantly higher than those on the 1st Test (Control Group) after 
participants had attended the 1st awareness session.  The result of the test shows as in 
Table 24 a significant difference between the mean scores on the 1st Test (M= 0.64, 
SD= 0.17) and the 2nd Test (M= 1.18, SD= 0.55) where the t statistic (df = 99) = -9.13 
and the P value two-tail = (<0.001) < alpha 0.05.  Therefore, it is concluded that the 
difference between the mean scores on the 1st and 2nd Tests are significantly different 
where participants scored higher on the 2nd Test compared with the 1st Test considering 
the higher mean score on the 2nd  Test (2nd Test’s M= 1.18 > 1st Test’s M= 0.64).  This 
conclusion does not support the Null hypothesis (H7a) and hence supports the Alternate 
Hypothesis (H7b).  The effect size of the significance of this mean score difference 
between the two groups’ is 1.49 according to Cohen’s d (Trending Sideways, 2017).  
Cohen’s d of 1.49 is considered large size effect according to the range “> 0.8” (Cohen, 
1992; Polyu.edu.hk, 2017). 
 





H8: Comparing datasets 3 and 6 
Null Hypothesis (H8a): There is no statistically significant difference between the 
mean scores on the 2nd Test and the 1st Test for the Online participant group.   
 
Test Results:  To test hypothesis (H8a), a two tailed paired t-test is conducted to 
compare the mean scores between the 1st Test and 2nd Test for the Online participant 
group to determine if there was a significant difference between the two tests and which 
test scores were significantly higher than the other.  This is to assess whether the Online 
participant group had benefited from the awareness session they attended after they had 
completed the 1st Test.  The participants’ scores on the 2nd Test (Experimental Group) 
are expected to be significantly higher than those on the 1st Test (Control Group) after 
attending the 1st awareness session.  Similar to hypothesis (H7a), the result of the test 
shows as in Table 25 a significant difference between the mean scores on the 1st  Test 
(M= 0.66, SD= 0.14) and the 2nd Test (M= 1.30, SD= 0.54) where the t statistic (df = 
39) = -7.14 and the P value two-tail = (<0.001)  < alpha 0.05.  Therefore, it is concluded 
that the difference between the mean scores on the 1st and 2nd Tests are significantly 
different where the Online participant group scored higher on the 2nd Test compared 
with the 1st Test considering the higher mean on the 2nd Test (2nd Test’s M= 1.30 > 1st 
Test’s M= 0.66).  This conclusion does not support the Null hypothesis (H8a) and hence 
supports the Alternate Hypothesis (h8b). The effect size of the significance of this mean 
score difference between the two groups’ is 1.89 according to Cohen’s d (Trending 
Sideways, 2017).  Cohen’s d of 1.89 is considered large size effect according to the 
range “> 0.8” (Cohen, 1992; Polyu.edu.hk, 2017). 
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Table 25 - Paired t-test comparing the scores of Online Group between 1st and 2nd test 
 
 
H9: Comparing datasets 2 and 5 
Null Hypothesis (H9a): There is no statistically significant difference between the 




Test Results:  Similar to the Online Group, the Face-to-Face participant group’s scores 
are compared through hypothesis (H9a).  Thus, a two tailed paired t-test was conducted 
to compare the mean scores between the 1st Test and 2nd Test for the Face-to-Face 
participant group to determine if there was a significant difference between the two 
tests and on which test,  scores were significantly higher than the other.  This is to assess 
whether the Face-to-Face participant group had benefited from the awareness session 
they attended after they had completed the 1st Test.  The participants’ scores on the 2nd 
Test (Experimental Group) are expected to be significantly higher than those on the 1st 
Test (Control Group) after attending the 1st awareness session.  Similar to hypothesis 
(H8a), the result of the test shows as in Table 26 a significant difference between the 
mean scores on the 1st  Test (M= 0.64, SD= 0.19) and the 2nd  Test (M= 1.10, SD= 0.54) 
where the t statistic (df = 59) = -6.09 and the P value two-tail = (<0.001)  < alpha 0.05.  
Therefore, it is concluded that the difference between the mean scores on the 1st  and 
2nd  Tests are significantly different where the Face-to-Face participant group scored 
higher on the 2nd Test compared to the 1st Test considering the higher mean on the 2nd  
Test (2nd Test’s M= 1.10 > 1st Test’s M= 0.64).  This conclusion does not support the 
Null hypothesis (H9a) and hence supports the Alternate Hypothesis (H9b).  The effect 
size of the significance of this mean score difference between the two groups’ is 1.26 
according to Cohen’s d (Trending Sideways, 2017).  Cohen’s d of 1.26 is considered 
large size effect according to the range “> 0.8” (Cohen, 1992; Polyu.edu.hk, 2017). 





5.18 Score Variance between the 2nd and 3rd Tests for each Participant 
Group  
The next 3 hypotheses will assess the differences in mean scores between the 2nd and 
3rd Tests in the same pattern as the previous 3 hypotheses above measuring the effect 
of attending the 2nd awareness session on the participants’ level of awareness before 
and after taking the 3rd test. 
 
H10: Comparing datasets 7 and 4 
Null Hypothesis (H10a): There is no statistically significant difference between the 




Test Results:  A two tailed paired t-test was conducted to compare the mean scores 
between the 2nd Test and 3rd Test for all participants to determine if there was a 
significant difference between the two tests and on which test, scores were significantly 
higher than the other.  This is to assess whether the participants had benefited from the 
awareness session they attended after they had completed the 2nd Test and before they 
had taken the 3rd Test.  The participants’ scores on the 3rd Test (Experimental Group) 
are expected to be significantly higher than those on the 2nd Test (Control Group) after 
attending the 2nd awareness session.  The result of the test shows as in Table 27 a 
significant difference between the means scores on the 2nd Test (M= 1.18, SD= 0.55) 
and the 3rd Test (M= 0.98, SD= 0.57) where the t statistic (df = 99) = 2.39 and the P 
value two-tail = 0.02 < alpha 0.05.  Therefore, it is concluded that the difference 
between the mean scores on the 2nd and 3rd Tests are significantly different where 
participants scored higher on the 2nd Test than on the 3rd Test considering the negative 
effect size explained below.   This conclusion does not support the Null hypothesis 
(H10a) and hence supports the Alternate Hypothesis (H10b).  However, the significant 
difference in the mean scores is in the opposite direction of the expected learning 
outcome of the Experimental Group as a result of attending two awareness sessions 
before taking the 3rd Test.  This unexpected finding will be further discussed in the 
Chapter 6 Results Discussion.  According to the significant difference being in the 
opposite direction of the experimental group, the effect size of the difference is also 
negative and medium sized.  The effect size of this mean score difference between the 
two groups’ is -0.35 according to Cohen’s d (Trending Sideways, 2017).  Cohen’s d of 
-0.35 is considered negative medium size effect according to the range “> 0.2 and <= 
0.5” (Cohen, 1992; Polyu.edu.hk, 2017). 
 126 
 
Table 27 - Paired t-test comparing the scores of all participants combined between 2nd and 3rd test 
 
 
H11: Comparing datasets 9 and 6 
Null Hypothesis (11a): There is no statistically significant difference between the mean 
scores on the 3rd Test and the 2nd Test for the Online participant group 
 
Test Results:  A two tailed paired t-test was conducted to compare the mean scores 
between the 2nd Test and 3rd Test for the Online participant group to determine if there 
was a significant difference between the two tests and on which test, scores were 
significantly higher than the other.  This is to assess whether the Online participant 
Group had benefited from the awareness session they attended after they had completed 
the 2nd Test and before they had taken the 3rd Test.  The participants’ scores on the 3rd 
Test (Experimental Group) are expected to be significantly higher than those on the 2nd 
Test (Control Group) after attending the awareness session.  The result of the test shows 
as in Table 28 a non-significant difference between the means scores on the 2nd Test 
(M= 1.30, SD= 0.54) and the 3rd Test (M= 1.09, SD= 0.48) where the t statistic (df = 
39) = 1.63 and the P value two-tail = 0.11 > alpha 0.05.  Therefore, it is concluded that 
the difference between the mean scores on the 2nd and 3rd Tests for the Online 
participant group was not significantly different.  Therefore, the null hypothesis (H11a) 
is supported and thus the alternate hypothesis (H11b) is rejected. 
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Table 28 - Paired t-test comparing the scores of Online Group between 2nd and 3rd test 
 
 
H12: Comparing datasets 8 and 5 
Null Hypothesis (H12a): There is no statistically significant difference between the 
mean scores on the 3rd Test and the 2nd Test for the Face-to-Face participant group.  
 
Test Results:  A two tailed paired t-test was conducted to compare the mean scores 
between the 2nd Test and 3rd Test for the Face-to-Face participants to determine if there 
was a significant difference between the two tests and on which test, scores were 
significantly higher than the other.  This is to assess whether the participants had 
benefited from the 2 awareness sessions they attended after they had completed the 2nd 
Test and before they had taken the 3rd Test.  The participants’ scores on the 3rd Test 
(Experimental Group) are expected to be significantly higher than those on the 2nd Test 
(Control Group) after attending the awareness sessions.  The result of the test shows as 
in Table 29 a non-significant difference between the means scores on the 2nd Test (M= 
1.10, SD= 0.54) and the 3rd Test (M= 0.91, SD= 0.62) where the t statistic (df = 56) = 
1.74 and the P value two-tail = 0.09 > alpha 0.05.  Therefore, it is concluded that the 
difference between the mean scores on the 2nd and 3rd Tests for the Face-to-Face 
participant group was not significantly different.   This conclusion supports the Null 
hypothesis (H12a) and hence rejects the Alternate Hypothesis (H12b).   
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Table 29 - Paired t-test comparing the scores of Face-to-Face Group between 2nd and 3rd test 
 
 
5.19 Score Variance between the 3rd and 1st Tests for each Participant 
Group  
Finally, the next 3 hypotheses will assess the differences in mean scores between the 
3rd and 1st Tests in the same pattern as the previous 6 hypotheses above assessing the 
mean scores between the 2nd and 3rd Tests and the 1st and 2nd Tests.  Throughout the 
next 3 hypotheses, the effect of the 1st and 2nd Awareness sessions participants attended 
after the 1st and 2nd Tests and before taking the 3rd Test is assessed and measured. 
 
H13: Comparing datasets 7 and 1 
Null Hypothesis (H13a): There is no statistically significant difference between the 




Test Results:  A two tailed paired t-test was conducted to compare the mean scores 
between the 3rd Test and 1st Test for all participants to determine if there was a 
significant difference between the two tests and on which test,  scores were significantly 
higher than the other.  This is to assess whether the participants had benefited from the 
2 awareness sessions they attended after they had completed the 1st and 2nd Tests and 
before they had taken the 3rd Test.  The participants’ scores on the 3rd Test 
(Experimental Group) are expected to be significantly higher than those on the 1st Test 
(Control Group) after attending the awareness sessions.  The result of the test shows as 
in Table 30 a significant difference between the means scores on the 3rd Test (M= 0.98, 
SD= 0.57) and the 1st Test (M= 0.64, SD= 0.17) where the t statistic (df = 99) = 5.92 
and the P value two-tail = (< 0.001) < alpha 0.05.  Therefore, it is concluded that the 
difference between the mean scores on the 1st and 3rd Tests is significant where 
participants (Experimental Group) scored higher on the 3rd Test than on the 1st Test 
considering the higher mean score on the 3rd Test (3rd Test’s M= 0.98 > 1st Test’s M= 
0.64) with a large positive effect size explained below.  This conclusion does not 
support the Null hypothesis (H13a) and hence supports the Alternate Hypothesis 
(H13b).  The effect size of the significance of this mean score difference between the 
two groups’ is 0.90 according to Cohen’s d (Trending Sideways, 2017).  Cohen’s d of 
0.90 is considered a large size effect according to the range “> 0.8” (Cohen, 1992; 
Polyu.edu.hk, 2017). 





H14: Comparing datasets 9 and 6 
Null Hypothesis (H14a): There is no statistically significant difference between the 
mean scores on the 3rd Test and the 1st Test for the Online participant group.  
 
Test Results:  A two tailed paired t-test was conducted to compare the mean scores 
between the 3rd Test and 1st Test for the Online participant group to determine if there 
was a significant difference between the two tests and on which test, scores were 
significantly higher than the other.  This is to assess whether the participants had 
benefited from the 2 awareness sessions they attended after they had completed the 1st 
and 2nd Tests and before they had taken the 3rd Test.  The participants’ scores on the 3rd 
Test (Experimental Group) are expected to be significantly higher than those on the 1st 
Test (Control Group) after attending the awareness sessions.  The result of the test 
shows as in Table 31 a significant difference between the means scores on the 3rd Test 
(M= 1.09, SD= 0.48) and the 1st Test (M= 0.66, SD= 0.14) where the t statistic (df = 
39) = 5.44 and the P value two tail = (<0.001) < alpha 0.05.  Therefore, it is concluded 
that the difference between the mean scores on the 1st and 3rd Tests is significant where 
participants (Experimental Group) scored higher on the 3rd Test than on the 1st Test 
(Control Group) considering the higher mean on the 3rd Test (3rd Test’s M= 1.09 > 1st 
Test’s M= 0.66) with a positive large effect size explained below.  This conclusion does 
not support the Null hypothesis (H14a) and hence supports the Alternate Hypothesis 
(H14b).  The effect size of the significance of this mean score difference between the 
two groups’ is 1.38 according to Cohen’s d (Trending Sideways, 2017).  Cohen’s d of 




Table 31 - Paired t-test comparing the scores of Online Group between 1st and 3rd test 
 
 
H15: Comparing datasets 8 and 5 
Null Hypothesis (H15a): There is no statistically significant difference between the 




Test Results:  The same test is also applied to the Face-to-Face Group.  Thus, a two 
tailed paired t-test was conducted to compare the mean scores between the 3rd Test and 
1st Test for the Face-to-Face participant group to determine if there was a significant 
difference between the two tests and on which test,  scores were significantly higher 
than the other.  This is to assess whether the Face-to-Face participant group had 
benefited from the 2 awareness sessions they attended after they had completed the 1st 
and 2nd Tests and before they had taken the 3rd Test.  The participants’ scores on the 3rd 
Test (Experimental Group) are expected to be significantly higher than those on the 1st 
Test (Control Group) after attending the awareness sessions.  The result of the test 
shows as in Table 32 a significant difference between the means scores on the 3rd Test 
(M= 0.91, SD= 0.62) and the 1st Test (M= 0.64, SD= 0.19) where the t statistic (df = 
59) = 3.52 and the P value two-tail = (<0.001) < alpha 0.05.  Therefore, it is concluded 
that the difference between the mean scores on the 1st and 3rd Tests is significant where 
participants (Experimental Group) scored higher on the 3rd Test than on the 1st Test 
(Control Group) considering the higher mean scores on the 3rd Test (3rd Test’s M= 0.91 
> 1st Test’s M= 0.64) with a medium size effect explained below.  This conclusion does 
not support the Null hypothesis (H15a) and hence supports the Alternate Hypothesis 
(H15b).  The effect size of the significance of this mean score difference between the 
two groups’ is 0.68 according to Cohen’s d (Trending Sideways, 2017).  Cohen’s d of 
0.68 is considered a medium size effect according to the range “> 0.5 and <0.8” (Cohen, 
1992; Polyu.edu.hk, 2017). 




In summary as in Table 33, three hypotheses (H7, H8 and H9) compared 1st Test’s 
scores with the 2nd Test’ scores which indicated significant differences in the 
participants’ mean scores and level of awareness being higher on the 2nd Test 
(Experimental Group) than that on the 1st Test (Control Group).  The same results were 
found for the Online participant group, the Face-to-Face participants and all participants 
combined.  Likewise three hypotheses (H13, H14 and H15) compared the 1st Test’s 
scores with the 3rd Test’s scores and indicated the same significant results where the 
experimental group outdid the control group on the 3rd Test for all participants, Online 
participant Group and Face-to-Face participant Group.   
 
However, the three hypotheses (H10, H11 and H12) that compared the 2nd Test’s scores 
with the 3rd Test’s scores indicated significant differences in scores only for all 
participants combined but in the opposite direction where the Control Group on the 2nd 
Test scored higher than the Experimental Groups on the 3rd Test.  The Experimental 
group whose learning outcome was expected to be higher and thus have higher scores 
on the 3rd Test than on the 2nd Test did not materialize according to this test.   On the 
other hand, there were no significant differences in scores for the individual Online 
participant group and the Face-to-Face participant group.   





5.20 Testing Independent Variables’ Impact on Scores 
The last three hypotheses test the impact of a set of independent variables such as the 
participants’ age groups, education levels and years of online study on the participants’ 
level of awareness reflected by the scores on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Tests respectively. 
 
H16: Testing dataset 1 
Null Hypothesis (H16a): The independent variables (Participants' Age, Education 
level and Years of online study) do not significantly impact the scores (dependent 
variable) on the 1st Test.   
 
Test Results:  A simple linear regression was calculated to predict participants' scores 
on the 1st Test based on three independent variables (1 participants’ age group, 2) years 
of online study and 3) education level.  As a result, a significant regression equation 
was found (F (3, 96) = 5.63, F value = 0.001 < alpha 0.05), with an R Square of 0.149 
(Modest relationship: <= 0.3) which explains about 15% of the variations.  The 
individual calculated P values for all the independent variables' coefficients (Age P 
Value = 0.78 > alpha 0.05 and Education Level P Value = 0.85 > alpha 0.05) were non-
significant > 0.05 while the 'Years of Online Study' variable whose P value was 
(<0.001) < alpha = 0.05 shows significance.  Therefore, participants' predicted scores 
will be predicted based on the following equation built from the Regression Test Results 
generated in Table 34:  (Intercept) + (Coefficient of Age Group) * (Participant’s Age 
Group) + (Coefficient of Years of Online Study) * (Participant’s Years of Online Study) 
+ (Coefficient of Education Levels) * (Participant’s Education Level).   
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Table 34 - Simple Linear Regression and Anova tests to calculate participants' scores based on their 1st Test 




Applying the formula to values from the regression test results above, the formula is:  
(0.50) + (0.005) * (Participant’s Age Group) + (0.078) * (Participant's 'Years of Online 
Study') + (0.004) * (Participant’s Education Level).  This indicates that participants' 
scores on the 1st Test can be predicted to increase by (0.078) which is about 8% 
(modest) for every higher category of the 'Years of online study' variable for each 
participant.  However, the P values of the other two independent variables’ coefficients 
(Age Coefficient = 0.005, P Value = 0.78 > alpha 0.05 and Education Level Coefficient 
= 0.004, P Value = 0.85 > alpha 0.05) are not considered significant predictors into the 
participants’ scores on the 1st Test.  Therefore, it is concluded from the results above 
that the Null hypothesis (H16a) is not supported since the ‘Years of Online Study’ 
variable has a modest significant impact on predicting participants’ scores on the 1st 
Test and thus the Alternate Hypothesis (H16b) is supported.  Residual and Line Fit plot 






Figure 40 - Residual and Line Fit Plots for Participants' Years of Online Study, Education and Age variables 
 
H17: Testing dataset 4 
Null Hypothesis (H17a): The independent variables (Participants' Age, Education 
level and Years of online study) do not significantly impact the scores (dependent 
variable) on the 2nd Test.   
 
Test Results:  A simple linear regression was calculated to predict participants' scores 
on the 2nd Test based on three independent variables (1 participants’ age group, 2) years 
of online study and 3) education level.  The resulting ANOVA F Significance level was 
> 0.05 which indicated insignificance (F (3, 96) = 1.80, F value = 0.15 > alpha 0.05), 
with an R Square of 0.05 (Poor relationship: <= 0.1) which explains about 5% of the 
variations.  In addition, the individual calculated P values for all the independent 
variables' coefficients (Age P Value = 0.77 > alpha 0.05, Years of Online Study P Value 
= 0.054 > alpha 0.05 and Education Level P Value = 0.20 > alpha 0.05) were all non-
significant > 0.05 as shown in the Regression Test Results generated in Table 35. 
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Table 35 - Simple Linear Regression and Anova tests to calculate participants' scores based on their 2nd Test 




Therefore, it is concluded from the results above that the Null hypothesis (H17a) is 
supported since all the independent variables have a non-significant and poor predicting 
power on participants’ scores on the 2nd Test and hence the Alternate Hypothesis 




H18: Testing dataset 7 
Null Hypothesis (H18a): The independent variables (Participants' Age, Education 
level and Years of online study) do not significantly impact the scores (dependent 
variable) on the 3rd Test.   
 
Test Results:  Finally, a simple linear regression was calculated to predict participants' 
scores on the 3rd Test based on three independent variables as in the above hypothesis.  
The resulting ANOVA F Significance level was > 0.05 which indicated insignificance 
(F (3, 96) = 0.58, F value = 0.62 > alpha 0.05), with an R Square of 0.01 (Poor 
relationship: <= 0.1) which explains about 1% of the variations.  In addition, the 
individual calculated P values for all the independent variables' coefficients (Age P 
Value = 0.34 > alpha 0.05, Years of Online Study P Value = 0.70 > alpha 0.05 and 
Education Level P Value = 0.90 > alpha 0.05) were all non-significant > 0.05 as shown 
in the Regression Test Results generated in Table 36. 
Table 36 - Simple Linear Regression and Anova tests to calculate participants' scores based on their 3rd Test 




Therefore, the Null hypothesis (18a) is supported since all the independent variables 
are non-significant with poor predicting power on participants’ scores on the 3rd Test 




In summary of all the above, we conclude that H1, H2 and H3 were supported indicating 
no significant variances in the scores between the Online participant group and the 
Face-to-Face participant group on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Tests respectively.  On the other 
hand, H4, H5 and H6 were not supported indicating a significant difference between 
the scores of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Tests for all participants combined and separated as the 
Online and Face-to-Face participant groups.  Likewise, H7, H8 and H9 were not 
supported indicating significant differences between the 2nd Test and 1st Test scores for 
all participant groups.  On the other hand, H10 was not supported, but indicated 
significance in the opposite direction of what was expected as a significantly higher 
mean score on the 3rd Test than on the 2nd Test for all participants combined, while H11 
and H12 were supported indicating no significance for the individual Online and Face-
to-Face participant groups.  Nonetheless, H13, H14 and H15 were not supported 
indicating significant differences between the 3rd Test and 1st Test scores for all 
participants combined and separated as the Online and Face-to-Face participant groups.  
Similarly as shown in Table 37 below, H16 was not supported indicating that the higher 
number of years of online study participants had, the higher scores they are predicted 
to acquire on the 1st Test.  However, the scores on the 2nd and 3rd Tests were not 
significantly impacted by the combination of participants’ independent variables such 
as age, education level and years of online study as indicated by H17 and H18. 
 
Although H17 and H18 did not provide much significance that allows participants’ 
scores to be predicted based on these independent variables except for the Years of 
Online Study, Spearman’s Rank-Order Correlation tests (Ramsey, 1989) were 
conducted to test for correlations between the increase and decrease of the scores in 
relation to 5 participants’ demographical traits individually such as participants’ age, 
years of online study, education level, elapsed days between attended awareness 
sessions and ISS role evaluation ratings.  These tests and their implications with the 
other hypotheses’ findings are discussed in detail next.   





1st Test’ Scores Correlation with Participant Age:  A Spearman's rank-order 
correlation test was run to determine the relationship between 100 participants' scores 
on the 1st Test and their age.   The test results show a strong, positive correlation 
between the scores on the 1st Test and the age of participants, which was statistically 
significant (Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient "rs" = 0.300, p = 0.002 < α: 0.05) 
as shown in Table 38 and Figure 22.  Therefore, it is concluded that the older 
participants were, the higher scores they acquired on the 1st Test. 
Table 38 - Spearman's Rank-order Correlation test to 
determine relationship between 100 participants' 
scores on the 1st Test and their age groups 
  
 
Figure 22 - relationship between 100 participants' 
scores on the 1st Test and their age groups 
 
1st Test’ Scores Correlation with Number of Years in Online Study:  As for the 
‘Years of Online Study’ variable, the Spearman's rank-order correlation test gave a 
strong, positive correlation between the 1st Test’s scores and the number of years of 
online study, which was statistically significant (Spearman Rank Correlation 
Coefficient "rs" = 0.477, p = (<0.001) < α: 0.05) as shown in Table 39 and Figure 20.  
Based on this result, it is concluded that the higher the number of years participants 
spent doing online study, the higher the scores they received on the 1st Test.  These 
results agree with the results from the Regression test conducted earlier for the Alternate 
Hypothesis (H16b) on the 1st Tests’ scores and their predictability based on the Years 
of Online Study independent variable. 
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Table 39 - Spearman's Rank-order Correlation 
test to determine relationship between 100 
participants' scores on the 1st Test and their 
Years of Online Study variable 
 
 
Figure 20 - Spearman's Rank-order Correlation test to 
determine relationship between 100 participants' scores on 
the 1st Test and their Years of Online Study variable 
 
1st Test’ Scores Correlation with Education Level and ISS Role Evaluation:  
On the other hand, the Spearman’s Rank-Order correlation test was run against the 
participants’ education levels (rs = 0.188, p = 0.06 > α: 0.05) and their ISS role 
evaluation ratings (rs = -0.143, p = 0.15 > α: 0.05).  The tests’ results were non-
significant which are in line with the results of the previously conducted Regression 
tests on the education level variable and its impact on the scores of the 1st Test. 
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2nd Test’ Scores Correlation with Participant Age:  The Age Group variable is again 
shown to have a correlation with the participants’ scores, but this time with the 2nd 
Test’s scores.  Thus, a Spearman's rank-order correlation was run to determine the 
relationship between 100 participants' scores on the 2nd Test and their age.  The test 
shows a strong, positive correlation between the scores and the participant age, which 
was statistically significant (Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient "rs" = 0.325, p = 
0.0009 < α: 0.05) as shown in Table 40.  Therefore, it is concluded that the older the 
participants were, the higher the scores they acquired on the 2nd Test as shown in Table 
40 and Figure 21. 
 
Table 40 -Spearman's Rank-order Correlation 
test to determine relationship between 100 




Figure 21 - Spearman's Rank-order Correlation test to 
determine relationship between 100 participants' scores on the 
2nd Test and their Age groups 
 
2nd Test’ Scores Correlation with Number of Years in Online Study and 
Education Levels:  On the other hand, the Years of Online Study does not have a 
significant correlation with the 2nd Test’s scores since the resulting p-Value = (0.66 > 
0.05).   Unlike the 1st Test, the participants’ education levels have a positive correlation 
with the 2nd Test’s scores which was statistically significant (Spearman Rank 
Correlation Coefficient "rs" = 0.322, p = 0.001 < α: 0.05) as shown in Table 41.  As a 
result, it is concluded that the higher the participant education levels were, the higher 
the scores they acquired on the 2nd Test as shown in Table 41 and Figure 22. 
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Table 41 - Spearman's Rank-order Correlation 
test to determine relationship between 100 
participants' scores on the 2nd Test and their 
Education levels 
  
Figure 22 - Spearman's Rank-order Correlation test to 
determine relationship between 100 participants' scores on 
the 2nd Test and their Education levels 
 
2nd Test’ Scores Correlation with Awareness Session Interval and ISS Role 
Evaluation:  On the other hand, the ISS Role evaluation ratings (rs = -0.118, p = 0.238 
> α: 0.05) and the Elapsed number of days between attended awareness sessions (rs = -




 3rd Test’ Scores Correlation with Participant Age:  Finally, Correlational 
relationships between the independent variables and the 3rd Test’s scores are tested and 
analysed.  Again and for the third time, participant age has a significant correlation with 
the scores on the 3rd Test which was statistically significant (Spearman Rank 
Correlation Coefficient "rs" = 0.398, p = (<0.001) < α: 0.05) as shown in Table 42.  
Therefore, it is concluded that the older participants were, the higher the scores they 
acquired on the 3rd Test as shown in Table 42 and Figure 23. 
Table 42 - Spearman's Rank-order Correlation 
test to determine relationship between 100 




Figure 23 - Spearman's Rank-order Correlation test to 
determine relationship between 100 participants' scores on 
the 3rd Test and their Age groups 
 
3rd Test’ Scores Correlation with Number of Years in Online Study:  Running 
the Spearman correlational test on the Years of Online Study variable, results in a 
strong, positive correlation between the 3rd Test’s scores and the number of online study 
years, which was statistically significant (Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient "rs" 
= 0.245, p = 0.013 < α: 0.05) as shown in Table 43.  It is concluded that the higher the 
number of years participants spent doing online study, the higher the scores they 
received on the 3rd Test as shown in Table 43 and Figure 24. 
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Table 43 - Spearman's Rank-order Correlation 
test to determine relationship between 100 
participants' scores on the 3rd Test and their 
Years of Online Study 
 
 
Figure 24 - Spearman's Rank-order Correlation test to 
determine relationship between 100 participants' scores on the 
3rd Test and their Years of Online Study 
 
3rd Test’ Scores Correlation with Participant’s Education Level:  As shown in 
Table 44 and Figure 25, a Spearman's rank-order correlation test was run to determine 
the relationship between 100 participants' scores on the 3rd Test and their education 
levels.  The test’s results show a strong, positive correlation between the scores and 
participants’ education levels, which was statistically significant (Spearman Rank 
Correlation Coefficient "rs" = 0.314, p = 0.001 < α: 0.05).   Therefore, it is concluded 
that the higher the education levels participants had, the higher the scores they acquired 
on the 3rd Test. 
Table 44 - Spearman's Rank-order 
Correlation test to determine relationship 
between 100 participants' scores on the 3rd 
Test and their Education levels 
 
 
Figure 25 - Spearman's Rank-order Correlation test to determine 
relationship between 100 participants' scores on the 3rd Test and 







3rd Test’ Scores Correlation with Awareness Session Interval and ISS Role 
Evaluation:  The ISS Role Evaluation rating variable (rs = -0.105, p = 0.296 > α: 0.05) 
and the Elapsed days between attended awareness sessions (rs = -0.035, p = 0.722 > α: 
0.05) do not have any significant correlations with the scores on the 3rd Tests.  In 
summary, Table 45 summarizes the tests’ results for the five independent variables and 
their correlations to the scores of the 3 Tests respectively. 
Table 45 - Summary of the correlation tests’ results for the five independent variables on the scores of the 3 Tests 
 
The Age Groups, Education Levels and Years of Online Study variables have 
correlational relationships with the scores on almost all the three tests, while the ISS 
Evaluation and the Elapsed days between attended awareness sessions do not have any 
significant correlations with the scores on any of the three tests.  As shown in the 
summary above, the Age Groups variable has a strong positive correlation with the 
scores on all the three tests.  The education levels show the same correlational 
relationship as that of the age groups, but only with the scores on the 2nd and 3rd Tests.  
In the same sense, the Years of Online study variable shows a strong positive correlation 




5.22 Awareness Risk Residual Categories 
The 18 hypotheses tested have provided answers as to whether the proposed SAMFP 
model has achieved its goals by improving the participants’ level of awareness.  
However, the analysis does not cater for measuring the gap or the awareness risk 
residual between the participants’ achieved awareness levels and the highest awareness 
level achievable which is Projection.  Therefore, the Information Security Awareness 
and Capability Model (ISACM) of Poepjes (2012) is capitalized upon to measure this 
gap.  The ISACM provides through one of its three attributes, the Awareness Risk; a 
mechanism to measure this awareness risk residual by calculating the difference 
between the Risk Capability which is the achieved awareness level represented by the 
participant’s final score on all the three Tests (Sum of the three Tests’ scores) and the 
Awareness Importance which is the weight assigned to the highest level of awareness 
targeted.  Thus, applying this mechanism by summing the weighted scores on all the 
three tests for each participant and subtracting the total (final score) from the maximum 
weight assigned to the highest level of awareness targeted (Projection level), which has 
a weight of 7 out of 7.  Then, the resulting differences are categorized according to their 
equality or proximity to any of the three weights (1, 3 and 7) respective to the three 
awareness levels (Perception, Comprehension and Projection).  In other words, if the 
final score of a participant is less than or equal to 1 which is the weight assigned to the 
Perception Level, the respective Awareness Risk is categorized as a ‘Perception Level 
Risk’, whereas if the final score is greater than 1 and equal to or less than 3 which is 
the weight assigned to the Comprehension level, the respective Awareness Risk is 
categorized as a ‘Comprehension Level Risk’ and finally, if the final score is greater 
than 3 and equal to or less than 7 which is the weight assigned to the Projection level, 




These Awareness Risk categorizations mean that the participants whose Awareness 
Risk is within a lower category might be exposed to Phishing Risks mitigatable by 
higher awareness levels.  For example a participant whose Awareness Risk is 
categorized as ‘Comprehension Level Risk’ may be protected from the ‘Perception 
Level Risk which is a lower risk category, but is prone to the ‘Projection Level Risk’ 
which is the higher risk category than his/her current achieved awareness level.  Figures 
26 and 27 illustrate the percentages of participants’ distribution over the three 





Figure 26 - Calculated Situation Awarness Levels' Risk for the Face-to-Face participants 
 
 




As explained above, the biggest percentage of the 100 participants (58%) have achieved 
the Comprehension Level according to the SAMFP Model and hence have the 
Comprehension Level Risk category which is a middle Risk.  On the other hand, 41% 
of the participants have achieved the highest awareness level on SAMFP Model which 
is the Projection level risk and therefore have the lowest Awareness Risk level.  Only 
1% of the participants have the highest Awareness Risk Level relative to the Perception 
level on the SAMFP Model.  These results indicate that more than half of the 
participants have made it to the second level of awareness.  Yet, they are exposed to the 
Projection Level Risk and therefore, need to have their awareness enhanced to achieve 
the highest level of awareness possible which is Projection.  Looking at participants’ 
awareness risk levels based on their participant groups, Figures 28 and 29 show that 
61% of the Face-to-Face participants have achieved the ‘Comprehension Level’ and 
therefore are at the Comprehension Level Risk as opposed to only 52% of the Online 
participants are at the same Risk Level.  On the other hand, 37% of the Face-to-Face 
participants as opposed to 48% of the Online participants are exposed to the Projection 
Level Risk which is the lowest risk level.  Finally, only 1% of the Face-to-Face 
participants is exposed to the Perception Level Risk which is the highest level of 
awareness risk as opposed to none from the Online participants.  These percentages 
indicate that more of the Online participants than those of the Face-to-Face participants 




5.23 Understanding the Attributes of Highest Ranked Participants 
Now the highest ranked participants who achieved the highest level of Phishing 
awareness and have the lowest risk categories are those who scored between 4 and 7 
out of 7 as far as their final score after summing their scores from all the three tests is 
concerned.  This criteria resulted in 9 participants selected as the highest ranked 9 
participants with the highest scores and lowest risk levels.  The highest score recorded 
was 5.86 out of 7 with the lowest risk level as 1.14 whereas the lowest score recorded 
in the highest score range (4-7) was 4.04 with a risk level of 2.96.  All the highest ranked 
9 participants have achieved the Projection awareness level and therefore have a 
Projection Risk Level which ranges from 0 to 3.  The first highest ranked participant 
has accordingly the lowest risk level in the Projection Level Risk range ever recorded 
which was 1.14, while the 9th (last) participant has the highest Projection Risk Level 
ever recorded in the range which was 2.96.  Table 46 lists the highest ranked 9 
participants with their weighted scores and risk levels. 
Table 46 - Highest ranked participants List 
 
It is observed that 6 participants out of the 9 (P2, P72, P45, P5, P23 and P7) have made 
steady improvements in their (weighted) scores from the 1st Test through the 3rd Test.  
This indicates that the awareness improvements they had achieved were gradual and in 
line with the proposed SAMFP awareness model.  This means that participants learn 
gradually from the awareness sessions they had attended as indicated by their scores on 
the three assessment tests.  Accordingly, these assessment tests were designed with 
gradual levels of difficulty to test if participants made meaningful progress in their 
awareness levels about Phishing e.g. participants improved from Perception level to 




Probing deeper to understand if there was something special about these 9 participants, 
it has been found that 6 participants out of the 9 belong to the Online participant group, 
while the other 3 belong to the Face-to-Face participant group as shown in Figures 28 
and 29. 
 
Figure 28 - Highest ranked participants by participant 
groups 
 
Figure 29 - Highest ranked participants by Age Group 
From an age perspective, 5 participants out of the 9 are between 20 to 25 years old, 2 
of them are between 31 to 35 years old, while the other 2 participants are in the 41-45 
and 46-50 age groups respectively as illustrated in Figure 31.  This indicates that most 
of the highest ranked participants are at a young age. 
 
From the education perspective, again 5 participants are studying for a bachelor degree, 
while only 3 are at the high school level or below with the last participant being at the 
Master’s degree level.  This indicates that the majority of the highest ranked 9 
participants are at the Bachelor Degree level as shown in Figure 30. 
 
Figure 30 - Highest ranked participants by Education levels 
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Although, almost half of the 9 participants (4 participants) have spent 5 years or more 
in online study, the first highest ranked participant has only been an online student for 
less than one year along with 2 others making a total of 3 out of the 9 participants.  
Finally, only 2 participants have spent 3 years in online study as n Figure 31.  This does 
not indicate a consistent relationship between the number of years of online study and 
the 9 participants’ highest scores.  Only this small subset of the data does not go in line 
with the results of the Regression tests conducted previously on all participants which 
indicated correlational relationships between participants’ number of years in online 
study and the scores on the 1st Test as an example. 
 
 
Figure 31 - Highest ranked participants by Number of Years of Online Study 
As Figure 32 shows, there are 4 participants out of the 9 participants have evaluated the 
role of their ISS as the best on a scale of 0 to 5.  Contrary to this is that the highest 
ranked participant has evaluated the role of ISS as the ‘Worst’.  The remaining 4 
participants have rated their ISS between 2, 3 and 4.  Again, Figure 34 does not indicate 
a pattern of any correlation between the highest ranked participant’s evaluation rates of 
their ISS and their highest scores.  This goes in line with the results of the Regression 




Figure 32 - Highest ranked participants by their ISS Role evaluations 
 
Finally, the majority of the 9 participants (8 out of 9) have an average of 7 days 
separating the two awareness sessions they had attended as opposed to greater periods 
of time the other participants had, which might have contributed to their low scores 
despite the fact that there was no correlational relationship found from the Regression 
test conducted on the average elapsed days between the two awareness sessions and the 
participants’ scores on any of the tests.   
 
In summary, it has been observed that the majority of the highest ranked 9 participants 
are from the Online Participant group, are at a young age (20-25) years old, have spent 
5 years or more of online study, have an education level of a bachelor degree, have the 
best rating for their ISS roles and an average of 7 days period between the two 




5.24 Understanding the Attributes of Lowest Ranked Participants 
On the other hand, the lowest ranked participants who achieved the lowest level of 
Phishing awareness and have the highest risk levels are those who scored between 0 
and 2 out of 7 as far as their final score after summation of their scores from all the 
three tests is concerned.  Running this criteria resulted in 16 participants being selected 
as opposed to only 9 selected as the highest ranked participants discussed in the 
previous section.  These 16 participants make 16% of the whole sampled population.  
The lowest score recorded was 0.65 out of 7 with the highest risk level recorded as 6.35 
whereas the highest score in the lowest score range (0-2) was 1.96  with a risk level of  
5.04.  15 out of the 16 lowest ranked participants have a Comprehension Risk Level 
except for the last participant who has a Perception Risk Level.  The Perception Level 
Risk ranges from 0 to 1, while the Comprehension Risk Level ranges from above 1 to 
3.  The first lowest ranked participant has the highest risk level in the Perception Level 
Risk range ever recorded which was 6.35, while the 16th (last) lowest ranked participant 
has the lowest Comprehension Level Risk ever recorded which was 5.04 was.  Table 
47 lists the 16 lowest ranked participants with their weighted scores and risk levels. 





It is observed that the 16 participants’ scores on each test, do not demonstrate a 
consistent pattern of progress as some participants made gradual progress on the 1st and 
2nd Test, but did not do well on the 3rd Test.  Surprisingly, some participants got their 
best score on the 3rd Test, while having their lowest scores on the 1st and 2nd Test despite 
that the first two tests had less difficulty compared with the 3rd Test.  Some other 
participants did not do any better as they went from one Test to another suggesting they 
did not have any benefits from attending the two awareness sessions.     
 
Trying to understand if there was something special about these 16 participants by 
looking into their attributes, it has been found that 15 participants out of the 16 belong 
to the Face-to-Face participant group, while only one participant belongs to the Online 
participant group.   This indicates that almost all the lowest ranked participants are from 
the Face-to-Face participant group.  From an age perspective, all the 16 participants are 
between 20 to 25 years old which is the youngest age group among the 100 participant 
sample.  From the education perspective, 14 participants out of the 16 are at a High 
School level, while only 2 have a bachelor degree.  This indicates that the majority of 
the 16 participants have the lowest education levels as in Figure 33. 
 




As in Figure 34, almost half of the 16 participants (7 participants) have spent less than 
a year in online study, while 5 of them have spent 5 years or more and the remaining 4 
have only spent 3 years in online study.   This indicates no consistent relationship 
between the number of years of online study and the 16 participants’ lowest scores.  
This also does not go in line with the results of the Regression tests conducted 
previously on all participants which found correlational relationships between 
participants’ number of years in online study and the scores. 
 
 
Figure 34 - Lowest ranked participants by Number of Years of Online Study 
 
As Figure 35 shows, the majority of the lowest ranked participants (11 out of 16) 
evaluated the role of their ISS as the best, while 3 evaluated it as 4 on the scale of 5 and 
only 2 chose ‘Not Sure’.  Again, Figure 35 does not show any sensible relationship 
between the lowest ranked participants’ evaluation rates of their ISS and their lowest 
scores.  This goes in line with the results found from the Regression tests conducted 
previously on all participants which could not establish any correlational relationships 





Figure 35 - Lowest ranked participants by their evaluation of ISS role 
 
Finally, the majority of the 16 (11 out of 16) have an average of 7 days separating the 
two awareness sessions they had attended as opposed to only 8 out 9 of the highest 
ranked participants who had the same period of time between awareness sessions.  
There is no correlational relationships found as a result of conducting the Regression 
Test on the average elapsed days between the two awareness sessions and the 
participants’ scores. 
 
In summary, Table 48 contrasts and summarizes the results of comparing the highest 




Table 48 - Compaison between Highest ranked  and Lower ranked participants 
 
 





Chapter 6 Results Discussion 
 
This research has aimed to achieve three goals.  Firstly, to better understand the 
vulnerable behaviour factors and their exploitation in Phishing attacks.  Secondly, to 
propose a conceptual framework to enhance awareness in online learners about these 
behavioural factors and their exploitation in Phishing attacks.  Thirdly, to assess the 
effectiveness of the proposed conceptual framework by measuring the learning 
outcomes in online learners after applying the conceptual framework model.   These 
three goals were fulfilled by answering the following 2 research questions and their 2 
sub questions: 
 
1. What are the vulnerable behavioural factors that are exploitable in Phishing 
attacks? 
a. How are these behavioural factors exploited in Phishing attacks? 
2. What is the preliminary awareness level in online learners about these Phishing 
related behavioural factors? 
a. How can awareness about these behavioural factors and their 
exploitation in Phishing attacks be improved for online learners? 
 
Thus, answering the 1st research question helped fulfil the first goal, while answering 
the 2nd research questions helped fulfil the second and third goals.  The next sections 
will discuss how the conducted research contributed to answering each question and 




6.1 Answering Research’s 1st Question and Fulfilling Research’s 1st Goal 
 
One of the major threats to cyber security today is people’s lack of awareness because 
people can be the weakest link in a security countermeasure systems, if they lack 
adequate awareness about information security risks such as Phishing (Gupta, Sharman, 
Raj, and IGI Global, 2009; Watson, Mason, Andrew, and Ackroyd, 2014); rendering 
other technical controls less effective if not properly addressed.    Therefore, in order to 
effectively raise awareness about Phishing attacks, the reasons behind victims falling 
prey to phishing attacks repeatedly, despite all the awareness efforts being exerted, 
needs to be uncovered and explored to enhance the way awareness raising is conducted.   
To uncover these reasons, a literature review has been conducted to look through 
previous work analysing phishing attacks.  The literature review revealed (see Chapter 
2) that vulnerable behavioural factors were behind phishing attacks. The literature 
review resulted in the identification of 16 behavioural factors that were revealed by 
other research (see Section 2.6) to have been potentially manipulated in Phishing 
attacks exploiting human vulnerable behaviours and lack of awareness to lure 
unsuspecting victims.  The literature review also revealed how these 16 behavioural 
factors were exploited to deceive victims in various phishing scenarios.  
 
This research builds on the contributions of previous research such as Jagatic et al  
(2007), Kirlappos and Sasse (2012), Ibrahim (2016), Williams, Beardmore and Joinson 
(2017) and many others to identify and build a comprehensive list of potential Phishing 
vulnerable behavioural factors.  No research was found to have gathered and compiled 
a comprehensive list of potential behavioural factors exploitable in Phishing attacks, 
before this research.  Therefore, this research took on that duty and gathered 16 
behavioural factors identified from the contributions of previous research.  These 16 
behavioural factors may not be considered inclusive of every possible behavioural 
factor exploitable out there, but it is a novel list.  The identification of the 16 exploitable 
behavioural factors and the methods of exploiting them in Phishing attacks has also 
resulted in developing the proposed conceptual framework SAMFP to enhance 
awareness raising about these 16 behavioural factors which encapsulates the knowledge 
contributed from the literature review.  Therefore by identifying the 16 behavioural 
factors and better understanding their exploitation in Phishing attacks from previous 
research, the first research question was answered and the first research goal fulfilled.   
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6.2 Answering Research’s 2nd Question and Fulfilling Research’s 2nd and 
3rd Goals 
 
In order to achieve the research’s 2nd goal which is to improve awareness in online 
learners about the Phishing related behavioural factors and how they are exploited, the 
second research question had to be first answered by determining the preliminary level 
of awareness in online learners (participants in this research) about these behavioural 
factors.  Knowing the participants’ preliminary level of awareness is a necessary step 
towards improving their awareness through identifying the gaps and designing the 
appropriate awareness materials to address these gaps; which answers the second part 
of the research’s 2nd question.   The identified snapshot of the preliminary awareness in 
online learners sets the starting point for further awareness endeavours to take that 
awareness to the next level on Endsely’s Situation Awareness Conceptual model 
(Endsley, 2015).  Thus, the 1st Test was designed to explore participants’ preliminary 
level of understanding about Phishing in general and their interpretations of why 
victims would fall prey to Phishing attacks.   The 1st Test’s results revealed that most 
of the participants (87/100) recognized the non-phishing scenarios more than they could 
recognize the Phishing scenarios.  The average score recorded was 4.31/7 which 
revealed a level of moderate awareness about Phishing in general.  However, the 
analysis of participants’ reasons for Phishing revealed a considerably lower level of 
awareness compared to the average score recorded for recognizing phishing scenarios 
in the first place.  The only behavioural factors referenced in participants comments as 
their reasons for considering these scenarios to be phishing were ‘Temptation’ and 
‘Urgency’.  These 2 factors out of the 16 behavioural factors were referenced by 38% 
and 6% of the 100 participants respectively.  The results also revealed participants’ 
oblivion and uncertain knowledge of the other 14 behavioural factors as indicated by 
the comment ‘No Specific Reasons’ (9.63%) which was the most highly mentioned 
comment among all participants’ answers.  Also, generality of the participants’ 
preliminary awareness about Phishing was indicated by the second most highly 
mentioned  comments, ‘Suspicious Request for Info’ (9.53%), ‘Unknown/Untrusted 
Sender/Caller’ (6.80%) and ‘Suspicious Course of Action’ (5.09%), expressing general 
suspicion in each scenario without being able to identify the specific behavioural factors 
actually exploited in the scenario.   A full discussion of the 1st Test analysis results is 
in Chapter 5, sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. 
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The evaluation of the preliminary awareness in the 100 participants provided the answer 
to the research’s 2nd question as well as fulfilling the research’s 2nd goal.  The value of 
providing information about the preliminary awareness level in online learners is very 
important for Information Security practitioners, who are responsible for raising 
employees’ awareness about Phishing, to take this information and use it as a control 
group to contrast with their experimental groups and measure the progress of the 
learning outcomes and build their cyber security awareness efforts upon. 
 
The analysis of the participants’ scores and their responses to the 1st Tests’ scenarios 
contributed a novel piece of knowledge about the preliminary awareness level in the 
participants about the 16 exploitable behavioural factors in Phishing.  According to the 
literature reviewed, several efforts have undertaken such research to identify the 
preliminary level of awareness about Phishing in their subjects such as the work of 
Jagatic et al (2007), Kirlappos and Sasse (2012), Ibrahim (2016), Williams, Beardmore 
and Joinson (2017) and many others referred to in Chapter 2, Section 2.6.  However, 
the 16 behavioural factors were not collectively covered by any of these efforts.  In 
addition, this research has required its subjects to be online learners only in order to 
participate; which gives the knowledge obtained a novel value being focused on online 




Gaining this knowledge about the participants’ preliminary awareness level paved the 
road to the development of the SAMFP model to enhance the participants’ preliminary 
awareness to higher levels of understanding about these 16 behavioural factors and their 
exploitation in Phishing attacks.  The developed SAMFP model utilizes the knowledge 
gained about the preliminary awareness level in the participants and builds its 
awareness program upon that knowledge to help participants improve their awareness 
gradually through the phases of the model.  In other words, the SAMFP model 
encapsulates the answer to the second part of the research’s 2nd question and fulfils the 
research’s 2nd and 3rd goals.  Thus, the SAMFP is a novel model that incorporates three 
components by integrating Endsely’s Situation Awareness model (2015) with a set of 
pedagogical guidelines recommended by Chen, Shaw and Yang (2006) to provide 
awareness and incorporating Poepjes’ (2012) Information Security Awareness and 
Capability Model (ISACM) to measure the learning outcomes.  During the conducted 
literature review, no research was found to have designed a similar framework like the 
SAMFP model that incorporates these three components together to provide similar 
features.  The SAMFP model is unique in being a sustainable, continual and 
interactivity enabler in both system to human and human to human fashions.  As such, 
the novelty of the SAMFP model lies in its carefully selected components and design 
which provide the following features:  A) Sustainability of awareness delivery and 
continuity of learning through its two dynamic variables namely ‘Time’ and ‘Space’.  
With Time, it provides awareness through iterative sessions across time until the desired 
level of awareness is achieved.  Through ‘Space’, it provides flexibility and dynamicity 
of awareness delivery by facilitating awareness through online and Face-to-Face 
settings.  B) Learning through interactive and collaborative methods using group 
discussions and role play.  C) Measurability through continuous assessments that 
quantitatively measure awareness improvements and identify awareness gaps and 
address them through the iterative awareness sessions.  The SAMFP model is discussed 




In the literature review, there are many cyber-security awareness systems and tools that 
follow different approaches to cyber security training.  Some of these approaches rely 
on games for educating users about the risks of Phishing such as ‘Anti-Phish Phil’ 
(Kumaraguru, 2009), while other approaches depend on simulated phishing messages 
such as PhishMe (PhishMe.com).  On the other hand, Phishing IQ tests is another 
approach to Phishing education (Anandpara et al, 2007).  All these approaches have 
been successful to some extent in raising users’ awareness, but lacked some of the 
requirements of dynamic participant and trainer engagement, and interactive learning 
(Kumaraguru, 2009).  These tools rely heavily on the system for providing interactivity.  
However, human collaborative interactivity through e.g. group discussions or 
workshops are missing in all these systems.  This is where the SAMFP model 
incorporates both types of interactivities.  The SAMFP model provides multiple 
scenario-based tests where users; in the first test, primarily use their imagination and 
intuition to recognize Phishing scenarios, while further iterative tests intervened by 
iterative awareness sessions extend users’ knowledge beyond recognition of Phishing 
to better understand the behavioural factors exploited in the Phishing scenarios.  The 
SAMFP Model accomplishes this through interactive group discussions that involve 
role play among participants.  Most of simulated message tools, game-based tools and 
Phishing IQs do not extend learning beyond Phishing recognition, whereas the SAMFP 
model extends knowledge to develop in-depth understanding of Phishing’s internal 
mechanisms and tactics.  Nonetheless, some of these tools focus in their training on one 
or two of the behavioural factors such as trustworthiness, but do not focus collectively 
on as many as 16 behavioural factors nor cover them in depth as has been done in this 
research.  They focus more on visual cues such as suspicious e-mail links (Kirlappos 
and Sasse, 2012).  Training approaches and Phishing awareness tools are covered in 




While the development of the SAMFP model encapsulates the answer to the research’s 
question of how to improve awareness in online learners, the implementation of the 
model has provided the answer to the second part of the question which is how effective 
the model was in enhancing the participants’ awareness about the 16 Phishing 
behavioural factors and hence fulfils the third goal of the research.  The analysis of the 
three tests’ scores (discussed in detail in Chapter 5) and its results (discussed later in 
the following sections) have shown that the level of awareness in the 100 participants 
who took the three tests and attended the two awareness sessions has significantly 
improved.  Thus, the final results of the data analysis after all 100 participants 
completed the three assessment tests and attended the two awareness sessions, showed 
that the SAMFP model successfully helped 58% of the participants improve their 
awareness from the preliminary ‘Perception’ level to reach the ‘Comprehension’ level, 
and 41% to reach the ‘Projection’ level; which is the highest awareness level in the 
SAMFP model.   The only exception to these achievements of the SAMFP model was 
one participant only who remained at the preliminary ‘Perception’ level.  These gradual 
awareness improvements achieved meet the expected learning outcomes of the SAMFP 
model considering its cyclic nature spanning different periods of time and space.  This 
means further improvements are potentially expected as more iterations of awareness 




Moreover, the interactive delivery of the awareness sessions incorporating 
collaborative group discussion and role play have positively impacted the learning 
outcomes of the SAMFP model.  The results of the data analysis on the SAMFP model’s 
Time and Space variables showed a positive impact on the learning outcomes.  With 
regards to Time, although the time periods separating the awareness sessions did not 
have any significant impact on the scores as far as the hypotheses tests are concerned, 
the results analysis showed that those who excelled in acquiring the highest awareness 
levels whether in the Online Group or the Face-to-Face Group all had lesser periods of 
time separating the conducted awareness sessions, compared to the longer periods the 
other participants had. This finding may indicate that the Time variable of the SAMFP 
model positively impacts the learning outcomes of participants as time periods decrease 
between sessions. With regards to the Space variable, although the Online participant 
group outdid the Face-to-Face participants in achieving higher awareness levels, the 
results did not indicate any significant impact on the learning outcomes with regards to 
the delivery method of the awareness sessions used.  The results rather indicate that the 
excellent achievements of the Online participant group over the Face-to-Face 
participant group were attributed to other demographical factors such as age, education 
level and length of online experience.  However, considering the limitations of the 
Online delivery method versus the Face-to-Face method (discussed in Chapter 3), it can 
be argued that the Face-to-Face setup could have a better position on the learning 
outcomes.  Nevertheless, this argument still needs more confirmation through future 
research. 
Next, the individual awareness levels (Perception, Comprehension and Projection) will 
be discussed in light of the analysis results to highlight awareness improvements.  Also, 
these awareness improvements will be discussed in terms of the actual and weighted 
scores (hypotheses tests analysis).  A discussion of the participants’ awareness risk gaps 
and residuals will also follow.  The highest ranked participants who achieved the 
highest awareness levels as opposed to those who only achieved the lowest awareness 
levels and the reasons that distinguished them from others will also be discussed.  





6.3 Participant’s Preliminary Awareness about Phishing - Perception 
The main objective of the 1st Test was to assess the preliminary awareness level namely 
‘Perception’ about Phishing in the participants in general by asking them to identify if 
a certain situation stated in the test was a Phishing scenario or not.  Also, if they 
recognized a scenario as Phishing, they were asked to tell why they thought it was.  This 
was the way to implicitly evaluate their ability, to sense the underlying bait in the 
Phishing scenario by only relying upon their preliminary knowledge, and whether their 
explanation matched the actual behavioural factor used in the test scenario.  The 
analysis of the results of the 1st Test revealed that most participants (up to 93%) were 
able to identify the non-phishing scenarios more than they could identify the phishing 
scenarios.  This result can reassure to a certain extent that the majority of the 
participants (93%) had the competence to minimally distinguish a non-phishing 
scenario from a phishing scenario.  However, this finding does not give the same 
assurance that they are as competent to recognize a phishing scenario as to identify a 
non-phishing scenario.  This is due to not being adequately aware of the behavioural 




On the other hand, the results also revealed that the most highly recognized phishing 
scenario was the one employing the ‘Over-confidence and Self-conscious’ behavioural 
factor as its implicit bait.  This scenario was recognized by 79% of the participants, 
which was the highest number for any of the 16 phishing scenarios.  However, this does 
not mean that the 97% who were able to recognize the phishing scenario were also able 
to identify the underlying ‘Over-confidence and Self-Conscious’ behaviour factor 
exploited by it.  This means that they were led by their intuition of Phishing, not by 
their knowledge of these two behavioural factors to recognize the scenario as phishing.  
This was confirmed by the varying explanations and reasons the participants gave 
which in most cases were very general and high level.  However, that does not belittle 
the phishing implications of the ‘Over-confidence and Self-Conscious’ behavioural 
factor in the scenario and its impact which aroused suspicion in participants and made 
them recognize the phishing nature of the scenario even though their expressions of the 
reasons were not a specific description of the factor as the behavioural factor used.  This 
is due to their lack of awareness about these behavioural factors.  Most of the 
participants’ comments about the phishing scenarios expressed general suspicion such 
as ‘suspicious request for information’ or ‘unknown sender/requestor’ and the like.  
These general expressions by the participants explained their preliminary perception of 
Phishing which does not go beyond their aroused suspicion of false requests for 
information from unknown/untrusted senders.  These two general explanations were 
entered in 11 scenarios out of the 16 phishing scenarios recognized in the test and were 
mentioned 302 times across the 11 scenarios.  It was also observed that the ‘No Specific 
Reason’ comment was also mentioned 91 times in 8 scenarios out of 16 phishing 
scenarios expressing participants’ uncertainty of any specific reason for believing these 
8 scenarios were phishing; which again confirmed the participants’ perception of 
phishing aroused by the underlying behavioural factors without being able to 
specifically recognize them.  Temptation was the fourth highest ranked comment out 
of 10 participants’ comments that were mentioned 87 times to explain why 5 scenarios 




Giving unspecific and general explanations (comments) to the phishing scenarios was 
not always the case.   For example, in scenario #1 where temptation was the underlying 
behavioural factor, 38% of the 66 participants who correctly recognized this scenario 
as phishing, also commented that ‘temptation’ was the reason they believed was behind 
the phishing in the scenario; which was a correct match that described the exact 
behavioural factor underlying the phishing scenario.  On the other hand, more 
generality was even expressed by participants using phrases such as ‘Suspicious Links’ 
and ‘Suspicious Course of Action’ to justify their judgement about certain scenarios of 
phishing.  These two comments had much lower frequencies compared to the other 
comments explained already.  The two comments were mentioned 37 and 28 times in 
4 and 3 phishing scenarios respectively.  One of the least frequently mentioned 
participants’ comments was ‘Urgency’ which was mentioned for 15 times in two 
scenarios; which also correctly matched the same actual behavioural factor used in one 
of these two scenarios (Scenario #2) by 6% of the participants.  Another comment with 
even lower frequency was ‘Monetary Matters’ which denoted fraud, also appeared 12 
times in 1 scenario only. 
 
It is concluded from the discussion above that Temptation and Urgency were the only 
behavioural factors out of the 16 factors that were correctly referenced by participants’ 
comments with varying frequencies.  Furthermore, the scenarios employing the 
behavioural factors: ‘Convenience’, ‘Social Proof’, ‘Temptation’ and ‘Diffusion of 
Responsibility’ received the next highest number of correct responses for being 
recognized as phishing by 74%, 71%, 66% and 66% participants respectively.  On the 
other hand, the scenarios employing the behavioural factors: ‘Over-Trust’ and 
‘Reciprocation’ received the lowest number of correct responses among all other 16 
phishing scenarios.  They were referenced by only 28% participants each.  Therefore, 
it is observed that the behavioural factors that received the lowest number of correct 
answers indicate a significant low level of awareness in participants and hence may 
pose higher risks for participants.  Therefore, more attention and awareness efforts 
should be dedicated to them to enhance the awareness about these less recognized 




6.4 Participant’s Awareness Improvements about Phishing Behavioural 
Factors - Comprehension 
The 1st awareness session was delivered to all the participants after their preliminary 
assessment test (1st Test) to explain to them the 16 behavioural factors and review with 
them how these factors were exploited in the phishing scenarios to lure victims.  After 
they attended the 1st awareness session, they took the 2nd assessment test.  The 2nd test 
manifests a higher level of difficulty as it requires the participants to identify the 
behavioural factors employed in a phishing scenario as opposed to the 1st Test which 
only required them to recognize if a scenario was phishing or not.  Once again, the 
analysis of the 2nd Test’s results reflect upon the significance of the awareness 
improvements made as far as the actual scores are concerned by discussing the correct 
answers on the 2nd Test.  For analysis of awareness improvements realized between the 
two tests, the results of the 18 hypotheses and the weighted scores are discussed next.  
 
On the 2nd Test, the behavioural factors that were most highly identifiable by 85% of 
the participants were ‘Temptation’, ‘Urgency’ and ‘Curiosity’.  On the other hand, 
‘Diffusion of Responsibility’, ‘Social Proof’ and ‘Likability and Similarity’ were the 
least identifiable behavioural factors as they were only identified by 33% of the 
participants.  Between the highest and the lowest of 85% and 33%, the second highest 
identifiable behavioural factors were ‘Authority’ and ‘Threatening, Fear and Anxiety’ 
which were identified by 81% of the participants.  The third highest were ‘Overloading’ 
and ‘Commitment and Consistency’ which were identified by 62% of the participants; 
closely followed by ‘Reciprocation’ and ‘Interpersonal Relationship’ which were 
identified by 60% of the participants.  ‘Over-trust’ and Convenience were identified by 
54% of the participants compared to the ‘Over-Confidence’ and ‘Show-off’ which were 




It is too early to judge whether these numbers of participants identifying the underlying 
behavioural factors on the 2nd assessment test indicate a significant improvement in 
their awareness levels before statistically testing the relative hypotheses.  However, just 
by recalling the results from the 1st Test where the only two behavioural factors 
correctly referenced in the participants’ comments were ‘Temptation’ and ‘Urgency’, a 
much bigger difference can be seen in the number of behavioural factors correctly 
identified by participants on the 2nd Test which increased by more than 50% most of 
the time.  Again, the results of the 2nd Test confirm those from the 1st Test since 
‘Temptation’ and ‘Urgency’ were the only behavioural factors that were correctly 
referenced by 66% and 46% of the participants respectively, the same behavioural 
factors are again part of the most highly identifiable factors (85%) on the 2nd Test.  On 
the other hand, the behavioural factors: ‘Over-Trust’ and ‘Reciprocation’ which were 
the least identifiable on the 1st Test (28%) each, are now identifiable by more 
participants (54% and 60% respectively) on the 2nd Test.  Although the phishing 
scenarios on the 1st Test employing the behavioural factors: ‘Convenience’, ‘Social 
Proof’ and ‘Diffusion of Responsibility’ received correct answers between 71% and 
66% based on the number of participants recognizing them as Phishing, the same 
behavioural factors were less identifiable on the 2nd Test (4% and 33%) respectively. 
 
Based on the analysis of the 2nd Test, a good level of understanding can be observed for 
most of the 16 behavioural factors especially those which were identified by more than 
50% of the participants.  The only exception which needs more attention in future 
awareness efforts is those behavioural factors identified by less than 50% of the 
participants namely ‘Diffusion of Responsibility’, ‘Social Proof’, ‘Likability and 




6.5 Participant’s Awareness Improvements about Phishing Behavioural 
Factors - Projection 
The 3rd Test is set up the same as the 2nd Test, but with a higher level of difficulty that 
participants are required to not only identify the behavioural factors in 7 phishing 
scenarios, but also predict the behavioural factors most suitable for each scenario.  
Considering the increased difficulty on the 3rd Test, the percentages of the correct scores 
are not as high as those on the 2nd Test or the 1st Test.  Hence, the weighted scores will 
be used instead to test for statistically significant awareness improvements by testing 
the relevant hypotheses later in this chapter.   
 
Since ‘Over-Confidence’ and ‘Show-off’ were among the behavioural factors least 
identifiable by the participants on the 2nd Test, the same two behavioural factors 
received the highest correct answers on the 3rd assessment test after the participants 
attended the 2nd Awareness session and discussed these behavioural factors in more 
depth and demonstrated their use among their groups.  ‘Over-Confidence’ and ‘Show-
off’ were correctly identified by 56% of the participants compared to only 46% on the 
2nd Test not taking into account the increased difficulty level on the 3rd Test at this stage. 
However, ‘Diffusion of Responsibility’, ‘Social Proof’ and ‘Likability and Similarity’ 
still are the least identifiable on the 3rd and 2nd tests by 33% and 4% of the participants 
respectively.  It is notable that an accurate judgement cannot be made about the 
degradation of scores in these behavioural factors on the 3rd Test since the increased 
level of difficulty is not considered at this point of the analysis.  With the exception of 
‘Over-Confidence’ and ‘Show-off’ which were identified by 56% of the participants, 
there is a general decrease in scores in all other behavioural factors on the 3rd Test 
compared to the 2nd Test and that could be attributed to the multiple levels of difficulty 
incorporated in the 3rd Test. Thus, the second highest identifiable behavioural factors 
on the 3rd Test are ‘Overloading’ and ‘Commitment and Consistency’ which were 
identified by 45% of the participants compared to 62% on the 2nd Test.  Nonetheless, 
‘Temptation’, ‘Urgency’ and ‘Curiosity’ came in as the third highest identifiable factors 
on the 3rd Test by 23% of the participants compared to 85% on the 2nd Test.  Similarly, 
‘Reciprocation’ and ‘Interpersonal Relationship’ fell in fourth position, identified by 
19% of the participants, whereas ‘Over-trust’ and ‘Convenience’ were identified by 




Based on the above analysis, it is concluded that a general decrease in scores was 
observed due to the increased level of difficulty on the 3rd Test.  However, the 
percentages of correct answers show a level of understanding that can easily be 
distinguished from those observed on the 1st and 2nd Tests respectively thanks to the 
two awareness sessions delivered to the participants before the 2nd and 3rd tests.  
Nonetheless, this is not a sound proof of awareness improvement.  Yet, the need stands 
to discuss the analysis of the hypotheses to verify whether there was a significant 
awareness improvement that is statistically manifested.  The utmost level of awareness 
achievable on the 3rd Test is the projection awareness level (Endsley, 2015) where most 
participants should be able to score full marks in each question.  In light of this 
preliminary analysis of the 3rd Test’s results, participants need more awareness sessions 
to improve their awareness levels and eventually their scores on the 3rd Test to reach 
the utmost level of awareness achievable.  Special attention should be given to the 
‘Diffusion of Responsibility’, ‘Social Proof’ and ‘Likability and Similarity’ 
behavioural factors which were the least identifiable by participants on both the 2nd and 
3rd Tests and especially on the 3rd Test where they were correctly identified by only 4% 
of the participants. 
6.6 Statistical Significance for Improved Awareness – Actual Scores 
Before the discussion of the results of the 18 hypotheses, the actual (unweighted) scores 
achieved by participants on the three assessment tests will be compared and discussed.  
The objective of the actual scores comparison is to see how the actual scores are 
distributed on the scale of 7 among the three tests and how well participants did on each 
test.   This comparison will only look at the actual scores not taking into consideration 
the varying difficulty factor on each of the three tests; which means that a higher score 
on the 1st Test compared to a lower score on the 2nd Test or the 3rd Test may not 
necessarily mean that there were no awareness improvements achieved as the difficulty 
levels between the three tests are not the same.  In the same way, a higher score on the 
2nd or 3rd tests does not necessarily mean a significant awareness improvement either.  
Therefore, the weighted scores considering the different difficulty levels in each test 
will be compared instead when testing the 18 hypotheses that will tell us whether there 
was a statistically significant improvement or not.  The result of the hypotheses tests 




The comparison between the actual scores reveals that participants achieved a higher 
mean score on the 1st Test (4.57) than on the 2nd Test (4.21) and 3rd Test (1.74) 
respectively.  The difference in the mean scores between the 1st and 2nd Tests is not 
large, whereas it is so when compared with the 3rd Test’s mean score.  This explains the 
magnitude of the increasing level of difficulty incorporated in the hierarchical design 
of the three tests representing the three layered Endsley (2015) situation awareness 
levels.  Similar differences are found between the medians, modes and standard 
deviations of the three tests.  Further information on these aggregate statistics can be 
found in Chapter 5.  Accordingly, on the 1st Test, the majority of participants (27%) 
scored 5 out of 7 whereas on the 2nd Test, the majority of participants (19%) scored as 
low as 4, and on the 3rd Test, the majority of participants (36%) scored as low as 2.   In 
a similar manner, the lowest score recorded on the 1st Test was 2 out of 7 which was 
scored only by 2% of the participants, while the lowest score recorded on the 2nd and 
3rd Tests was 0 which was scored by 2% and 11% of the participants on the 2nd and 3rd 
tests respectively.  These decreasing scores also confirm the impact of the difficulty 
level increasing with each test. 
6.7 Statistical Significance for Improved Awareness – Weighted Scores 
The hypotheses are stated to test whether there was a significant improvement in the 
level of awareness achieved by the participants throughout the course of the three 
assessment tests and the two awareness sessions in between.  The hypotheses will 
compare participants based on their weighted scores and groups namely, the online and 
the Face-to-Face groups and all participants (two groups combined).  The results of the 
first 3 hypotheses tests (H1, H2, and H3) comparing the weighted scores of the two 
participant groups within each test revealed no significant awareness improvement 




Nevertheless, the results of hypotheses (H4, H5 and H6) comparing the two participant 
groups’ weighted scores between the three tests revealed that there were significant 
differences between the three tests for the Online and Face-to-Face groups and both 
groups combined as well.  To find out which test of the three compared tests made that 
significant difference where a potential awareness improvement could have 
materialized, the next set of hypotheses verify that.  Thus, the results of the hypotheses 
tests (H7, H8, H9, H13, H14 and 15H) comparing the weighted scores between the 1st 
Test and the 2nd Test pair, and then between the 1st Test and the 3rd Test pair, revealed 
significant awareness improvements achieved by both groups of participants on the 2nd 
and 3rd Tests respectively (2nd Test’s  weighted mean score = 1.18, 3rd Test’s weighted 
mean score = 0.98) over the 1st Test (weighted mean score = 0.64) after attending the 
two awareness sessions between these tests.  This finding confirms the findings from 
the actual scores comparison explained earlier. 
 
However, hypothesis H10 comparing the weighted scores between the 2nd Test and the 
3rd Test for all participants combined from the two participant groups revealed a 
significant difference in mean scores between the two tests.  However, this significant 
difference is in the opposite direction of the expected learning outcomes to be gained 
after participants attended the 2nd Awareness Session where the higher mean should 
have been on the 3rd Test; not vice versa.  The 2nd Test had the significantly higher mean 
score of (1.18) whereas the 3rd Test had the lower mean score of (0.98).  Thus, the 
participants on the 3rd Test did not achieve significant awareness improvements over 
what had been achieved on the 2nd Test.  This finding could be attributed to two reasons 
a) the multiplying difficulty level in the 3rd Test compared to the 2nd Test and b) the 
iterative nature of the applied SAMFP model where some participants might have 
required more iterations of awareness sessions to achieve the Projection level.  
Hypotheses H11 and H12 did not reveal any significance between the 3rd and 2nd Tests’ 




6.8 Participants’ Demographics and their Impact on Awareness 
Improvement 
The results of the analysis conducted on the participants’ demographical data and its 
correlational impact on the weighted scores of the three tests are reflected by the last 3 
hypotheses (H16, H17 and H18).   These 3 hypotheses tested for how much of the 
variations in the three tests’ scores can be attributed to the participants’ age, education 
levels and the number of years they spent in online study.  In other words, the regression 
tests conducted on these three hypotheses helped determine which of these participants’ 
demographics could positively or negatively influence the participants’ scores on the 
three tests.  As a result, it has been found that there are no significant relationships 
between these three independent variables and the participants’ scores on the three tests, 
except for one positive modest relationship between the participants’ number of years 
in online study and their scores on the 1st Test.  This positive modest relationship with 
a coefficient of 0.078 can explain about 8% of the variations in the participants’ scores 
on the 1st Test.  In other words, every higher category of ‘Years of Online Study’ can 




Furthermore, the analysis of the participants’ demographic attributes went a step further 
to test 2 more demographics for any correlational relationships with the scores on the 
three tests.  These correlational tests considered 5 participants’ attributes namely, 1) the 
age, 2) education level, 3) the number of years in online study, 4) average period 
between the two awareness sessions and 5) participants’ evaluation rates of ISS.  The 
objective of these correlational tests is to find out if any of these 5 participants’ variables 
could have impacted the participants’ scores on any of the three tests.  These tests could 
yield a positive or negative correlation explaining that the affected score could either 
increase or decrease accordingly.  Thus, the results of the conducted Spearman’s Rank-
Order Correlation tests revealed that age has a strong positive correlation with the 
scores on all the three tests indicating that the scores on the three tests would always 
increase for the participants who belong to older age groups (1st Test rs coefficient = 
0.300; 2nd Test rs coefficient = 0.325; 3rd Test rs coefficient = 0.398).  Similarly, 
education level also has a strong positive correlation with the participants’ scores on 
the 2nd Test (rs coefficient = 0.322) and 3rd Test (rs coefficient = 0.314) only.  In the 
same way, the Years of Online study variable has also a strong positive correlation with 
the scores on the 1st Test (rs coefficient = 0.477) and 3rd Test (rs coefficient = 0.245) 
only.  On the other hand, the results revealed that the number of elapsed days (period) 
between the two awareness sessions and the participants’ ratings of ISS have no 




Based on the above, it can be concluded that the participants’ age has a strong influence 
on the scores on all three tests as the older the participants were, the higher the scores 
they achieved.  Also, the participants’ education level has the same positive, significant 
influence on the scores, but only affecting the scores on the 2nd and 3rd Tests.  The 
scores on the 1st Test were not affected by the education levels of participants, as the 1st 
Test was a preliminary level test that required no preparation from participants.  In 
addition, this latter finding corresponds to the same results revealed by the regression 
test conducted on hypothesis (H16) for the 1st Test’s scores and the effect of 
participants’ education levels on the scores.  Finally, the number of years participants 
had experienced online learning has also paid off on the 1st and 3rd Tests only, whereas, 
it had no effect on the 2nd Test’s scores.  These results support the results from the 
regression test conducted on hypothesis (H16) for the 1st Tests’ scores where it revealed 
that the number of online study years had significantly explained the variations in the 
1st Test’s scores. 
 
All participants in this research were recruited on the basis of having studied online for 
some time.  However, there are other attributes of these participants that were collected 
during the 1st assessment Test that deserve attention and analysis to see if they had any 
correlational or influential relationship with the participants’ scores.  The participants’ 
attributes which impacted the scores are the participants’ age group, education level, 
the number of years in online study, while the average number of days elapsed between 
the two awareness sessions and the evaluation rating given by participants about their 
own Information Security Support (ISS) at their own establishments, whether 
educational or business organizations, did not have a significant impact on the scores.  
More information about participant’s demographic data and their predefined categories 




Analysis of the participants’ age groups revealed that (74%) of the participants are aged 
between 20 and 25 years old which indicates that the majority of participants are at a 
very young age or alternately said, are in the youngest age group defined for 
participants’ selection.  It is also observed that this high percentage (74%) covers a 
(100%) of the Face-to-Face participant group (60 participants), and (35%) of the Online 
participant group (40 participants).  In addition, another 10% of the Online participants 
are aged between 26 and 30 years old which is the second youngest age group.  This 
makes the percentage of the young participants aged between 20 and 30 years old as 
high as 84%.  Thus, only 16% of the participants are distributed over the remaining 5 
older age groups ranging from 31 to 51+ years old with each group spanning 5 years of 
age.   This high percentage (84%) of participants being in the youngest age group 
supports the strong positive correlation found between the age groups and the Online 
participant Group’s scores on all the three tests in which the older age group the 
participants were in, the higher the scores they tended to get. 
 
Since the majority of the participants are in a young age group, they are also expected 
to have achieved an educational level that is as early as their young age would allow 
them to have achieved.  Thus, it was found that the education level of 57 out of 60 
participants in the Face-to-Face participant group is ‘High School’; which goes in line 
with the finding that all the Face-to-Face participant group are aged between 20 and 25 
years old.  On the other hand, the education level of the majority of the Online 
participant group is a ‘Bachelor Degree’.  This is explained by the finding that the 
majority of the Online participant group are in older age groups as opposed to the Face-
to-Face participant group who are all at the youngest age group.  These results also 
conform to the findings from the correlational tests about the impact of the strong 
positive correlation between the education level and the scores where the higher an 
education level a participant had, the higher the scores they acquired on the 2nd and 3rd 




Examining the participants’ educational level and field of study revealed that there were 
10 different disciplines and study fields.  However, since the majority of participants 
were at the high school level, High School had the highest percentage of participants 
among all other fields which is 40%.  The next highest were ‘Oil and Gas’ and 
‘Information Technology’ with 17% and 13% of the participants respectively.  The 
remaining 30% of the participants are scattered in fields such as Business 
Administration, Marketing, Fine Arts, HR, and Management etc.  The fields and majors 
of study were not included in the correlational testing as the percentages are too widely 
dispersed and therefore would not produce meaningful results. 
 
The number of years participants have spent in online study is also an important factor 
that influenced scores on the 1st and 3rd assessment tests as verified by the correlational 
tests.  The statistics show that 54% of the participants have spent one year or less 
studying online.  It was observed that the education level of more than half (57%) of 
those 54% participants was ‘High School’ and therefore they were also in the age group 
of 20-25 years old and made up the majority of the Face-to-Face participant group.  The 
next highest category in the number of years of online study is those participants who 
have been studying online from 1 year up to 5+ years making 46% of all participants 
with more than half of them being trainees, whereas about 43% of these participants 
hold different jobs such as manager, senior management, team leader, regular 
employee, unemployed and others. 
 
Taking these results and linking them to the results obtained from the correlational tests 
about the strong and positive relationship found between the number of years in online 
study and the scores on the assessment tests where the higher the number of years in 




With regards to the participants’ evaluation of their ISS, 49% of them rated their ISS 
as ‘Best’ as opposed to only 2% whose rating for their ISS was ‘Worst’ on a Likert 
scale of 5.  Almost two thirds (35 participants) of the 49% who rated their ISS as ‘Best’ 
were part of the Face-to-Face participant group, aged between 20 to 25 years old and 
hold a High School education level.  The remaining 49% of the participants rated their 
ISS as ‘Excellent’ (21%), ‘Very Good’ (11%), ‘Good’ (7%) and finally 10% of the 
participants were neutral to evaluating their ISS choosing ‘Not Sure’ as their rating.  
Despite a high percentage of participants evaluating their ISS to have an excellent role 
on average in raising awareness about Phishing risks, the ISS evaluation ratings showed 
no significant correlations that would positively or negatively influence the 
participants’ scores on any of the tests. 
6.9 Participants’ Awareness Risk Residuals 
After discussion of the significant awareness improvements realized and the 
correlational relationships between the participants’ demographics and the assessment 
tests’ scores, the final part of the discussion covers how all of the above is interpreted 




The participants are positioned relative to these awareness levels as far as their achieved 
awareness levels and the residual phishing risks.  According to the findings obtained 
from the Information Security Awareness and Capability Model (ISACM) (Poepjes, 
2012) that was applied to measure the residual risk of Phishing from the results realized 
after applying the proposed SAMFP model, it has been found that 58% of the 
participants have successfully achieved the ‘Comprehension Level’ on the SAMFP 
model which is considered the middle awareness level and therefore the risk residual is 
at the ‘Comprehension Level Risk’ category.  Being at the Comprehension Level Risk 
category means that the participants are believed to be potentially protected from the 
lower level risk category namely (Perception Level Risk), but are still prone to the risks 
in their current awareness level category (Comprehension Level Risk) and beyond 
(Projection Level Risk).  Nonetheless, 41% of the participants have also successfully 
achieved the highest level of awareness namely the Projection Level and therefore are 
believed to be exposed to the lowest risk residual which is the Projection Level Risk.  
On the other hand, only 1% which is equal to 1 participant only from all participants is 
still at the preliminary awareness level of Perception and is believed to be exposed to 
the highest risk residual category.  This means that applying the proposed SAMFP has 
been successful in improving Phishing awareness for (99%) of all participants where it 
enabled more than half of the participants (58%)  to improve their awareness from the 
preliminary (Perception Level) to the next level (Comprehension Level).  Additionally 
(41%) of the participants achieved the highest level of awareness namely Projection.  
Hence, the risk of falling prey to Phishing attacks has been minimized in both awareness 
levels. 
   
Achieving the highest level of awareness which means having the lowest risk residual 
does not mean full awareness or full protection as awareness is an iterative and dynamic 
process that has to constantly deal with the evolving Phishing risk.  Achieving a certain 
awareness level e.g. the Perception level, Comprehension Level or the Projection level 
is relative to where participants are positioned within the range of their awareness risk 
levels.  Since each level has its own range, some participants could just have achieved 
awareness to be at the beginning of the level, others between the middle and the 
maximum ranges of the level.  This conclusion hereby provides an answer to the second 
research question of how awareness can be improved and sustained for online learners 
about Phishing behavioural factors. 
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Breaking down this conclusion into a more granular level to see its effect on the two 
participant groups namely the Online and the Face-to-Face groups, the analysis results 
tell us that 61% of the Face-to-Face group have achieved the Comprehension level as 
opposed to only 52% of the Online group.  This means more participants in the Online 
Group have achieved the Projection level and therefore are exposed to less risk residual 
thanks to their higher awareness levels than in the Face-to-Face Group.  Moreover the 
only participant (1%) who did not achieve higher than the preliminary Perception level 
belongs to the Face-to-Face Group.   
 
Now digging into the results with more granularity to discuss the attributes of the 
highest ranked participants who achieved the highest levels of Projection during the 
course of this research.  9 participants were selected based on their scores falling in the 
range of the Projection Level.  The first participant in the selection achieved the highest 
score of 5.86 out of 7.  6 out of the 9 participants have made gradual improvement 
manifested by their scores on the 1st Test through the 3rd Test.  This indicates that the 
awareness improvements were gradual and in line with the proposed SAMFP awareness 
model as participants learned gradually from the awareness sessions they had attended.  
Six out of the 9 highest ranked participants belong in the Online Group as opposed to 
only 3 participants from the Face-to-Face Group.   
  
From an age perspective, 7 out of the 9 highest ranked participants are aged between 
20 and 35 years old, this indicates that they are at a younger age.  Also, from the 
education perspective, 6 out of the 9 highest ranked participants (more than half) have 
a bachelor degree education level or above, this supports the conclusion from the 
statistical testing that there is a strong and positive correlation between the education 
levels and the participants’ scores. 
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Finally, the number of years spent in online learning by the highest ranked 9 participants 
does not show a meaningful pattern as 4 of the 9 participants have been studying for 5+ 
years, while the (first) participant had been studying online for less than one year, while 
the others have spent different periods in online study. This inconsistency of this 
attribute within the selected data does not conform to the findings from the Regression 
and Correlational tests conducted on the whole dataset which showed a significant, 
positive and strong correlation between the number of years in online learning and the 
participants’ scores.  As far as the 9 highest ranked participants are concerned with their 
ISS evaluations, there is no consistent pattern found.  This finding goes in line with the 
results from the Regression and correlational tests explained earlier.  Last, but not least, 
it was observed that 8 out of the 9 highest ranked participants had an average of 7 days 
between attending the two awareness sessions as opposed to longer periods for other 
participants.  However, there is no evidence from the regression or correlational tests 
that suggests any significance or indicates any relationship between the numbers of 
days elapsed and the participants’ scores on any of the three assessment tests. 
 
To summarize the findings from the analysis of the highest ranked 9 participants’ 
demographical data, it is concluded that the majority of them are from the Online 
Participant group, are aged between 20 and 35 years old, have spent 5 years or more in 
online learning, have an education level of a bachelor degree, have an average rating of 
‘Excellent’ for their ISS roles and an average of 7 days period between attending the 
two awareness sessions. 
 
To complete this discussion, the attributes of the lowest ranked participants who are 
believed to be exposed to the highest risk residuals are discussed.  16 participants were 
selected based on the lowest scores in the range of 0 to 2 out of 7.  The lowest score 
was 0.65 out of 7 with the highest risk residual recorded as 6.35 out of 7.  The selection 
based on this range resulted in 16 participants.  15 out of the 16 participants have a 
Comprehension Risk Level except for one participant who has the Perception Risk 




Analysing the 16 participants’ scores on each test reveals no consistent pattern of a 
learning curve as found with the highest ranked participants.  Despite the fact that the 
16 participants made some gradual progress on the 1st and 2nd Tests, they had an out-
of-band downside pattern on the 3rd Test as they did not do as well as on the other tests.  
Yet, some of the 16 participants got their best scores on the 3rd Test compared to their 
lowest scores on the 1st and 2nd Tests,  therefore might have benefited from attending 
the two awareness sessions before taking the 3rd Test.   However, some of the 16 
participants did not show any sign of improvement as they progressed from one test to 
the next indicating a steady pace despite attending the two awareness sessions.   
 
Probing deeper in the 16 participants’ demographic data looking for more clues that 
might explain the reasons for their low achievement, it was found that 15 out of the 16 
participants were from the Face-to-Face group which might indicate that the Online 
Group gained better awareness than the Face-to-Face group.  From an age perspective, 
all the 16 participants are aged between 20 to 25 years old which is the youngest age 
group as supported by the results of the correlational tests conducted on age groups.  
This shows that the younger the participants are, the lower the scores they tend to get.  
From the education perspective, 14 out of the 16 participants have a High School 
education level.  The majority of the 16 participants have the lowest education levels, 
which gives an indication supporting the results from the correlational tests that the 
lower education level a participants have, the lower the scores they tend to get.    
  
Finally, with regards to the number of years in online learning, the elapsed days 
between the two awareness sessions and the ISS evaluations, there were no consistent 
patterns or potential relationships found to justify the 16 participants not achieving 
higher levels of awareness.  The findings from analysing the number of years in online 
learning for the 16 participants do not conform to the results of the regression and 
correlational tests conducted on the whole dataset.  With regards to the average elapsed 
days between the two sessions, it was the only thing that was common between the 
lowest ranked and highest ranked participants which was 7 days.  However, the results 
from the correlational and regression tests did not provide any evidence of a relationship 




6.10 Research Contributions and Future Research 
The conducted research linking both realms Information Security and TEL have 
contributed the conceptual framework SAMFP which is based on a combination of 
learning theories to address the awareness residual risk in online learners in particular 
and general online users in general.   As such, the outcome of the study could indirectly 
be applicable to any type of online users in general since all online users including e-
learning users rely on the Internet and online environments which are venues for online 
Phishing attacks, to conduct their activities.  Therefore, the contributions of this 
research to knowledge are the following:  
1. Identification of the 16 Phishing Related Behavioural Factors: The 
identification of the 16 Phishing exploitable behavioural factors and the 
methods of their exploitation in Phishing attacks through the Literature review 
has provided the answer to the research’s 1st question and also fulfilled the 
research’s 1st goal by better understanding these behavioural factors.  
 
2. A snapshot of current online learners’ awareness of Phishing behavioural 
factors:  Through the 100 participants’ answers to the 1st assessment test, a 
snapshot of current awareness level in a sample of 100 online learners about 
Phishing behavioural factors has been obtained to answer the research’s 2nd 
question (RQ2). 
 
3. A novel conceptual framework model called SAMFP:  The development and 
introduction of the novel conceptual framework model ‘SAMFP’ helped raise 
participants’ awareness from preliminary awareness level (Perception) to higher 
levels e.g. ‘Comprehension’ and ‘Projection’.  This was a fulfilment of the 
research’s 2nd goal. 
 
4. Evidence of the efficacy of SAMFP in raising awareness levels in online 
learners:  The implementation of the SAMFP model to enhance online learners’ 
awareness about Phishing behavioural factors has enabled measuring awareness 
improvements and identifying awareness gaps which in turn helped in the 
assessment of the efficacy of the SAMFP model in raising awareness in online 
learners.  This has provided answers to the research’s 2nd question and helped 




Since the sampling approach taken in this research is non-random convenience 
sampling requiring participants only to be online learners regardless of any other traits 
such as specific location, discipline or culture, Therefore, the distribution of participants 
in terms of location and culture was not part of the selection strategy or the data 
analysis.  Hence, this could also be a potential opportunity to extend this in future 
research studying the effect of a particular sampling distribution that is based on 
specific demographics such as culture, nationality, location, education major or career 
on online learners’ susceptibility to Phishing attacks.    
 
This research also opens other venues for future research.  Since the focus of this 
research is online learners, further research could take the SAMFP model and apply it 
to test its efficiency for other categories of online users.  For example, applying the 
SAMFP model on gender-specific online learners, specific age group, or specific 
specialities and compare the differences in the learning outcomes with other research 
experiments such as this one.  Another opportunity for future research is to apply the 
model to a different class of users such as specific school students or a group of 
employees.   
 
Furthermore, extending the cycle of implementing the SAMFP model to include more 
iterations of awareness sessions and a bigger number of assessment tests could be 
another future expansion to this research.  Since awareness improvements in SAMFP 
are time and space dependent, extended experiments will test for more significance of 
the impact of the two dynamic variables of the SAMFP model, which can be built upon 




Finally, I would suggest to employ the SAMFP model within an organization that 
favourably and solely depends on technical controls as a silver bullet for protection 
against cyber-attacks.  This will provide a great opportunity for information security 
practitioners and researchers to study how incorporating the SAMFP model as a second 
layer of defence within that organization could benefit the organization by enhancing 
its immunity and protection against Phishing attacks.  This also goes in line with the 
principal of ‘Defence in depth’ which encourages designing security controls in layers 
where incorporating an effective cyber-security awareness model as an additional layer 
of defence can complement the technical controls already in place by greatly enhancing 









Appendix A - Statistical Testing  
 
A.1 Statistical Testing Process 
To start the statistical analysis, different attributes of the data such as data distribution 
(Bai and NG, 2005) and skewness are initially assessed and measured in order to 
determine the type of statistical tests appropriate to use on the data e.g. parametric or 
non-parametric tests.  Parametric tests are used when the data is assumed to be normally 
distributed whereas the non-parametric tests are used when the assumption of normal 
distribution is not met (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2011).  Therefore, the following 
test process is followed as in Figure 36. 
 
Figure 36 - Statistical Testing Process in this research 
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The statistical analytical testing process above starts by initially testing the data (The 
Three tests’ scores) individually for normality as normal distribution in the tested data 
is an assumption of some of the statistical tests (Shapiro and Wilk, 1965) used in the 
testing procedure which will be explained later.  Data normal distribution is tested by 
(1) comparing the data to a normal probability plot (Ghasemi and Zahediasl, 2012; 
Bandyopadhyay n.d.; Filliben, 1975), (2) using Frequency Bins and Histograms 
(Sircombe, 2004; Scott, 1979’ Tukey, 1977) to graphically draw the normal distribution 
curve of the data and (3) finally measuring the data skewness significance (Altman and 
Bland, 1996).  More on this will be discussed in detail in the data normality tests section 
later in this appendix.   
 193 
 
The testing process will branch out into two different paths depending on the result of 
the data normality tests conducted.  If the data is proven to be normally distributed, a 
set of parametric tests (Sheskin, 2003) will be used while if otherwise, a set of non-
parametric tests will be used instead.  The other assumption required by some 
parametric tests such as the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test (Ruxton, 2006; 
Febrero and Fraiman, 2004) is that compared datasets should have equal variances 
(Levene, 1960; Markowski and Markowski, 1990).  Therefore, after data normality is 
tested, F-test (Bernhardson, 1975) is used to test for variance equality between any two 
datasets or more that will be consumed by ANOVA test which is the next step in the 
testing process.    If the 3 dataset pairs (Scores of the 1st Test, 2nd Test, and 3rd Test) are 
shown to have equal variances, all 3 tests’ scores datasets are compared using ANOVA 
test to check if the differences in the mean scores between the three tests’ scores are 
significantly different.  However, the ANOVA test does not report which dataset is the 
source of the significance (Rice, 2017).  Therefore, the next step in the process is to test 
each pair of datasets individually to identify where the significance is among the three 
datasets compared.  There are two statistical tests that are appropriate for verifying the 
significance of difference between the mean scores of any two datasets compared. 
These tests are the One Sample Paired t-Test and the Two Independent Samples t-Test 
(Zimmerman, 1997; Knapp, 1978).  The One Sample Paired t-Test is used when the 
two datasets (tests’ scores) compared belong to the same sample e.g. the scores of the 
same participant group are compared between two different tests.  For example, this 
type of t-Test is used to compare the scores of all the 100 participants, the Online 
participant group and the Face-to-Face participants’ datasets individually between the 
three tests in test pairs e.g. the 1st Test and the 2nd Test pair, the 2nd Test and the 3rd Test 
pair and finally the 3rd Test and 1st Test pair.  The second type of t-Test is the Two 
Sample Independent t-Test which is used to compare the scores of two different samples 
(different participant groups) between the three test pairs and within each test.   For 
example, the Independent Sample t-Test is used to compare the mean scores of the 
Online participant group with those of the Face-to-Face participant group between the 
3 test pairs and within each test.  However, the Independent Samples t-Test comes with 
two flavours; one of which is designed to test two datasets assuming unequal variances 
whereas the other one is designed to test two datasets assuming equal variances.  Thus, 
each pair of dataset’s variance is tested for equality first.  For example, the variance 
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between the mean scores of the 1st Test and 2nd Test’s scores dataset is calculated to 
determine the right type of test to use as illustrated in Figure 38. 
On the other hand, if the data is not shown to be at an acceptable level of data normality, 
non-parametric tests (Siegel, 1956) can be used as these non-parametric tests do not 
require their underlying data to be normally distributed or to have equal variances 
(McKnight and Najab, 2010).  Similar to the parametric tests path, the first test used in 
the non-parametric process path is to compare the mean scores of all the three tests for 
significance using Kruskal-Wallis H test (Wallace, 1995).  If Kruskal-Wallis H test 
shows that the data demonstrates a significant difference between the compared mean 
scores, further non-parametric tests are to be used to identify which of the two datasets 
was the source of the significance.  The choice of the non-parametric tests for testing 
significance between the 3 individual test pairs depends on the group of participants 
involved in each test.   If the compared scores belong to the same group of participants 
(one sample) e.g. the Online participant group or the Face-to-Face participant group or 
the participants of the two groups combined, Sign Test (Dixon and Mood, 1946) and/or 
Wilcoxon Rank Sign Test (Woolson, 2008) are used.  While if the scores compared 
belong to two independent groups of participants, Mann-Whitney U Test (McKnight 
and Najab, 2010) and/or Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test (Gibbons and Chakraborti, 2011; 
Conover and Iman, 1981; Siegel, 1956) are used.   
Finally the last tests performed as part of the testing process are the Simple Regression 
Test (Pedhazur, 1997) and the Spearman Correlation Coefficient Test (Zar, 1972) used 
for the Parametric and the Non-parametric tests paths of the process respectively.  These 
two tests are used to measure the impact of participants’ attributes (independent 
variables) such as age, education, periods of online study, intervals between awareness 
sessions and role of ISS on the tests’ scores (Knofczynski and Mundfrom, 2008) and to 
use the results from these tests to predict future tests’ scores. 
The following section will explain how the data analysis using the process above was 




A.2 Testing Data Normality and Variance Equality 
The methods used for testing data normality and variance equality according to the 
testing process explained earlier and their results are described.   This is the preliminary 
work to prepare the data for further testing and analysis against the 18 stated 
hypotheses.  This data preparation includes normalizing and standardizing the scores 
first (explained earlier in Chapter 4 Sections 13-15) and then testing the data to see if it 
satisfies the assumptions of the statistical tests intended for use in the hypotheses 
analysis. 
A.3 Data Normal Distribution Tests 
The following normality tests are applied to all the 9 datasets explained earlier that 
provide all the data consumed by the statistical tests.   This preliminary step is required 
to verify whether the statistical tests’ assumptions about the data are met.  In order to 
test the normal distribution attribute of the data, two methods are used.   First, data 
skewness (Altman and Bland, 1996) was calculated and graphically compared to a 
normal probability plot (Ghasemi and Zahediasl, 2012; Bandyopadhyay n.d.; Filliben, 
1975) drawn to illustrate the level of data skewness against the normal distribution 
curve of the data.  Second and complementary to the first method, Histograms and 
Frequency Bins (Sircombe, 2004; Scott, 1979’ Tukey, 1977) are developed to 
graphically demonstrate the curve of normal distributions built into the data.  The 
objective of using multiple methods is to validate the output from one method against 




Data Skewness and the Normal Probability Plot: The normal probability plot is a 
graphical way of looking at the data to verify its normal distribution by sight.  This is 
accomplished by simply plotting the data on a scatterplot and comparing its plotted line 
against a normalized data plot (Bandyopadhyay n.d.; Filliben, 1975).  To produce a 
normalized plotted line of scores against which the original scores are compared, two 
sets of scores namely the expected scores and the z-scores corresponding to every 
original score in the data are calculated based on the probability figure obtained by 
using the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) (Abramowitz and Stegun, 1967; 
Brownlee, 1965).  Then, the original set of scores and the expected scores are both 
plotted and compared to the set of z scores; resulting in two plotted lines.  The resulting 
two plotted lines are then compared.  If the two plotted lines appear to coincide, then 
that indicates that the data is normally distributed, otherwise skewed.   
 
Even if the data appears to be skewed, yet the significance level of skewness is 
evaluated to determine if the data skewness is within an acceptable range for 
consumption by a parametric test that requires normality (Mardia, 1970). The skewness 
significance range of the data is measured by comparing the calculated skewness value 
against twice the roughly estimated standard error of skewness which is obtained by the 
following formula: “2 multiplied by the square root of the number of original scores 
divided by 6”.  This means that if skewness is within the range of twice the skewness 
standard error, it is not considered a significant normality issue (Trochim and Donnelly, 
2006).  If the measured skewness value is greater than the calculated result of the 
formula then, the data (original scores) are significantly skewed and hence cannot 
satisfy the normality requirement of the test (Shapiro and Wilk, 1965).   
 
Below are the formulas used in the previous normality test that calculate the CDF, 
Expected Value of the scores, the z-value and the significance of skewness of the 
original scores.  All the other formulas are dependent on the CDF value: 
 
 CDF = the first score’s CDF value is calculated with the formula “1 / (2 * Count 
of Scores)”.  Then the next score’s CDF value is generated by adding the 
previous CDF to the result of the formula “2 / (2 * Count of Scores)” and so on 
until the last score’s CDF value is generated. 
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 Expected Value = is calculated using the Excel Function “NORM.INVERSE 
(CDF , Mean of Scores , Standard Deviation of Scores)” 
 Z-Value = is calculated using the Excel Function “NORM.S.INVERSE(CDF)” 
 
These normality tests are applied to the 9 datasets in two rounds; once using the original 
scores and another round of tests using the standardized scores. A standardized score is 
a more normalized form of the original score which is calculated by subtracting the 
original score from the mean score and dividing it by the standard deviation of original 
scores.  It is a verification technique by which the results of conducting the normality 
tests on the original scores are validated against those of the standardized scores.  As a 
result, both rounds of tests collectively indicated that all the 9 datasets (original scores 
and standardized scores) show an acceptable level of normality that allow them to be 
consumed by the intended statistical tests.  Table 49 shows the collective normality 
tests results for both the original and standardized scores.     
Table 49 - collective normality tests results for both the original and standardized scores for the three tests 
 
Moreover, the probability plot drawn for each dataset shows relatively acceptable level 
of normal distribution for the plotted scores against the normal z-scores’ plotted line 
(Ghasemi and Zahediasl, 2012) as illustrated in Figures 37 through 42 plotting the 
original scores of the Face-to-Face and Online Groups’ participants for the 1st  2nd and 




Figure 37 - Normal Distribution test for 2nd Test scores of the Face-to-Face Group using Probablity Plot 
 




Figure 39 - Normal Distribution test for 2nd Test scores of the all participants combined using Probability Plot 
 




Figure 41 - Normal Distribution test for 3rd Test scores of the Face-to-Face Group using Probability Plot 
 
Figure 42 - Normal Distribution test for 3rd Test scores of the all participants combined  using Probability Plot 
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Frequency Bins and Histograms:  The second method to test and verify the normality 
of the data is to use the Frequency Bins and Histograms to graphically show the level 
of normal distribution curve of the data.  This is to complement and support the results 
revealed by the normal probability plot and the measured skewness significance 
obtained from the previous tests.  Frequency bins and histograms are a technique to 
visualize the distribution curve of the data by bins or buckets filled with the frequency 
(occurrences) of each score occurring at pre-set intervals (bins) over the distribution 
curve (Sircombe, 2004; Scott, 1979’ Tukey, 1977).  This test is conducted on all the 9 
datasets with their original sores and standardized scores.  The results from these 
histograms show that all the 9 datasets demonstrate a relatively similar level of 
normality with non-significant levels of skewness conforming to the results obtained 
by the previous normality plot tests.  Following are some of the histograms and bins 
shown in Figures 43 through 53 for some of the participants’ standardized scores on the 




Figure 43 - Normal Distribution test for 1st Test scores 
of the Online Group using Histograms and Bins 
 
Figure 44 - Normal Distribution test for 1st Test 
scores of the Face-to-Face Group using Histograms 
and Bins 
 
Figure 45 - Normal Distribution test for 1st Test scores 
of the Online Group using Histograms and Bins 
 
Figure 46 - Normal Distribution test for 1st Test 
scores of the Face-to-Face Group using Histograms 
and Bins 
 
Figure 47 - Normal Distribution test for 2nd Test scores 
of the Online Group using Histograms and Bins 
 
Figure 48 - Normal Distribution test for 2nd Test 






Figure 49 - Normal Distribution test for 3rd Test scores 
of the Online Group using Histograms and Bins 
 
Figure 50 - Normal Distribution test for 3rd Test 
scores of the Face-to-Face Group using Histograms 
and Bins 
 
Figure 51 - Normal Distribution test for 1st Test scores 
of all participants combined using Histograms and Bins 
 
Figure 52 - Normal Distribution test for 2nd Test 
scores of all participants combined using Histograms 
and Bins 
 
Figure 53 - Normal Distribution test for 3rd Test scores of all participants combined using Histograms and Bins 
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As illustrated by the frequency bins and histograms above, it is concluded that all tests' 
scores for both groups of participants have relatively close degrees of normal 
distributions.  However, the histograms of the Online Participant group indicate that the 
Online Group consisting of 40 participants’ scores tend to have a higher degree of 
normal distribution than that of the Face-to-Face Group which consists of 60 
participants. 
A.4 Variance Equality Testing 
Another attribute of the data which is required by some of the parametric statistical tests 
namely the Independent t-test and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) test is variance 
equality between the mean scores of the compared tests (Ruxton, 2006; Febrero and 
Fraiman, 2004).   There are two types of the Independent t-test that deal with data with 
equal variances and data with unequal variances respectively.  Thus, testing the 
variances of the compared independent samples for equality is a requirement to 
determine the right type of Intendent t-test to use.  In order to test variance equality 
between any two independent datasets, an F-test (Bernhardson, 1975) is used.  An F-
test is used to determine whether a pair of independent samples (Face-to-Face Group 
dataset versus Online Group dataset) which are compared for differences in mean 
scores, have equal variances (Box, 1953; Levene, 1960).   As such, three F-tests were 
conducted to compare the variances between the weighted mean scores of the Face-to-
Face participant group dataset versus the Online participant group dataset for the 1st, 
2nd and 3rd Tests respectively to determine if the variances between each pair of 
compared datasets were equal and hence eligible to use the Independent t-test and 




Thus, running F-test to check for variance equality between the weighted mean scores 
of the Online Participant group and the Face-to-Face Participant group on the 1st  Test 
(Face-to-Face variance = 0.04, Online variance = 0.02) indicates unequal variances 
since (F = 1.83 > F Critical Value = 1.65).   Similarly, running F-test to check the 
variances between the two groups of participants on the 3rd Test (Face-to-Face variance 
= 0.39, Online variance = 0.23) also indicates unequal variances since (F = 1.69 > F 
Critical Value = 1.65).  However running F-test on the 2nd Test (Face-to-Face variance 
= 0.30, Online variance = 0.29) indicates equal variances since (F = 1.01 < F Critical 
Value = 1.65).  On the 2nd  Test, the F Statistic of (1.01) is less than the F Critical Value 
of (1.65) indicating equal variances between the Face-to-Face Group’s weighted mean 
score (1.10) and the weighted mean score of the Online Group’s (1.30) respectively 
(Markowski and Markowski, 1990) as shown in the generated F-test results report in 
Tables 50 through 52. 
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Table 50 - F-test results for testing variance equality 
between the Face-to-Face and Online groups on 1st Test 
 
Table 51 - F-test results for testing variance equality 
between the Face-to-Face and Online groups on 3rd 
Test 
 
Table 52 - F-test results for testing variance equality between the Face-to-Face and Online groups on 2nd Test 
 
 
Despite the negative results of the F-tests on the 1st and 3rd Tests above indicating 
unequal variances, a less strict variance equality test was also conducted which yielded 
positive results indicating that the variances on the 1st and 3rd Tests are still within an 
acceptable range of equality (O’brien, 2007).   This test checks to verify whether the 
variance of the first group (Face-to-Face Group) is not greater than (<) 4 times the 
second group’s variance (Online Group) * (4).  Hence, this rule holds true for the 1st 
and 3rd Tests.  In conclusion, the results of running the F-tests as summarized in Table 
53 indicate that the compared independent samples’ datasets have equal variances only 
on the 2nd Test which qualifies them to be consumed by the Independent t-Test 
assuming Equal Variances.  While on the 1st and 3rd Tests, unequal variances resulted 
indicating the feasibility of using the other type of Independent t-Test assuming 
Unequal variances.   
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Table 53 - Summary of F-Test results for variance equality for all three tests 
 
 
Variance Equality for ANOVA:  In addition to the checks above with regards to using 
the Independent t-test, using ANOVA test to compare pairs of datasets for a specific 
group of participants’ scores between the three tests also requires equal variances.  An 
example of this is the comparison of the Online Group’s scores between the three Tests 
using ANOVA to identify if there is a significant difference between the three sets of 
scores.  Therefore, 9 additional F-tests were conducted to compare the variances of each 
participant group’s scores between the following paired tests: the 1st Test and 2nd Test, 
the 2nd Test and the 3rd Test and finally between the 3rd Test and 1st Test.   
 
Thus, running F-test to check for variance equality between the 1st and 2nd Tests’ 
weighted mean scores of the Online Participant group (1st Test Online Group variance 
= 0.02, 2nd Test Online Group variance = 0.29) indicates equal variances since (F = 0.07 
< F Critical Value = 0.59).   Similarly, running the same F-test on the Face-to-Face 
Participants’ weighted scores (1st Test Face-to-Face Group variance = 0.04, 2nd Test 
Face-to-Face Group variance = 0.30) also indicates equal variances since (F = 0.12 < F 
Critical Value = 0.65).   Equally, running F-Test on all participants combining both 
groups (1st Test All Participants variance = 0.03, 2nd Test All Participants variance = 
0.30) still indicates equal variances since (F = 0.10 < F Critical Value = 0.72).  Tables 
54, 55 and 56 show the F-Tests results accordingly. 
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Table 54- F-test results for variance equality between 
1st and 2nd Tests scores for the Online Group 
 
Table 55 - F-test results for variance equality between 
1st and 2nd Tests scores for the Face-to-Face Group 
 





In the same way, running F-test to check for variance equality between the 2nd and 3rd 
Tests’ weighted mean scores of the Online Participant group (2nd Test Online Group 
variance = 0.29, 3rd Test Online Group variance = 0.23) indicates equal variances since 
(F = 1.27 < F Critical Value = 1.70).   However, running the same F-test on the Face-
to-Face Participants’ weighted scores (2nd Test Face-to-Face Group variance = 0.30, 3rd 
Test Face-to-Face Group variance = 0.39) indicates unequal variances since (F = 0.76 
> F Critical Value = 0.65).   Overall, running F-Test on all participants combining both 
groups (2nd Test All Participants variance = 0.30, 3rd Test All Participants variance = 
0.33) yet indicates unequal variances since (F = 0.91 > F Critical Value = 0.72).  Tables 
57, 58 and 59 show the F-Tests results accordingly.   Despite the results of the F-tests 
on the Face-to-Face participants in particular and the overall participants on the 2nd and 
3rd Tests indicating unequal variances, these variances are still within an acceptable 
range of equality since the variances on the 2nd Test are not greater than 4 times the 
variances on the 3rd Test (O’brien, 2007) for the Face-to-Face Group and for all 
participants in general.  Therefore, these two groups of participants’ scores are 
considered to have equal variances between the 2nd and 3rd Tests.   
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Table 57 - F-test results for variance equality between 2nd 
and 3rd Tests scores for the Online Group 
 
Table 58 - F-test results for variance equality 
between 2nd and 3rd Tests scores for the Face-to-
Face Group 
 
Table 59 - F-test results for variance equality between 2nd and 3rd Tests scores for all participants combined 
 
 
Finally, running F-test to check for variance equality between the 3rd and 1st Tests’ 
weighted mean scores of the Online Participant group (3rd Test Online Group variance 
= 0.23, 1st Test Online Group variance = 0.02) indicates unequal variances since (F = 
11.49 > F Critical Value = 1.70).   Similarly, running the F-test on the Face-to-Face 
Participants’ weighted scores (3rd Test Face-to-Face Group variance = 0.39, 1st Test 
Face-to-Face Group variance = 0.04) also indicates unequal variances since (F = 10.61 
> F Critical Value = 1.54).   Overall, running F-Test on all participants combining both 
groups (3rd Test All Participants variance = 0.33, 1st Test All Participants variance = 
0.03) still indicates unequal variances since (F = 11.06 > F Critical Value = 1.39).  
Tables 60, 61 and 62 show the F-Tests results accordingly. 
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Table 60 - F-test results for variance equality between 3rd 
and 1st Tests scores for the Online Group 
 
Table 61 - F-test results for variance equality 
between 3rd and 1st Tests scores for the Face-to-Face 
Group 
 
Table 62 - F-test results for variance equality between 3rd and 1st Tests scores for all participants combined 
 
In conclusion, the results of the F-tests conducted above summarized in Table 63 
indicate that the variances between the 1st Test and 2nd Test and between the 2nd Test 
and 3rd Test for all the participant groups are equal and that the assumption of variance 
equality is met and hence qualifies the datasets of these groups to be consumed by the 
ANOVA test.  However, the variances between the scores of the 3rd Test and the 1st 
Test are unequal rendering ANOVA test inappropriate for use with these datasets.  In 
that case, the non-parametric test kruskal-Wallis H test (Wallace, 1995) will be used as 
an alternative test. 
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Table 63 - Summary of all F-tests' results 
 
 
Now that the data have been checked for normality and variance equality, the 







Appendix B – List of the 18 Hypotheses  
Null Hypothesis (1a): There is no significant difference between the mean scores of 
the Online Group and the Face-to-Face Group on the 1st Test.  In other words, there is 
no significant difference between the Online participants and the Face-to-Face 
participants in the ‘Perception’ level of awareness about Phishing. 
 
Alternate Hypothesis (1b):  There is a significant difference between the mean 
scores of the Online Group and the Face-to-Face Group on the 1st Test.  In other 
words, there is a statistically significant difference between the Online 
participants and the Face-to-Face participants in the ‘Perception’ level of 
awareness about Phishing as statistically manifested by the 1st Test’s scores.  If 
the result of the statistical test does not significantly support the Null hypothesis 
and hence supports the Alternate hypothesis, the participant group with the 
higher mean score will be the group whose participants have a better Perception 
awareness level than that of the other group.  
 
Null Hypothesis (2a): There is no significant difference between the mean scores of 
the Online Group and the Face-to-Face Group on the 2nd Test.  In other words, there is 
no significant difference between the Online participants and the Face-to-Face 
participants in the ‘Comprehension’ level of awareness about Phishing after attending 
the 1st awareness session. 
 
Alternate Hypothesis (2b):  There is a significant difference between the mean 
scores of the Online Group and the Face-to-Face Group on the 2nd Test.  In other 
words, there is a statistically significant difference between the Online 
participants and the Face-to-Face participants in the ‘Comprehension’ level of 
awareness about Phishing after attending the 1st awareness session.  
 
Null Hypothesis (3a): There is no significant difference between the mean scores of 
the Online Group and the Face-to-Face Group on the 3rd Test.  In other words, there is 
no significant difference between the Online participants and the Face-to-Face 





Alternate Hypothesis (3b):  There is a significant difference between the mean 
scores of the Online Group and the Face-to-Face Group on the 3rd Test.  In other 
words, there is a statistically significant difference between the Online 
participants and the Face-to-Face participants in the ‘Projection’ level of 
awareness about Phishing after attending the 2nd awareness session.   
 
Null Hypothesis (4a): There is no significant difference between the mean scores 
acquired by the Online participant group on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Tests.  In other words, 
there is no statistically significant difference between the three tests’ scores for the 
Online participant group that will indicate gradual improvements in participant 
awareness from the Perception Level to the Comprehension level and then finally to the 
Projection Level after attending the two awareness sessions respectively. 
 
Alternate Hypothesis (4b): There is a significant difference between the mean 
scores acquired by the Online participant group on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Tests.  In 
other words, there is a statistically significant difference between the three tests’ 
scores for the Online participant group that will indicate gradual improvements 
in participant awareness from the Perception Level to the Comprehension level 
and then finally to the Projection Level after attending the two awareness 
sessions respectively.  
  
Null Hypothesis (5a): There is no significant difference between the mean scores 
acquired by the Face-to-Face participant group on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Tests.  In other 
words, there is no statistically significant difference between the three tests’ scores for 
the Face-to-Face participant group that will indicate gradual improvements in 
participant awareness from the Perception Level to the Comprehension level and then 




Alternate Hypothesis (5b): There is a significant difference between the mean 
scores acquired by the Face-to-Face participant group on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd 
Tests.  In other words, there is a statistically significant difference between the 
three tests’ scores for the Face-to-Face participant group that will indicate 
gradual improvement in participant awareness from the Perception Level to the 
Comprehension level and then finally to the Projection Level after attending the 
two awareness sessions respectively. 
 
Null Hypothesis (6a): There is no significant difference between the mean scores 
acquired by all participants on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Tests.  In other words, there is no 
statistically significant difference between the three tests’ scores for all participants that 
will indicate gradual improvements in participant awareness from the Perception Level 
to the Comprehension level and then finally to the Projection Level after attending the 
two awareness sessions respectively. 
 
Alternate Hypothesis (6b): There is a significant difference between the mean 
scores acquired by all participants on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Tests.  In other words, 
there is a statistically significant difference between the three tests’ scores for 
all participants that will indicate gradual improvements in participant awareness 
from the Perception Level to the Comprehension level and then finally to the 
Projection Level after attending the two awareness sessions respectively. 
 
Null Hypothesis (7a): There is no statistically significant difference between the mean 
scores on the 2nd Test and the 1st Test for all participants.  In other words, the mean 
scores on the 2nd Test is not significantly higher or lower than the mean scores on the 
1st Test for all participants. 
 
Alternate Hypothesis (7b): There is a statistically significant difference 
between the mean scores on the 2nd Test and the 1st Test for all participants.  In 
other words, the mean scores on the 2nd Test is significantly higher or lower than 
the mean scores on the 1st Test for all participants. 




Null Hypothesis (8a): There is no statistically significant difference between the mean 
scores on the 2nd Test and the 1st Test for the Online participant group.  In other words, 
the mean scores on the 2nd Test is not significantly higher or lower than the mean scores 
on the 1st Test for the Online participant group. 
 
Alternate Hypothesis (8b): There is a statistically significant difference 
between the mean scores on the 2nd Test and the 1st Test for the Online 
participant group.  In other words, the mean scores on the 2nd Test is 
significantly higher or lower than the mean scores on the 1st Test for the Online 
participant group. 
 
Null Hypothesis (9a): There is no statistically significant difference between the mean 
scores on the 2nd Test and the 1st Test for the Face-to-Face participant group.  In other 
words, the mean scores on the 2nd Test is not significantly higher or lower than the mean 
scores on the 1st Test for the Face-to-Face participant group. 
 
Alternate Hypothesis (9b): There is a statistically significant difference 
between the mean scores on the 2nd Test and the 1st Test for the Face-to-Face 
participant group.  In other words, the mean scores on the 2nd Test is 
significantly higher or lower than the mean scores on the 1st Test for the Face-
to-Face participant group.   
 
Null Hypothesis (10a): There is no statistically significant difference between the 
mean scores on the 3rd Test and the 2nd Test for all participants.  In other words, the 
mean scores on the 3rd Test is not significantly higher or lower than the mean scores on 
the 2nd Test for all participants. 
 
Alternate Hypothesis (10b): There is a statistically significant difference 
between the mean scores on the 3rd Test and the 2nd Test for all participants.  In 
other words, the mean scores on the 3rd Test is significantly higher or lower than 




Null Hypothesis (11a): There is no statistically significant difference between the 
mean scores on the 3rd Test and the 2nd Test for the Online participant group.  In other 
words, the mean score on the 3rd Test is not significantly higher or lower than the mean 
scores on the 2nd Test for the Online participant group. 
Alternate Hypothesis (11b): There is a statistically significant difference 
between the mean scores on the 3rd Test and the 2nd Test for the Online 
participant group.  In other words, the mean scores on the 3rd Test is 
significantly higher or lower than the mean scores on the 2nd Test for the Online 
participant group. 
 
Null Hypothesis (12a): There is no statistically significant difference between the 
mean scores on the 3rd Test and the 2nd Test for the Face-to-Face participant group.  In 
other words, the mean scores on the 3rd Test is not significantly higher or lower than 
the mean scores on the 2nd Test for the Face-to-Face participant group. 
 
Alternate Hypothesis (12b): There is a statistically significant difference 
between the mean scores on the 3rd Test and the 2nd Test for the Face-to-Face 
participant group.  In other words, the mean scores on the 3rd Test is 
significantly higher or lower than the mean scores on the 2nd Test for the Face-
to-Face participant group.   
 
Null Hypothesis (13a): There is no statistically significant difference between the 
mean scores on the 3rd Test and the 1st Test for all participants.  In other words, the 
mean scores on the 3rd Test is not significantly higher or lower than the mean scores on 
the 1st Test for all participants. 
 
Alternate Hypothesis (13b): There is a statistically significant difference 
between the mean scores on the 3rd Test and the 1st Test for all participants.  In 
other words, the mean scores on the 3rd Test is significantly higher or lower 




Null Hypothesis (14a): There is no statistically significant difference between the 
mean scores on the 3rd Test and the 1st Test for the Online participant group.  In other 
words, the mean scores on the 3rd Test is not significantly higher or lower than the mean 
scores on the 1st Test for the Online participant group. 
 
 
Alternate Hypothesis (14b): There is a statistically significant difference 
between the mean scores on the 3rd Test and the 1st Test for the Online 
participant group.  In other words, the mean scores on the 3rd Test is 
significantly higher or lower than the mean scores on the 1st Test for the Online 
participant group. 
 
Null Hypothesis (15a): There is no statistically significant difference between the 
mean scores on the 3rd Test and the 1st Test for the Face-to-Face participant group.  In 
other words, the mean scores on the 3rd Test is not significantly higher or lower than 
the mean scores on the 1st Test for the Face-to-Face participant group. 
 
Alternate Hypothesis (15b): There is a statistically significant difference 
between the mean scores on the 3rd Test and the 1st Test for the Face-to-Face 
participant group.  In other words, the mean scores on the 3rd Test is 
significantly higher or lower than the mean scores on the 1st Test for the Face-
to-Face participant group.   
 
Null Hypothesis (16a): The independent variables (Participants' Age, Education level 
and Years of online study) do not significantly impact the scores (dependent variable) 
on the 1st Test.  In other words, participants’ attributes do not significantly affect the 
scores on the 1st Test and hence cannot accurately be used to predict participants’ scores 
on future tests. 
 
Alternate Hypothesis (16b): The independent variables (Participants' Age, 
Education level and Years of online study) significantly impact the scores 
(dependent variable) on the 1st Test.  In other words, participants’ attributes can 
significantly affect the scores on the 1st Test and hence can be used to predict 




Null Hypothesis (17a): The independent variables (Participants' Age, Education level 
and Years of online study) do not significantly impact the scores (dependent variable) 
on the 2nd Test.  In other words, participants’ attributes do not significantly affect the 
scores on the 2nd Test and hence cannot accurately be used to predict participants’ scores 
on future tests. 
Alternate Hypothesis (17b): The independent variables (Participants' Age, 
Education level and Years of online study) significantly impact the scores 
(dependent variable) on the 2nd Test.  In other words, participants’ attributes can 
significantly affect the scores on the 2nd Test and hence can be used to predict 
participants’ scores on future tests. 
 
Null Hypothesis (18a): The independent variables (Participants' Age, Education level 
and Years of online study) do not significantly impact the scores (dependent variable) 
on the 3rd Test.  In other words, participants’ attributes do not significantly affect the 
scores on the 3rd Test and hence cannot accurately be used to predict participants’ scores 
on future tests. 
 
Alternate Hypothesis (18b): The independent variables (Participants' Age, 
Education level and Years of online study) significantly impact the scores 
(dependent variable) on the 3rd Test.  In other words, participants’ attributes can 
significantly affect the scores on the 3rd Test and hence can be used to predict 




Appendix C – Consent Form  
Below is a screenshot of the online consent form participants signed before starting 
their participation in this research.  This consent form is part of the 1st Test that 
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